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Summary 
This study examines the impact of the Marshall Plan on the British Labour 
government and the trade union movement. It argues that the British government 
was able to 'manage' relations with the US in terms of limiting unwanted US 
influence, while restructuring relations with its domestic support base. in this 
way, the British government was able to play what Putnam has referred to as a 
two-level game, satisfying demands at both the national and international levels. 
The Marshall Plan provides evidence of how, as Putnam explains, 'central 
decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives 
simultaneously. ' By drawing on TUC archives it shows how the government and 
the leadership of the TUC used the Marshall Plan to realign the unions and 
increase their control over the labour movement. 
The study rejects arguments that the Labour government was forced to change its 
policies because of the Marshall Plan. Instead it shows that the Labour 
government used American pressure to persuade its own constituents of the value 
of its policies. The government and trade union leaderships were able control 
those on the left through an anti-communist campaign while removing 
communists from positions of authority. Through its role in the establishment of 
an anti-communist, pro-Marshall Plan international trade union body, the British 
Trades Union Congress weakened the left's source of external support. The 
establishment of a network of pro-Marshall Plan organisations such as the 
European Recovery Programme Trade Union Advisory Committee and the 
Anglo-American Council on Productivity, helped the trade union leadership to 
delineate the parameters of debate and to assure the longer-term marginalisation 
of the far left. 
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Introduction 
Introduction and Arguments 
The aim of this study is to examine the significance of the Marshall Plan for the 
British labour movement. Much has been written on the impact of the Marshall 
Plan on the recipient European states, on their economies, politics, and on 
various domestic actors. This study maintains that these approaches tend to treat 
the recipients of US aid as passive, and not as active political agents in their own 
right. Thus, while this study analyses the impact of the Marshall Plan on the 
British Labour government and the trade union movement, it is also 
fundamentally concerned with the way these actors used the Marshall Plan for 
their own purposes. It sees the relationship between donor and recipient, and 
between international and domestic politics, as complex, and not explicable in 
terms of a one-way causal analysis. While Marshall Aid gave the US an 
opportunity to influence the British Labour government, it also gave the British 
government an opportunity to influence the US administration, and to exert 
influence over its own domestic constituency. The significance of the thesis lies 
in its focus on this latter issue. 
There are two main academic approaches to the Marshall Plan that this work is 
particularly concerned with. Firstly, there are macro accounts written within the 
context of an international relations and international political economy 
2 
framework, such as the work by Cox and Van der Pijl. 1 These draw on theoretical 
assumptions to make substantive arguments, in particular about the significance 
of US hegemony in the postwar period. Often these accounts have over-stated the 
power of the US to rework the postwar order, and as such can be criticised as 
being overly determinist. More recently, Lundestad has emphasised that US 
hegemony in Europe 'was to a large extent an empire by invitation'. Ikenberry 
has made a similar argument, while highlighting that each. European country 
sought to use American hegemonic power for its own national purposes. 2 
However, most of these authors do not provide much in the way of detailed 
research to back up their arguments. Their grand theoretical claims sound 
plausible, but there is a lack of empirical research with which to test them. 
The second type of account of the Marshall Plan that this study is particularly 
concerned with is that produced by labour and economic historians, such as 
Carew and Tomlinson. 3 These authors often produce incredibly detailed, 
thorough, micro-level research, but they do not make, explicit their theoretical 
concerns. They also tend to approach their topics within a national framework 
and ignore the wider, international implications. While there have been valuable 
accounts of the Marshall Plan produced within the past decade which do combine 
1 Robert Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making offfistory, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1987; Kees Van der Pijl, The Making ofan Atlantic 
Ruling Class, London: Verso, 1984. 
2 Geir Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-19521, 
Peace Research, Vol. 23, No. 3,1986, p. 263, and The American "Empire", Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990, p. 56; John G. Ikenberry 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony', 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 104, No. 4,1989, pp. 376 & 399. 
3 Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1987; Jim Tomlinson, 'A Missed Opportunity? Labour and the Productivity Problem, 1945-5 V, 
in G. Jones & M. Kirby, (eds. ) Competitiveness and the State, Manchester: Manchester 
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detailed research with a broader analysis, these have been from- a US 
perspective, 4 or concerned more with the economic aspects of the Marshall Plan 
5 
rather than with an analysis of the political situation. 
The contribution of this study is that it bridges the two approaches highlighted 
above. It begins with many of the concerns of the labour and economic historians 
but places them within a broader context of explanation and analysis. It also 
shows that approaches that treat the impact of the Marshall Plan in a narrowly 
national context tend to underestimate the international factors. By drawing on 
arguments surrounding the establishment and the exercise of US hegemony 
through the Marshall Plan, this study looks at the impact of the Marshall Plan on 
relations between and within states. It takes Britain as a case study, with the 
relationship between the Labour government and the trade union movement as its 
specific focus. Using detailed archival research to build up what could be called a 
narrative-analysis-interpretation structure, 6 this work argues that the British 
government was able to play several games at once within the context of the 
Marshall Plan. It was able to play what Putnam refers to as a 'two-level game'. 
7 
University Press, 199 1, pp. 40-59, and Tomlinson, 'The Failure of the Anglo-American Council 
on Productivity'. Business History, Vol. 33, No. 1,199 1, pp. 82-92. 
4 Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan, America, Britain, and the reconstruction ofwestern 
Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; Melvyn Leffler, 'The United 
States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan', Diplomatic History, Vol. 12, No. 3, 
pp. 277-306, and A Preponderance ofPower. National Security, the Truman Administration and 
the Cold War, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992. 
-5 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, London: Methuen, 1984; 
Imanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited the European Recovery Programme in Economic 
Perspective, London: Greenwood, 1983. 
6 See the Methodological Appendix for an explanation of this. 
7 Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', Appendix 
in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds. ), Double-EdgedDiplomacy: 
International Bargaining and International Politics, Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1993, pp. 431-468. 
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The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a 
two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests 
by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians 
seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the 
international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of 
foreign developments! 
This study argues that the British government was able to 'manage' relations with 
the US, in terms of limiting unwanted US influence, while 'managing' or 
manipulating relations with its domestic support base. In particular, the 
goverranent and the leadership of the TUC used the Marshall Plan to restructure 
the unions and establish their hegemony over the labour movement. Thus, the 
findings of this work do support some of the more macro-level claims, such as 
those by Ikenberry, but they do so from the standpoint of a detailed study of a 
specific aspect of the Marshall Plan. They also add a new level of analysis to the 
historiography of postwar Labour Britain. 
Interaction between International and Domestic Politics 
The analytical framework of this study is underpinned by the view that 
international relations and the international system impact upon domestic politics 
and, importantly, domestic actors draw upon the international system to buttress 
their political activities and policies. As Gourevitch puts it, 'International 
relations and domestic politics are ... so interrelated that they should be analyzed 
simultaneously, as wholes. '9 Thus, events such as the Marshall Plan can be most 
profitably understood with reference to both domestic and international relations 
Ibid., p. 436. 
Peter Gourevitch, 'The Second Image Reversed: the International Sources of Domestic Politics', 
International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4, Autumn 1978, p. 91 1. 
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and politics, and as a type of two-level game where the 'central decision-makers 
strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously. " 0 
Hence, a concept such as hegemony, which can be used to describe domestic and 
international power relations, is particularly useful for analysing the impact and 
the uses of the Marshall Plan. While the Marshall Plan is often presented in tenns 
of its impact upon the recipient states within a system of US hegemony, it is 
important to note that those states in turn influenced the extent and nature of this 
imPact, and of US hegemony in general. One of the main theoretical currents that 
flows through the thesis is that there are limits to such external influence because 
of the strength of domestic actors. Recipients of American aid were not passive, 
but active political agents in their own right. Correspondingly, domestic actors 
are able to draw upon external factors in order to pursue their own objectives and . 
strengthen their own position. The external factors which can affect domestic 
regimes, as Gourevitch points out, include 'the distribution of power among 
states, or the international state system; and the distribution of economic activity 
and wealth, or the international economy. "' Significantly, Gourevitch also refers 
to other external forces, such as ideas or ideology, as important in its impact. 
Thus, lines of ideological tension, such as fascism, communism and bourgeois 
democracy fighting against each other, shape not only the international system 
but intemal politics as well. 12 
As a consequence of the focus on the interaction of the domestic and 
international, and because of nature of the topic of the Marshall Plan and British 
10 Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics', p. 459. 
11 Peter Gourevitch, 'The Second Image Reversed', pp. 882-883. 
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labour, this study embraces many types of approach and literatures. It attempts to 
combine the study of 'high politics', of policy-makers and government, with that 
of the working class and trade union perceptions of the Marshall Plan in Britain. 
Furthermore the study combines macro with micro approaches. The first section 
of the thesis focuses on the former with an overview of the literature on the 
Marshall Plan, the circumstances surrounding the announcement of the 
programme and the subsequent scale and impact of the Marshall Plan. The 
second section focuses on the specific questions relating to the Marshall Plan, the 
Labour govenunent and trade union leaderships, and the rank and file of the trade 
union movement encompasses both macro and micro approaches, high and low 
politics. The underlying concept that ties both of these focuses together is that of 
hegemony. 
Hegemony, Power and the Marshall Plan 
The concept of hegemony has been widely used in international relations, and, 
more recently, international political economy literature to analyse the postwar 
world order, with the United States at the helm of a multilateral free trade regime. 
As Keohane puts it, people look back to the postwar era as one in which 'a single 
power, possessing superiority of economic and military resources, implemented a 
plan for international order based on its interests and its vision of the world. ' 13 
The Marshall Plan was one of the main instruments through which America 
established its hegemony, though the extent to which hegemony was a deliberate 
policy objective is open to debate. Gaddis, for instance, has suggested that US 
12 Ibid., p. 883. 
13 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 3 1. 
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influence and hegemony was established in an incremental manner, as a 
consequence, rather than as an objective, of US policy in the early postwar 
years. 14 However, the use of the concept of hegemony is complicated because it 
is used, in two ways, firstly, to mean domination, and secondly, to mean 
leadership, implying some notion of consent. Within the international relations 
literature realist writers have emphasised the first definition of the concept, and 
neo-Gramscians have emphasised the second. As Robert Cox points out, 
Antonio Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to express a unity between 
objective material forces and ethico-political ideas - in Marxian terms, a unity 
of structure and superstructure - in which power based on dominance over 
production is rationalized through an ideology incorporating compromise or 
consensus between dominant and subordinate groups. 15 
While realists tend to focus on the use of relational power by the hegemon, that 
is, the ability of one state to affect the actions of another, neo-Gramscians focus 
more on structural power. Structural power can be seen as 'the power to shape 
and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other 
states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their 
scientists and other professional people have to operate. ' 16 Relational power is 
similar to the conception of power used by Robert Dahl, that 'A has power over 
B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do'. 17 Structural power is more associated with what Lukes calls the two- 
dimensional and three-dimensional views of power. 18 The two-dimensional view, 
14 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace. Inquiries Into the History ofthe Cold War, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 60-6 1. 
15 Robert Cox, 'Labor and Hegemony', International Organization, Vol. 3 1, No. 3,1977, p. 3 87. 16 Susan Strange, States and Markets, (2 nd edn. ), London: Pinter, 1994, pp. 24-25. 
17 Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', Behavioural Science, Vol. 2,1957, pp. 202-3. 18 Steven Lukes, Power. A Radical View, London: Macmillan, 1974. 
8 
as propounded by Bachrach and Baratz, 19 relates to the ability of some groups to 
control the political agenda, to prevent certain issues reaching the political arena, 
which draws on Schattschneider's 'mobilisation of bias': 
All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of 
some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is 
the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others 
are organized out. 20 
While the one-dimensional view relates to decision-making, the two dimensional 
view relates to non-decision making. The three-dimensional view of power is that 
'A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, 
but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his 
very wants. 21 This ties in with the neo-Gramscian view of hegemony, where the 
term is used to mean, 
a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that 
permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities. In a hegemonic 
order these values and understandings are relatively stable and unquestioned. 
They appear to most actors as the natural order. Such a structure of meanings 
is underpinned by a structure of power, in which most probably one state is 
dominant but that state's dominance in itself is not sufficient to create 
hegemony. Hegemony derives from the ways of doing and thinking of the 
dominant social strata of the dominant state or states insofar as these ways of 
doing and thinking have acquired the acquiescence of the dominant social 
strata of other states. 22 
This study draws on the concept of hegemony in a Gramscian sense, meaning 
leadership, rather than domination, based on the notions of consent and 
" Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 56,1962, pp. 947-52, and 'Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework', 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 57,1963, pp. 632-642. 
20 E. E. Schnattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View ofDemocracy in 
America, (reissued edn. ), Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1975, p. 69. First published New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. 
21 Lukes, Power, p. 23. 
22 Robert Cox, 'Towards a Post-hegemonic Conceptualisation of World Order: Reflections on the 
Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', in James Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds. ), Governance without 
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consensus. It is used in two ways, in terms of relations between Britain and the 
United States, and in terms of social and political relations within Britain. Thus 
an underlying thread throughout the study is that hegemony is not simply about 
relations between states, but relations within states. This is brought out by the 
study of the relationship between the govenunent, the trade union leadership and 
its membership base, in particular with reference to the two main trade union 
organisations arising out of the Marshall Plan, the Anglo-American Council on 
Productivity and the European Recovery Programme Trade Union Advisory 
Committee. 
The findings of this research support the hypothesis formulated in some of the 
macro-theoretical international political economy approaches to the influence of 
the US in the postwar era, namely that 'US hegemony in Europe was largely an 
empire by invitation', and that each European country sought to use American 
hegemonic power for its own national purposes. 
23 However, it does so from a 
detailed empirical study of the impact of the Marshall Plan in Britain. This study 
therefore rejects arguments developed in some of the literature that Marshall Aid 
was used by the United States to exercise relational power in order to push the 
British Labour government off its socialist course (referred to by Burnham as the 
'capitulation' thesis). 24 Thus, this study argues that while the Marshall Plan was 
one of the instruments through which the United States established its structural 
Government., Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992, p. 140. 23 Ikenberry, 'Rethinking the origins of American Hegemony, pp. 376 & 399. 
24 Peter Burnham, The Political Economy ofPostwar Reconstruction, London: Macmillan, 1990, 
p. 5, referring, for example, to T. Brett, S. Gilliatt and A. Pople, 'Planned Trade, Labour Party 
Policy and US Intervention: The Success and Failures of Post-War Reconstruction', History 
Workshop, No. 13,1982, pp. 13 0-142. 
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power in the postwar era, it was not successfully used as an exercise in relational 
power with regard to Britain. This argument is addressed in the review of the 
approaches to the Marshall Plan in Chapter 1, and more fully in the analysis of 
the Marshall Plan in Chapter 3. 
While the study addresses the question of the extent to which the United States 
was able to use this hegemony through the Marshall Plan to influence Britain, the 
question which is at the heart of the analysis is the way in which British actors 
used the issues and events surrounding the Marshall Plan for their own political 
purposes. Therefore, the main hypothesis of this thesis stipulates that the British 
Labour government, with the centre-right of the trade union leadership, 
successfully manipulated the whole issue of the European Recovery Programme 
in an attempt to establish its hegemony over the labour movement. This was at a 
time when the left, particularly the 'hard' or 'militant' left in the unions, was 
strong and well organised '25 and when the 
international situation immediately 
after the war was potentially unstable with public support for the Soviet Union 
and for communism. Thus, the Labour government and the trade union leadership 
used the Marshall Plan to establish some degree of management over the 
labour 
movement. This involved entrenching their own power over the trade union 
membership and delineating the parameters of political debate, at a time when 
international perceptions of the Soviet Union were hotly debated. 
25 The terms 'hard', or 'militant' left, will be used at times for the sake of ease of analysis, 
denoting those on the communist and non-communist 'far left' of the movement. These two terms 
are unsatisfactory in that they can be interpreted in a value-laden way. However, they are used in 
other studies of the 1945 Labour government, for example, Jonathan Schneer, 'Hopes Deferred or 
11 
This hypothesis reflects but undermines some of the existing work on the 
Marshall Plan. According to Kees Van der Pijl, the Marshall Plan 'led to a 
concrete transformation of the European class structure along the lines of the US 
model. -)26 Van der Pijl tends to take the perspective that changes in the class 
structure in Europe, while established with the co-operation of the Social 
Democrat parties, were imposed by the US administration. However, the 
strongest interpretation arising from this study, which includes detailed research 
using the archives of the trade union movement, is that British union leaders, 
acting in concert with the Labour government, were able to manipulate the issue 
of the Marshall Plan in order to restructure internal relations within Britain. This 
occurred because it was felt to be in the interests of the Labour goverment and 
the trade union leadership to do so, and not because of pressure exerted by the 
United States. Thus, this study argues that the British government was able to 
pursue a policy of what Bayart refers to as extraversion, 
27 whereby leading actors 
in a state mobilise resources from the external environment (in this case 
American hegemony based on free trade, mass production and anti-communism) 
to consolidate their own power, in the process of political centralisation and 
accumulation. Thus, they pursue their own agenda, rather than the one set by the 
donor nation, an agenda that is defined by their location within the domestic 
arena. In this way, the Labour govenunent and the trade union leadership 
manipulated the conditions created by US hegemony, and, more specifically, the 
Shattered: The British Labour Left and the Third Force Movement, 1945-49', Journal ofModern 
History, Vol. 56, No. 2, p. 214. 
26 Van der Pij 1, The Making ofan, 411antic Ruling Class, p. 13 8. 
27 J. F. Bayart, The State inAfrica, London: Longmans, 1993, pp. 21-23. 
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Marshall Plan. This was possible because of the nature of the relationship 
between the government and organised labour at this time. 
The Trade Union/Government Relationship 
The relationship between the 1945 Labour government and the trade unions was 
complex. The election of a Labour government meant that, 
The trade-union movement finally and triumphally achieved the political 
power which had prompted the formation of the Labour party in 1900 and the 28 
reform in the movement and the party in 1918. 
Ernest Bevin, from the Transport and General Workers Union, was Foreign 
Secretary, and there were five other union-sponsored MPs in the Cabinet. Out of 
the total of 393 Labour MPs, 120 of them were trade union sponsored. However, 
according to Coates, 'the unions were, in spite of their improved image of 
respectability, very much less powerful in determining hard policy than had been 
thought. '29 Both these views can be seen as correct: the trade unions did have a 
relationship with the Labour government which in some ways was 
unprecedented, but, this did not automatically mean that they had control over 
political and economic decision making. 
As Middlemas, Hinton and Hyman have argued, unions are central to the 
governing of the working class and the regulation of labour. 30 According to 
Middlemas, a 'new form of harmony' between the government and trade unions 
28 Denis Barnes and Eileen Reid, 'A New Relationship: Trade Unions in the Second World War', 
in Ben Pimlott and Chris Cook (eds. ), Trade Unions in British Politics, London: Longman, 1982, 
165. 
Ken Coates, 'The Vagaries of Participation', in Pimlott and Cook (eds. ), Trade Unions in 
British Politics, p. 177. 
13 
had actually been established in the decade 1916 to 1926, and not during the 
years of the Second World War: 'earlier than in any other industrial country, 
British governments began to make the avoidance of crises their first priority. 31 
This was because the goverment perceived that 'The line of greatest social 
conflict ... lay through 
industrial politics. ' Co-operation between govermnent 
and the two sides of industry, 'led to the elevation of trade unions and employers' 
associations to a new sort of status: from interest groups they became "governing 
institutions". ' Realisation of this through institutionalisation meant that 
'Equilibrium was maintained because the governing institutions came to share 
some of the political power and attributes of the state'. Middlemas refers to this 
as corporate bias. 32 
There was, however, a quid pro quo for the increased power of organisations 
such as the trade unions, since 
the claims of governing institutions to a share of state power and enhanced 
status rested on their acceptance of fundamental national aims and their 
abandonment in practice (though not on the public platform) of the ideology 
of class conflict. Thus there grew up a new range of conflicts between them 
and their constituencies. In spite of a long attempt to impose more central 
control, TUC and employers' organisations failed to make their institutions 
fully representative according to the models obligingly proffered by corporate 
theorists, and because their association with the state remained vulnerable to 
revolt from below, they took care to veil it as far as possible. All partners to 
this political contract had a vested interest in secrecy; none was able to 
dispense with political education and the manipulation of opinion in its own 
sphere, because each feared the power of opposition from within its own 
organisation. 33 
30 Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society, London: Andre Deutsch, 1979; James Hinton, 
Labour and Socialism, London: Wheatsheaf, 1983; Richard Hyman, Industrial Relations: A 
Marxist Introduction, London: Macmillan, 1975. 
31 Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society, p. 18. 
32 Ibid., p. 20. 
33 Ibid., p. 2 1. 
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Thus, the immediate postwar Labour Party leaders such as Attlee and Bevin, and 
trade union leaders such as Arthur Deakin, Tom Williamson and Will Lawther, 
adhered to the doctrine that 'it was the prior aim of government to prevent crisis 
and class confrontation, and of the institutions to assist. 34 While this did mean 
that the trade union leadership had greater political power than if they had 
remained in opposition to the government, it also meant that it limited their scope 
for political protest or struggle. Vic Allen's conclusion from his study of this 
period was that, 
The main advantages from a trade union and Labour Government relationship 
have gone to the Government. Trade unions from 1945 to 1951 were loath to 
exert pressure on the Government, because they did not want to embarrass it 
and they made concessions to enable the Goverment to implement its 
policy. 35 
However, as Middlemas makes clear in the passage above, the 'abandonment in 
practice (though not on the public platform) of the ideology of class conflict' was 
entered upon by the trade union leadership willingly rather than unwillingly. And, 
as Richard Hyman points out, for the two decades after the Second World War, 
the national leadership of almost every union remained committed to the same 
aims of 'moderation' and 'responsibility, and was in general successful in 
preventing any serious challenge to stable capitalist development. 
36 
This process of 'incorporation' or 'corporate bias', was entered into for two main 
reasons. Firstly, it allowed the Labour government, and the trade union 
leadership, the opportunity to attempt to regulate union members, and to shape 
internal labour relations. Hyman concludes that, 
34 Ibid., p. 22. 
35 Vic Allen, Trade Unions and the Government, London: Longmans, 1960, p. 312. 
36 Richard Hyman, Industrial Relations, p. 13 5. 
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Governments have come to appreciate that if union organisation is outside the 
law but cannot be suppressed ... its policies are likely to be militant and 
disruptive, perhaps involving an explicit challenge to the political regime. 
Conversely, if unions are assigned legitimacy - through legal protection, 
consultation, representation on governmental committees, 'honours' for 
individual leaders - they are likely to form a means of integrating the working 
class into capitalist society, thus serving as a mechanism of social control. 37 
While legislating against unions was not on the agenda, restructuring the 
relationship between the union and Party leadership was. The closeness of the 
relationship, and the co-operation of the trade union leadership, provided the 
avenue through which labour could be regulated. 
Secondly, incorporation was entered into because of the shared view of socialism 
and anti-communism of the Labour and trade union leaderships. This was 'that 
economic growth would provide an automatic solution to the moral dilemma of a 
socialist party in an affluent society, that growth would give us equality without a 
fight, justice without tears. 38 This tied in with the ideology that was contained 
within the Marshall Plan that has been termed the 'politics of productivity'. This 
was the idea that it was possible to ameliorate social conflict, and by implication, 
class conflict, through the 'transition to a society of abundance' through 
increased production and productivity, which was presented as a 'problem of 
engineering, not politics'. 
39 Thus, while the close relationship between the 
Labour governinent and the trade union leadership provided the avenue through 
which labour could be regulated, the Marshall Plan provided the focus for this 
reshaping. The 'mobilisation of bias' contained within the Marshall Plan was 
37 Hyman, Industrial Relations, p. 143. 
38 David Owen, John Macintosh and David Marquand, quoted in Radhika Desai, Intellectuals and 
Socialism, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1994, p. 127. 
39 Charles Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic 
Policy after World War If, International Organization, Vol. 3 1, No. 4,1977, p. 615. 
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ideal for splitting communists from non-communists, and for marginalising 
dissent within the labour movement. Thus, this study argues that the Marshall 
Plan, with its intrinsic stress on productivity, responsibility and working in the 
national interest, was used by the centre-right labour leadership to firmly 
establish its hegemony over the left of the movement at a time of radical change 
and expectations. 
This relationship between the Labour government and the trade unions is fin-ther 
explored in Chapter 4 of this study. The ways in which the Marshall Plan was 
used to establish the hegemony of the centre-right of the trade union leadership 
and Labour government are addressed in Chapters 5 to 7, where this study 
examines the union's institutional response to, and activity in, the Marshall Plan. 
Outline of Thesis 
This study is split into two main parts. The first part examines the context of the 
Marshall Plan. The study starts with an overview of the approaches taken by the 
literature on the Marshall Plan, while Chapter 2 provides the background to the 
Marshall Plan. Chapter 3 examines the size and scale of the Marshall Plan, what 
it was used for, and how this affected the amount of leverage the US could apply 
over the recipient states. The study then turns to its particular focus on British 
labour and the Marshall Plan. Chapter 4 examines the relationship between the 
Labour government and the trade unions in Britain in more detail. Chapter 5 then 
turns to the trade union reaction to the Marshall Plan. This chapter also assesses 
the role that the TUC played in the trade union International, the World 
17 
Federation of Trade Unions, as one of the earliest impacts of the Marshall Plan 
was to provide the issue over which the international trade union movement 
would split into communist and anti-communist camps. Chapters 6 and 7 analyse 
the two main trade union organisations resulting from the Marshall Plan, the 
European Recovery Programme Trade Union Advisory Committee and the 
% Anglo-American Council on Productivity. These two organisations provided 
institutional structures with which to shape and control trade union responses to 
the Marshall Plan. The Conclusion draws together the main threads, themes and 
arguments of the work. The Appendix addresses methodological issues arising 
from the research topic in particular, and from doing a PhD in the social and 
political sciences more generally. 
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Chapter 1 
Approaches to the Marshall Plan 
Introduction 
A vast literature has been produced on the Marshall Plan from many perspectives 
and disciplines. The Marshall Plan has been analysed from an international relations 
perspective, and in tenns of the politics of the individual states involved. It has been 
written about from a US and from a European angle. There are macro-economic 
approaches and microeconomic views, in addition to works of diplomatic history and 
labour history. The Marshall Plan has been seen as resulting from the national 
security concerns of the developing Cold War, and as an attempt to shape a postwar 
liberal economic order. ' Attempting to categorise research into these headings can be 
misleading, since many studies of course fit into several categories. Whilst this study 
has been informed by many of these approaches, it draws upon and engages with the 
work of several authors in particular. My approach is different from recent work 
1 Examples of these different approaches are, respectively: Joyce & Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of 
Power; the World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, New York:, Harper & Row, 1972; 
David Ellwood, 'From "Re-education" to the selling of the Marshall Plan in Italy', in N. Pronay & K. 
Wilson (eds. ), The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies after World War 11, London: 
Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 219-239; Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the 
reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; Alan 
Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, London: Methuen, 1984; Imanuel Wexler, 
The Marshall Plan Revisited: the European Recovery Programme in Economic Perspective, London: 
Greenwood, 1983; Jim Tomlinson, 'The Failure of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity% 
Business History, Vol. 33, No. 1,199 1, pp. 82-92; Charles Kindleberger, Marshall Plan Days, Boston: 
Allen & Unwin, 1987; Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1987; Melvyn Leffler, 'The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the 
Marshall Plan', Diplomatic History, Vol. 12, No. 3,1988, pp. 277-306; Robert Cox, Production, 
Power, and World Order., Social Forces in the Making of History, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987. 
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which has continued the traditional, historical narrative approach, such as that by 
Pelling, 2 but builds upon some of the work carried out during that 1980s that has 
brought a new political economy focus to the Marshall Plan, such as Maier, 
Milward, and Burnham 3. This study also takes into account the recent work of 
writers such as Carew, Weiler, and MacShane 4. which have attempted to bring new 
interpretations to the role of British trade unions in the Marshall Plan and the 
international trade union movement after the Second World War. The first part of 
this chapter discusses competing overall interpretations of the Marshall Plan, in 
particular the motives for it and the role of the US. It then turns to an assessment the 
literature that focuses on organised labour and the Marshall Plan. Finally, the chapter 
outlines the approach taken in this study in relation to the literature discussed here. 
1.1 Traditional Approaches to the Marshall Plan 
The traditional perspective of the Marshall Plan presented the aid programme as a 
necessary and successful attempt to save Europe from economic collapse. As such, this 
approach focused on the activities of the US, was largely based on US sources of 
information, and tended to treat the recipient European states as passive. In the years 
immediately following the Marshall Plan most analyses, produced from an American 
2 Henry Pelling, Britain and the Marshall Plan, London: Macmillan, 198 8. 
3 Charles Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic 
Policy after World War IF, International Organization, Vol. 3 1, No. 4,1977, pp-607-633, and'Two 
Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe', American 
Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 1,198 1, pp. 327-367; Milwardý The Reconstruction Of Western Europe 
1945-51; Peter Burnham, The Political Economy ofPostwar Reconstruction, London: Macmillan, 
1990. 
4 Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan; Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1988; Dennis MacShane, International Labour and the Origins ofthe Cold 
War, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
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perspective, painted it in glowing terms, thereby reproducing much of the Marshall 
Aid propaganda that was written in the late 1940s. For example, Price wrote in 1955 
that, 
For the first time in history, resources from one continent were to be channelled, 
deliberately and on a huge scale, into rebuilding production, trade, and stability in 
another. 
The Marshall Plan as approved by Congress was more, then, than a reaction to an 
immediate crisis. It reflected more than a desire to alleviate distress, or to restore 
a prewar level of economic activity, or to check Communist expansion. It 
revealed also the beginning of a recognition that these goals could no longer be 
effectively pursued in isolation. 5 
Price's book was actually sponsored by the Marshall Plan administration agencies, 
and was thus a semi-official interpretation. As such, it reflected many of the 
assumptions prevalent at the time, and ties in with the work of those involved in the 
Marshall Plan such as Kindleberger. 6 Price"s work is useful because of this, and 
because through the interviews he carried out as part of his research in the early 
1950s, it is possible to gain information on the motivations, ideas and viewpoint of 
those directly involved in the Marshall Plan. The study by Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 
produced a similar perspective, focusing on the origins of the Marshall Plan from a 
State Department viewpoint. 7 
Gimble, in The Origins of the Marshall Plan, offered an alternative account, though 
still within the traditional approach, seeing the Marshall Plan as originating, 
5 Harry Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955, p. 6. 
6 Kindleberger, Marshall Plan Days. 
7 Jo seph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21 -June 5,194 7): An Inside A cco unt of the Genes is 
ofthe Marshall Plan, New York: Viking, 1955. 
21 
as a cash program to dovetail German economic recovery with a general 
European recovery program in order to make German economic recovery 
politically acceptable in Europe and in the United States. It was not a plan 
conceived by long-range planners as a response to the Soviet Union or as an 
element in the cold war. The Marshall Plan was a series of decisions that grew out 
of a continuing bureaucratic struggle between the Army and the State Department 
8 [over what to do about Germany] . 
Gimbel's approach differed from that of Price in that it offered an interpretation of 
the Marshall Plan based on policy-making and the study of the bureaucratic 
organisations involved, but it still worked within the framework which assumed that 
the United States was making an act of benevolence. The traditional approach tended 
to lack adequate analysis and insight into the purposes of the Marshall Plan policies 
in order to address the question of US dominance at this time. 
Not all the early works on the Marshall Plan fit easily into this typology of the 
traditional approach, for there were a few which were highly critical of the Marshall 
Plan. The study published by economist Seymour Harris in 1948, is one example. 
Harris questioned the motives for the Marshall Plan, seeing it as an opportunity to 
dump US surpluses in Europe and to seek out new markets, 9 rather than as an aid 
programme designed to shore up the economies of Western Europe. However, such 
works are in the minority, and on the whole the traditional approach presented a 
positive evaluation of the Marshall Plan. 
8 John Gimbel, The Origins ofthe Marshall Plan, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979, p. 4. 
9 Seymour Harris, The European Recovery Program, Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948, 
p. 12. 
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1.2 Revisionist Approaches 
The work by the Kolkos published in 1972, The Limits of Power: the World and 
United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54, was perhaps the first and one of the best 
known works to be labelled 'revisionist'. For the Kolkos, the Marshall Plan was not 
an outcome of US benevolence, or even its fear of communism in Western Europe, 
but of the alarm with which Washington viewed the development of independent, 
nationally oriented capitalisms in Europe, which would not be readily accessible for 
US goods. " The Marshall Plan was thus an attempt to impose US hegemony on the 
rest of the world and maintain open markets for its goods. This view is also 
propounded by Fred Block, who states that the Marshall Plan provided the US 'with 
the means of financing a large export surplus and influencing Western Europe's 
economic course'! 1 He also points out that the Marshall Plan helped ease the threat 
from the Left in Europe, which contributed to the recovery of industrial production, 
fo r, 
High levels of industrial investment were possible only if consumption and 
expenditures for social services were kept down. This required defeating the 
demands for labor and the Left for higher standards of living and expanded social 
services. 12 
Writers such as the Kolkos and Block are keen to point out the limitations and 
failures of the Marshall Plan. For instance, Block asserts that the Marshall Plan was 
10 Kolkos, The Limits ofPower, pp. 359,376 &712. 
"Fred Block, The Origins ofInternational Economic Disorder, Berkeley: University of California, 
1977, p. 87. 
12 Ibid., p. 91. 
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not successful in accomplishing its long-term goals. 13 This is in direct contrast to the 
more traditional analysis of the Marshall Plan that sees it as a success story. 
While the Kolkos set the scene for revisionist approaches, much of the subsequent 
work has built on the idea of European capitulation to US interests and influence. 
This incorporates a consideration of the imposition of US ideas and ideals on 
European class relations with an analysis of the relative autonomy of the state. 
Writers such as Brett, Gilliatt and Pople, who focus on Britain, see the Marshall Plan 
as part of a British capitulation to US hegemony. They argue that the 'relative 
autonomy' of the British state 'was decisively moderated not so much by the power 
of the domestic bourgeoisie as by that of its foreign counterpart in the US', and that 
this was 'certainly seen to be the biggest single obstacle to a programme of planned 
reconstruction. 14 Furthermore, 
Although free trade can now be taken to represent the dominant ideology of the 
capitalist class, this was by no means universally true at the end of the war, when 
it was only generally accepted by the strongest elements in the US and hardly at 
all in the rest of the war-damaged world. 
15 
The work by Brett et al. is useful as it presents a more refined analysis of postwar 
events than many of the general overviews of Labour governments. 
16 In particular, it 
recognises the complexity of the constraints on the policies of the government, 
arguing that, 
13 Ibid., p. 92. 
14 Teddy Brett, Steve Gilliatt and Andrew Pople, 'Planned Trade, Labour Party Policy and US 
Intervention', History Workshop, Vol. 13,1982, p. 133. 
15 Ibid. 
16 For instance, that by David Coates, The Labour Party and the Strugglefor Socialism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
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[T]he 'dollar shortage' arising out of the relative strength of American industry 
and the country's correspondingly large balance of trade surplus was the major 
constraint on the Labour government's freedom of action both at home and 
abroad. 17 
However, this account stops short of a detailed analysis of British class relations and 
the Marshall Plan. 
By contrast, the more macro level, international relations and international political 
economy approach, such as that by Cox, Rupert and Van der Pijl, does contain an 
analysis of the impact of the Marshall Plan on class relations in Europe., 
8 According 
to Van der Pijl, the Marshall Plan (along with the 'Kennedy offensive') 'led to a 
concrete transformation of the European class structures along the lines of the US 
model. '19 This was necessary because, 
On the European continent, the power of the working class and the general mood 
of change at the end of the war jeopardized the entire framework of capitalist 
relations of production. 
20 
Thus for America, ? 
If a Western Europe capable of withstanding the challenge Of socialism was to be 
created and made part of an Atlantic economy in which the American mode of 
accumulation could be generalized, the restructuration of European class relations 
to resemble the US pattern was mandatory. 
21 
Not only was the establishment of US hegemony in the North Atlantic area directed 
against the spread of social revolution, it was also directed against the national, self- 
17 Brett et al., 'Planned Trade, Labour Party Policy and US Intervention', p. 133 
18 Cox, Production, Power, and World Order; Mark Rupert Producing Hegemony. The Politics of 
Mass Production andAmerican Global Power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; Kees 
Van der PijI, The Making ofan Atlantic Ruling Class, London: Verso, 1985. 
19 Van der Pij 1, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, p. 13 8. 
20 Ibid., p. 138. 
21 Ibid., p. 146. 
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contained reconstruction programmes pursued by most of the Western European 
states. 22 Thus Van der Pijl follows closely the analysis offered by the Kolkos in 
concluding that 'the Marshall Plan was instrumental in bringing European 
reconstruction along national lines to a standstill. )23 
The arguments that Van der Pijl presents are persuasive, though he overstates his 
case about the power of the working class in Europe and the degree of success of the 
US in breaking down national approaches to reconstruction. It is also possible to 
question whether Britain, for example, actually had a national reconstruction strategy 
as such. However, Van der PJjl provides a precise interpretation of the hegemony 
that the US was seeking to impose. This was mass production, with the export of 
Taylorism and Fordism to Western Europe through the Technical Assistance and 
Productivity Program (in Britain this took the form of the Anglo-American Council 
on Productivity). He writes that, 
in participating in the new mode of accumulation, the European working class 
[had to] limit itself to purely economic demands. Thus, in the context of a general 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, the Marshall offensive aimed at the 
elimination of revolutionary and anti-systemic ideologies in the Western 
European labour movement. In this aim, the Atlantic corporate-liberal bourgeoisie 
found its privileged partner and relay in the Social Democratic parties ... 
24 
And so, 
the concept guiding class formation of the European bourgeoisie henceforward 
would tend toward the corporate liberalism dominant in the U. S. A. 25 
22 Ibid., pp. 148-9. 
23 Van der Pij I, 'Class Foffnation at the International Level', Capital and Class, No. 9,1979, p. 12. 
24 K. Van der Pijl, The Making ofan Atlantic Ruling Class, p. 150. 
25 Ibid., p. 16 1. 
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Van der Pijl offers a rare analysis of the effect of the Marshall Plan on class relations 
in Europe, and this study engages with some of his ideas. However, he is working 
within the perspective that America imposed these changes on the structure of class 
relations in Europe. This study will show that for Britain this was not the case. 
Rather, the British government actively encouraged the importation of US style class 
relations and production techniques through activities such as the Anglo-American 
Council on Productivity. Despite the establishment of US hegemony, the British 
Labour government was able to circumvent much of the unwanted US influence 
arising from the Marshall Plan. 
1.3 Recent Political and Economic Approaches 
Milward is one of the more recent writers to question the importance of the Marshall 
Plan. In essence, he adopts a macro-economic approach to the Marshall Plan. The 
starting point for Milward is that the Marshall Plan did not save Britain from a 
severe economic crisis because the conditions for such a crisis did not exist. While 
there was the very real problem of the dollar shortage, this was due to Europe's 
economic recovery and the subsequent increase in demand for US capital goods. 26 
Accordingly, 
It was the success and vigour of the European recovery, not its incipient failure, 
which exacerbated this payments problem. Marshall Aid did not save Western 
Europe from economic collapse. 27 
26 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, p. 465. 
27 Ibid., pp. 465466. 
27 
He reaches these conclusions by looking at trade and production figures, at flows of 
exports and imports during this period, at output and GDP figures, and by analysing 
what the ERP aid was actually used for. He points out that American exports to 
Europe actually fell during the ERP, and that American capital exports to Western 
Europe were at one of their lowest ebbS. 28 He argues that, 
Marshall Aid was not in fact important enough to give the United States sufficient 
leverage to reconstruct Western Europe according to its own wishes. The main 
economic importance of Marshall Aid over the whole duration of the programme 
29 was the imports, particularly goods imports, which it permitted. 
Milward's approach signalled a departure from the earlier revisionist work in that it 
was gave greater prominence to European archival sources, presented the European 
states as being active agents rather than as passive recipients of US aid, and 
questioned whether the Marshall Plan had really been that important. Milward's 
work can be seen as introducing a substantially different perspective than that of the 
earlier revisionists, and has had a significant impact on many subsequent studies of 
the Marshall Plan. However, some recent approaches, notably the immensely 
detailed work of Hogan and Leffler, have rejected the Milward thesis, and have again 
placed a greater emphasis on the importance of the aid programme. 30 Hogan argues, 
Although this sort of revisionism is a healthy corrective to earlier American paens 
to the Marshall Plan, it succeeds through a feat of analytical legerdemain that 
denigrates the American contribution and leads to conclusions almost as 
unbalanced as those it seeks to refute. 31 
28 Ibid., p. 91. 
29 Ibid., p. 469. 
30 Hogan, The Marshall Plan; Leffler, 'The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the 
Marshall Plan', and Leffler, A Preponderance ofPower. National Security, the Truman 
Administration and the Cold War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992. 31 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 43 I. 
28 
Hogan feels that the Marshall Plan provided what Schuker has called the rcrucial 
margin' that made European self-help possible. 32 Hogan argues that Milward tends to 
exaggerate the extent of the pre- 1947 recovery, and both he and Leffler agree that the 
European recovery was made possible by the imports and aid received from the US. 
They also point out that the problem of the dollar shortage would have impacted on 
Europe's ability to produce goods, and so cannot be separated out from Europe's 
recovery needs. 
A form of the Milward thesis has occurred in the more macro, international relations 
type of approach to the Marshall Plan. Charles Maier argues that 'in quantitative 
economic terms American aid amounted to little' and points out the 'Washington's 
33 assistance served more as capital-liberating than as capital transfusing'. Writers 
such as Maier fit in with the macro-approach of the Kolkos and Van der Pijl, in that 
theY analyse the immediate postwar era in terms of a more explicit conceptual 
international relations framework than people such as Milward. However, this is 
done from the standpoint of treating the European recipient states as active rather 
than passive agents. While the Marshall Plan was one of the initiatives that led to the 
establishment of US hegemony in Europe, this was not imposed by the US. Thus for 
Maier, 
32 Ibid., p. 432, citing Schuker's comments on Maier's article 'The Two Postwar Eras and the 
Conditions for Stability' in American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, pp. 3 53-8, note 7. 33 Charles Maier, 'The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability, pp. 341 & 342. In a later 
version of this paper he amends the first of these comments, saying that the role of American aid was 'limited', rather than it amounted to little. Maier, 'The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for 
29 
Perhaps the best term for the postwar Western economy would be that of 
consensual American hegemony. 'Consensual' can be used because European 
leaders accepted Washington's leadership in view of their needs for economic and 
security assistance. 34 
Maier's view of the nature of American hegemony at this time is one that offers a 
valuable insight into the nature of the postwar period, especially as regards the nature 
of the relationship between Britain and the United States. 
Lundestad has also been influential in terms of analysing the nature of US 
hegemony, though he does so with the use of the term 'empire' rather than 
'hegemony'. He points out that he differs from the early revisionists in that he feels 
that if we are to use the term empire, 'it was to a large extent an empire by 
invitation', that 'the United States was generally encouraged to take a more active 
interest in the outside world'. 35 Ikenberry, reflecting the work of Lundestad, also 
argues that 'U. S. hegemony in Europe was largely an empire by invitation', with the 
US being drawn reluctantly into a direct role in Europe after its early efforts to build 
a postwar self-regulating liberal multilateral system had largely failed. 
36 Ikenberry 
goes a step ftu-ther than Maier in his reinterpretation of this relationship and of the 
Marshall Plan. He points out that, 
Stability', in, In Searchfor Stability Explorations in Historical Political Economy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 172, see note 3 6. 
34 Charles Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity', p. 630. 
35 Geir Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952', 
Journal ofPeace Research, Vol. 23, No. 3,1986, p. 263, and The American "Empire ", Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990, p. 56. 
36 John Ikenberry, 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony', Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 104, No. 4,19 89, p. 376. 
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British officials were more concerned with preventing the return by the United 
States to an isolationist position than with an overbearing American hegemonic 
presence in Europe. 37 
He argues that each European country sought to use American hegemonic power for 
its own national purposes, and that by involving the US in formal commitments, 
38 Europe could 'influence and render predictable American hegemonic power'. This 
could be done in a way that would not have been possible with a 'less encumbered 
America'. 39 For Britain in particular, being part of the US sphere of influence meant 
that she could develop the room for manoeuvre within it to preserve her 
Commonwealth position and shield her balance of payments, which might not 
otherwise have been able to do. 40 
Regardless of whether US hegemony was imposed or invited by Europe, the US did 
attempt to use its hegemonic status to shape Europe according to its own needs. 
Maier provides an original insight on how the US did this, namely by seeking, 
to transform political issues into problems of output, to adjourn class conflict for 
a consensus on growth. The American approach was successful because for 
almost two decades high rates of growth made the politics of productivity 
apparently pay off . 
41 
Hence questions of wealth redistribution could be by-passed, for according to the 
Marshall Plan administration, and increasingly the Labour government and the trade 
union leadership in Britain, the way to affluence was through increasing production 
and productivity. Maier puts it that, 
37 Ibid., p. 372. 
38 Ibid., p. 399. 
39 Ibid., p. 394. 
40 Ibid. 
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For society as a whole, the politics of productivity meant simply the adjournment 
of conflicts over the percentage share of national income for the rewards of future 
economic growth. 42 
And, 
American opinion generally viewed the transition to a society of abundance as a 
problem of engineering, not politics. 43 
Burnham points out that it is inaccurate to claim that the US administration saw the 
export of US accumulation conditions to Europe in terms of engineering and not 
politics, and that 'The political justification for increasing productivity - to prevent 
the 'lure of communism' - was always prominent in the productivity rhetoric. 
44 
However, this does not detract from the impression that the administrative apparatus 
sought to give, namely that productivity was apolitical in terms of benefiting the 
whole of society. The importance of this was those who did not co-operate with the 
Marshall Plan and with the productivity drives could then be presented as 
subversive, or as trying to politicise an issue that had 'common sense' on its side. 
One of the conclusions that Maier reaches is that, 
As Western leaders looked more and more to economic growth, increasingly 
presupposed, first, as automatic and second, as the major index of a society's 
welfare, the stakes of politics narrowed. Communism increasingly became a 
permanent and sullen opposition, to be analyzed, in the spirit of the 1950s, as 
inherently pathological. 45 
41 Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity', p. 607. 
42 Maier, 'Two Postwar Eras', p. 345. 
43 Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity', p. 615. 
44 Burnham, The Political Economy ofPostwar Reconstruction, pp. 97-98. 
45 Maier, 'Two Postwar Eras', p. 347. 
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Burnham, in The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction, reaches some 
similar conclusions to those of Maier and Milward. He proposes that the Marshall 
Plan 'was not indispensable to the Attlee government's economic objectives', and, 
Whilst it is inaccurate to assume that Marshall aid had no beneficial effect on 
British accumulation ... it is wrong to claim that it acted as an economic 
lifeline 
for the UK economy. 46 
This is because, 
Marshall aid disbursements to Britain were primarily used, for food imports 
releasing resources to enable the already widespread domestic reconstruction 
programme to continue. 47 
Burnham agrees that 'a clear primary aim of the US administration' was 'to lay the 
foundations for an Atlantic economy based on the generalised export of American 
accumulation conditions' through the Marshall Plan. However, unlike other 
accounts, his conclusion is that 'this objective was not achieved by the Marshall 
Plan. 48 
Burnharn also strongly rejects the 'orthodox interpretations of postwar Britishaction 
, 49 which claim that the British state capitulated to American demands. 
It is simply untrue to suggest that postwar labour Britain was 'blown of its 
socialist course' or 'forced to capitulate' on economic policy because of 50 American pressure. 
Rather, the Labour government's economic policy was designed to remove barriers 
to capital accumulation, the primary one being the 'inappropriate structure of 
46 Burnham, The Political Economy ofPostwar Reconstruction, p. I 11. 
47 Ibid., p. 72. 
49 Ibid. 
49 Peter Burnham, 'The British State and Capital Accumulation 1945-5 V, unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Warwick, 1987, p. 1. 
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production and trade experienced in the dollar gap. '51 Burnham's argument is that 
the US did not impose its hegemony on the UK. To a certain extent this fits in with 
the Ikenberry view that 'U. S. hegemony in Europe was largely an empire by 
invitation'. 52 
Rupert has recently produced a study which attempts to combine the analytical 
framework of a macro-approach to the analysis of the establishment of US global 
power and hegemony, with the detail of a micro-approach through an analysis of the 
impact that the emergence in the US of mass production and 'producitivist' ideology 
had on hegemony. While the Marshall Plan is not a central focus of Rupert's work, 
he does provide useful insights with his examination of the role of organised labour 
in gaining acceptance of a neoliberal world order based on US hegemony. One of his 
main themes is the linkage between domestic an international politics, how the 
'exercise of US global power was shaped by the historically specific ways in which 
mass production was institutionalized, and by the political, cultural, and ideological 
aspects of this process at home and abroad. 03 Because of the focus on organised 
labour in my study, literature that has attempted to analyse the impact of the 
Marshall Plan on the labour movement in Britain will be examined in the next 
section of this review of the approaches to the Marshall Plan. 
50 Burnham, The Political Economy ofPostwar Reconstruction, p. 72. ` Burnham, 'The British State and Capital Accumulation 1945-5 1', p. 1. 52 Ikenberry, 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony, p. 3 76. 53 Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics ofMass Production andAmerican Global Power, P-2. 
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1.4 Labour and the Marshall Plan 
There have been a number of political studies in recent years that have attempted to 
place the labour movement in Europe and America in the postwar period in the 
centre of the picture when analysing the Marshall Plan and international events at 
this time. The main works are by Carew, MacShane, Romero and Weiler. 54 They 
tend to focus on national and international labour movements from the point of view 
of the effects of the United States' economic and foreign policy and the developing 
Cold War. This final part of the literature review on the Marshall Plan will examine 
the work of Carew, Weiler and MacShane, as Romero's work has the Italian labour 
movement as its specific focus. 
MacShane's work is a study of national and international labour movements and 
their role in the origins of the Cold War. As such, he argues that the Marshall Plan 
did not have a significant impact on'British and international trade unionism. 55 
MacShane makes three main points. First, that the Cold War was not external to the 
trade union movement but grew from existing political divisions dating back to 1920 
that resurfaced once the Second World War was over. 56 Second, that union leaders in 
Britain and the US were not pUPPets of their governments and did not have anti- 
communism imposed on' them. Rather, their views arose from experience of 
54 Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan; MacShane, International Labour and the Origins ofthe 
Cold War; Federico Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944-5 1, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992; Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War. 55 MacShane, International Labour and the Origins ofthe Cold War, p. 162. 56 Ibid., Ch. 15. 
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international trade unionism dating from the 1920s. For instance, MacShane writes 
that, 
Bevin, like his friends in the AFL ... had a clear, if obsessive, idea of the Soviet Union and of communism, and it was their vision that was imposed on or became 
conflated with government and diplomatic policy after 1945.57 
MacShane's work focuses on the trade union leadership, reflects their viewpoint, and 
takes very little account of the views being propounded by the rank and file of the 
movement, some of which were very different. 
MacShane's third conclusion is that the attempt to create world trade union unity 
after World War 11 with the establishment of the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) was doomed to failure from the start: 
Instead of seeing the WFTU falling victim to global power politics, diplomatic 
chicanery, or the Cold War it would be better to admit that it was set an 
impossible task - that of expressing international working class interests at a 
moment when these were being most effectively asserted in the national context. 
The WFTU was created at a moment of history when the conditions were not 
there to sustain its continuing existence. In 1945 and 1946, unions were reaching 
58 the peak of their identification with national interests. 
Thus, MacShane argues that the collapse of international trade union co-operation 
between communists and non-communists was not due to events such as the 
Marshall Plan, but due to their own internal differences. -However, MacShane 
assumes that trade union national interests precluded the expression or operation of 
international ones. 
57 Ibid., p. 284. 
58 Ibid., p. 282. 
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Weiler's book, British Labour and the Cold War, reaches different conclusions from 
those of MacShane. Through a series of case studies he considers three underlying 
themes. These are Britain's participation in the Cold War; the growing corporatist 
relationship of the trade union movement to the state; and the relationship of the 
British labour movement to socialism. 59 His research focuses on political elites, with 
his central concern being the TUC leadership, and so his work is more concerned 
with the making of policy than the effects of policy. His case studies do not tackle 
directly the impact of the Marshall Plan on British trade unionism, but from his study 
of the World Federation of Trade Unions and of postwar propaganda, Weiler does 
reach some interesting conclusions on aspects of the Marshall Plan. One of the most 
significant is that while the Cold War 'consensus' arose in part from the actions of 
the Soviet Union and the United States, 'it is less recognised that the new Cold War 
consensus was also created by the propaganda activities of the labour leadership and 
of the United States. ' He argues that, 
the United States used the Marshall Plan, whose administration included an 
elaborate propaganda apparatus, to try to shape European labour opinion and to 
isolate politically the USSR and West European communist parties ... the leaders 
of the [British] Labour Party and the TUC used anti-communism to overcome 
residual sympathy for the Soviet Union in the labour movement and to reconcile 
their followers to a foreign policy that would have been denounced if followed by 
the Tories. 60 
While Weiler reaches some interesting conclusions about the impact of the Marshall 
Plan on British trade unions, and about the British anti-communist campaign, he 
fails to fully draw out the connections between the two, and how they could be used 
to restructure British trade unions. 
59 Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 10. 
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Of these authors, Carew's work is mostly closely focused on the Marshall Plan, and 
he approaches the issue of the Marshall Aid in an original and interesting way. He 
sets out to 'outline [the Marshall Plan's] major phases and programmes and to do so 
in a way that enables some judgements to be made as to its impact on the 
development of labour PolitiCS., 
61 One of the questions he seeks to answer is that, 
if Marshall Aid had an impact on the world of labour, was it through the specific 
programmes of support for anti-communist labour organisations or more 
generally through the cultural norms it helped to implant in a society gradually 
accustoming itself to economic growth and consumer affluence? 62 
His conclusion is that the really important impact of the Marshall Plan was through 
the ideas and cultural norms it exported. One of the major themes in Carew's book 
is, 
[T]he Marshall Plan's role in developing among European workers a 
consciousness - indeed an acceptance - of the need for an ever increasing level of 
productivity, with all that that implies for the role of labour in the workplace and 
its relationship with capital. Indeed, it is arguable that this was the Marshall 
Plan's greatest achievement and the factor that has had the most lasting effect on 
labour in its struggle for greater material rewards and more control over the 
process through which wealth is created. 63 
While Carew's work is based on State Department and British government archives 
and Trades Union Congress records, he tends to focus on the activities of the 
Economic Co-operation Administration. Because of this, he does not really address 
the question of why the British trade union leadership co-operated with the transfer 
of the politics of productivity, or why they worked so closely with the British 
60 Ibid., p. 9. 
61 Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, p. 2. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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government in the arena of international trade union politics. These questions will be 
addressed in the following chapters of this study. The arguments to follow will 
attempt a new synthesis by taking more account of data reflecting the views of the 
British trade union leadership and the rank-and-file trade unionists; by focusing more 
on the connections between domestic and international events, and as a consequence 
address a much wider literature and series of debates on the Marshall Plan than 
Carew. 
1.5 Outline of the Approach Taken in this Study 
Overall, this study most readily fits in with what it has could be termed the 
'European' revisionist approach to the Marshall Plan in that it focuses on the active 
way that a recipient state sought to use the Marshall Plan. It agrees with the Maier, 
Lundestad, Ikenberry argument, rather than the earlier revisionist approach, that US 
hegemony was largely invited rather than imposed. It also takes on board Gaddis' 
point that the establishment of US hegemony occurred through an incremental 
manner, and as a consequence, rather than as an objective, of US policy in the early 
Cold War. 64 This study will argue that the Labour government invited US hegemony, 
as they saw it as the most effective way they could continue to operate in a changing 
world order. It shall also argue that the concept of hegemony needs to be seen in 
terms of domestic relations as well as international relations. It shall propose that the 
British government imposed its own hegemony on its support base by using aspects 
64 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History ofthe Cold War, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987, pp. 60-61 
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of American economic and political ideals at a time when British political ideas and 
allegiances were, even if momentarily, open to influence from the hard left. Thus, 
this study will also seek to build on many aspects of the interpretation of the 
Marshall Plan as presented by Milward, Maier and Burnham, primarily that it did not 
give the United States enough leverage to impose its influence on British actors. 
Rather, US hegemony could be manipulated by the British Labour government to 
strengthen its position internally. However, this study disagrees with the Milward 
argument that, 
The political and economic influence of the Marshall Plan must ... be seen as 
parts of a whole and if it is indeed true that, economically, Marshall Aid was not 
of major importance to Western European economic recovery, then it must follow 
that its influence on Western Europe's internal political choices must also be 
SMall. 65 
Instead, it will be argued that the Marshall Plan did have long term and important 
economic and political impact on Britain because of he way it was used by British 
actors, rather than because of undue US influence. 
Politically, the Marshall Plan had an important impact in Britain as its was used to 
marginalise the communist and non-communist 'hard' left and to control those on 
the left who were critical of the government and the trade union leadership. This 
allowed the government to determine the parameters of political debate in Britain, 
and to implement their policies without the problem of the vocal criticism of the left. 
Politically and economically, the Marshall Plan allowed for the transfer of what 
Maier refers to as the 'politics of productivity' to Britain; 
40 
For society as a whole, the politics of productivity meant simply the adjournment 
of conflicts over the percentage share of national income for the rewards of future 
economic growth. 66 
Just as the US sought 'to transform political issues into problems of output, to 
adjourn class conflict for a consensus on growth', 67 so did the British Labour 
goverment. This study shows that the British Labour goveniment, with the support 
of the centre-right trade union leadership, played an active part in the transfer of the 
politics of productivity to Britain, and that they did so because this tied in with their 
economic vision for Britain, while strengthening their position domestically. Thus, 
in the case of Britain, the Marshall Plan had a profound and lasting economic and 
political impact, but this was because of way that the Marshall Plan was used by the 
labour leadership to exert its own hegemony and establish some degree of 
management over the labour movement, rather than because of the exercise of US 
influence on passive British actors. With the incorporation of the politics of 
productivity into Britain, the Labour government and the trade union leadership 
could marginalise their hard left critics, and as Maier concludes, 
As Western leaders looked more and more to economic growth, increasingly 
presupposed, first, as automatic and second, as the major index of a society's 
welfare, the stakes of politics narrowed. Communism increasingly became a 
permanent and sullen o position, to be analyzed, in the spirit of the 1950s, as 
inherently pathological. 
S 
That this policy was" so successful was because of the active part that organised 
labour played in the Marshall Plan. As Anthony Carew points out, 
65 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 145-51, p. 90. 
66 Maier, 'Two Postwar Eras', p. 345. 
67 Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity', p. 23. 
69 Maier, 'Two Postwar Eras', p. 347. 
41 
in reviewing the impact of Marshall Aid it has to be constantly bome in mind that 
organised labour was not simply on the receiving end of the programme but was, 
through American union officials and their counterparts in Europe, deeply 
involved in administering it. 69 
Conclusion 
This study will argue that the Marshall Plan did have a long-term political effect on 
Britain. This was not because it saved Britain from economic collapse, nor because 
the United States used it to impose its hegemony. Rather, the Labour government 
and trade union leaders in Britain used the Marshall Plan to impose their own 
hegemony on their members and to define the parameters of political debate in 
Britain. This will be done with reference to much of the existing literature on the 
Marshall Plan, both the general literature and that focused more specifically on its 
impact on the British labour movement. The next chapters turn to an examination of 
the Marshall Plan itself, before reviewing the impact that this had on the Labour 
movement in Britain. 
" Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, pp. 1 -2. 
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Chapter 2 
The Marshall Plan 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the empirical and historical context necessary for a 
consideration of the purpose and significance of the Marshall Plan. It discusses the 
content of Marshall's speech that launched the aid programme, and analyses the 
economic, political and strategic reasons for the Marshall Plan. It then goes on to 
describe in some detail the response of Western Europe and the Soviet Union to the 
Marshall Plan. The split between Western Europe and the Soviet Union over their 
attitudes towards Marshall Aid was to lay the foundations of the split within the left 
in Britain. The chapter then places the Marshall Plan in the framework of the 
developing Cold War. 
2.1 Marshall's Speech 
George Marshall, who had played the crucial role of Army Chief of Staff during the 
Second World War, was appointed as Secretary of State on January 21,1947. 
Realising the true extent of the devastation in Europe, he went on to make his 
famous speech in which he outlined what came to be known as the 'Marshall Plan', 
or, more properly, the European Recovery Programme (ERP), at Harvard University 
on June 5 1947. According to Marshall, the remedy to Europe's problems lay in 
restoring the economic confidence of the European people. This was a necessity for 
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the well-being of America as well as Europe, as, 
Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of 
disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the 
consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is 
logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the 
return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no 
political stability and no assured peace. ' 
Marshall also went on to point out that, 
Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, 
poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working 
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social 
conditions in which free institutions can exist. 2 
In many ways this can be seen as a continuation of the Roosevelt tradition, echoing 
the Four Freedoms of Roosevelt's Annual Message to Congress of January 1941: 
freedom of speech, of religion, freedom from fear, and 'freedom from want - which, 
translated into world terms, mean economic understandings which will secure to 
every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants - everywhere in the world. 
0 
Marshall felt that aid from the US 'must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises 
develop', that 'Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should 
provide a cure rather than a mere palliative', and that the Europeans must make the 
first move themselves: 
It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much 
further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on 
its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe 
1 Foreign Relations ofthe United States (hereafter FR US), 1947, Vol. 111, Washington: Department of 
State, 1972, 'Remarks by the Honourable George. C. Marshall, Secretary of State, at Harvard 
University on June 5,1947', p. 237. 2 Ibid. 
3 The Public Papers andAddresses ofFranklin D. Roosevelt, 1940 Volume, London: Macmillan, 
194 1, p. 672. 
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as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will 
take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this 
Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for the Government to 
undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet 
economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must 
come from Europe ... 
4 
The reasoning for this, according to George Kennan, the director of Marshall's 
Policy Planning Staff and a key player in the development of the European Recovery 
Programme was firstly, that, 'we had serious doubts about the success of any 
movement toward European recovery that rested merely on a series of uncoordinated 
national programs'. Therefore, 'by insisting on a joint approach, we hoped to force 
the Europeans to begin to think like Europeans, and not like nationalists, in their 
5 
approach to the economic problems of the continent. The second reason was of a 
more practical nature, that without a common approach, 
the United States would have been confronted with a whole series of competing 
national demands, all padded and exaggerated for competitive purposes, all 
reflecting attempts to solve economic problems within national frameworks rather 
than on an all-European basis. This would have forced us to make choices bound 
to be politically unpopular in many quarters, with the respective European 
governments in a position to shift onto our shoulders the blame for any features of 
the programs that were particularly disagreeable to sections of their electorate. 6 
One of the interesting factors is that Marshall's speech was very general, it did not 
outline what form such 'action' or 'program' should take, and it did not mention an 
aid plan as such. It did emphasise that Europe must work together, and must come 
forward with its own initiative and ideas. According to Denis Healey, the Labour 
Party's International Secretary, 'The Americans themselves didn't regard the speech 
4 Ibid. 
George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, New York: Pantheon Books, 1967, p. 337. 
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made at Harvard as much more than waffling aloud, ' but Ernest Bevin, Britain's 
Foreign Minister, 'seized on it as an American "offer" that Europe should respond 
to., 7 Marshall himself described his speech as 'Something between a hint and 
suggestion', adding that he was embarrassed that it should have been dubbed a Plan 
by the president and the press, with his name 'tagged to it'. 8 
Marshall's speech was also an emotive one, highlighting the American thinking at 
this time that economic chaos would lead to political chaos, that Europe must be 
saved, and that anyone who sought to 'perpetuate human misery in order to profit' 
would encounter the opposition of the United States. The speech can be seen as the 
bridgehead to the new politics of the Cold War, echoing in many ways the Truman 
Doctrine, when Truman. had stated that, 
Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full 
cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any 
government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot 
expect help from'us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which 
seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or 
otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States. 9 
The Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine came to be seen as two fronts in the 
crusade against communism. 10 However, in order to draw out these links further, and 
to see the Marshall Plan in terms of its contribution to the establishment of American 
hegemony, it is necessary to pay some attention to the reasons for the Marshall Plan. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, Denis Healey and the Policies ofPower, London: Sidgewick & 
Jackson, 1971 p. 72. 
' Conversation between Marshall and British Ambassador, 30 June 1947; text in NA RG 59, Office of 
European Affairs, cited in David Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction, London: Longman, 1992, p. 86. 
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The Reasons for the Marshall Plan 
The idea for the Marshall Plan did not simply come out of thin air. As Ellwood puts 
it, in the United States, 'Everyone, it turned out had a plan', from the Twentieth 
Century Fund to fomier President Hoover. " Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
had hinted at events to come when he pronounced in a speech in Mississippi at the 
beginning of May 1947 that, 
Not only do human beings and nations exist in narrow economic margins, but also 
human dignity, human freedom, and democratic institutions. 
It is one of the principal aims of our foreign policy today to use our economic and 
financial resources to widen these margins. 12 
Acheson had requested in March that the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee 
produce a report on the question of possible requests for US aid by countries other 
than Greece and Turkey. 13 The result was the establishment of a special sub- 
committee to determine the policies, procedures and costs of assistance by the US to 
foreign countries. This included the 'relevant considerations of United States 
national security and interest which should govem the decision in the case of each 
country', and the effects of refusing aid on each country and on US 'general foreign 
policy and security interests'. 14 Then in April, Marshall set up a Policy Planning 
9 FRUS, 1947, Vol. III, p. 239. 
10 See Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, (5h revised edn. ), New York: Penguin, 1988, p. 85. 
" David Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 79. In Britain, economic reconstruction plans had been 
mapped out in the government's 1947 Economic Survey, but this did not envisage an aid package of 
such dimensions. 
" Excerpts of Acheson speech in Documents on American Foreign Relations, Boston: World Peace 
Foundation, 1947, pp. 159-63, cited in Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, pp. 79-80. 
13 FRUS, 1947, Vol. 111, pp. 197-8, letter from Dean Acheson to the Acting Secretary of State to the 
Secretary of War (Patterson), 5 March 1947. 
14 Ibid., pp. 198-9, Memorandum by the State Department Member, State-War-Navy Co-ordinating 
Committee (Hilldring), 17 March 1947. 
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Staff (PPS), appointing George Kennan as Director. It was from the reports of the 
State-War-Navy sub-committee and the Policy Planning Staff that much of the 
subsequent Marshall Plan was based! 5 
There are many arguments over the reasons for the Marshall Plan. On the one hand, 
it was presented as an act of altruism by the United States, and as intended to save 
Europe from economic disaster. Communist opponents of the American plan, on the 
other hand, saw it as a Wall Street plot, designed to cause a rift with the Soviet 
Union, and to prevent an American economic recession. Neither of these viewpoints 
is accurate, but both include aspects of the realities of the situation. There is 
evidence to show that certain policy makers in the US were concerned about a 
recession, and were hoping to shore up markets overseas. This is shown in the 
findings of the State-Navy-War Co-ordinating Committee which met in early 1947: 
The conclusion is inescapable that, under present programs and policies, the 
world will not be able to continue to buy U. S. exports at the 1946-47 rate beyond 
another 12-18 months. 
The President's Council of Economic Advisors has indicated that a slight 
business recession may be anticipated sometime within the next twelve months. A 
substantial decline in the United States export surplus would have a depressing 
effect on business activity and employment in the U. S.... if the export decline 
happened to coincide with weakness in the domestic economy, the effect on 
production, prices and employment might be most serious. 16 
" For a detailed account of the origins and drafting of the Marshall Plan, see John Gimbel, The 
Origins ofthe Marshall Plan, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979, and Joseph M. Jones, The 
Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5,1947): An Inside Account ofthe Genesis ofthe Marshall Plan, 
New York: Viking, 1955. For a summarised account see Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: 
America, Britain and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 194 7-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987, pp. 40-43. For documents relating to the origins of the Marshall Plan, see 
FRUS, Vol. Ill, pp. 197-249, especially the Memorandum by Charles Kindleberger on the 'Origins of 
the Marshall Plan', July 22,1948, pp. 241-247. 
16 FRUS, 1947, Vol. III, pp. 21 0-11, Report of the Special 'Ad Hoc' Committee of the State-War- 
Navy Co-ordinating Committee, April 21,1947, Annex 'IN' to Appendix "A", Memorandum of 
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This, with other documentary evidence, does suggest that part of the motivation for 
what would become the Marshall Plan did stem from a fear of a US depression 
caused by decreased exports to Europe. However, both the economic and political 
motives for the Marshall Plan go deeper than this. Four main reasons for the 
Marshall Plan are laid out in detail below. 
Firstly, as Hogan convincingly argues, the motivation behind the Marshall Plan can 
be traced back to Roosevelt's New Deal. 17 Roosevelt said to Stalin at Yalta, 
in his [Roosevelt's] opinion any leader of a people must take care of their primary 
needs. He said he remembered when he first became President the United States 
was close to revolution because the people lacked food, clothing and shelter, but 
he had said, 'If you elect me President I will give you these things', and since then 
there was very little problem in regard to social disorder in the United States. 18 
Many of the policy-planners at work in the immediate postwar period had been 
involved in the development and implementation of the New Deal, and subsequently 
carried that tradition with them. The New Deal had been based on the premise that 
internal political stability could be enhanced by improving people's standard of 
living through economic growth: politics could be replaced by the economics of 
growth. Markets needed to be expanded, and people needed to believe that through 
hard work they could improve their lot in life. The Marshall Plan was to some extent 
the international extension of the American New Deal: Europe could benefit from 
Request to Working Group on Economic Aid (Food and Finance), March 21,1947. See also Fred 
Block, The Origins ofInternational Economic Disorder, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977, p. 82. 
17 Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 
1947-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
'a FRUS., The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington: Department of State, 1955, 
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America's enlightened self-interest in growth and so pull itself out of the quagmire 
of internal strife and division. The Marshall Plan, then, was in many ways a 
projection of New Deal ideas abroad, an attempt to modernise the 'Old World' in the 
tradition of American production and enterprise, to 'remake Western Europe in the 
likeness of the United States. ' 19 
Unfettered market capitalism was viewed with suspicion by many sections of society 
in Europe after the War, being linked with the depression and the subsequent rise of 
fascism. There were expectations in Europe for a new social consensus based on 
collectivism and social welfare, rather than a return to the discredited capitalism of 
the 1920s and 1930s based on individualism and prosperity for the few. Parties from 
the left, both socialist and communist, had done extremely well in elections across 
Europe. 20 Both the Conservative and Labour Parties had stood in the 1945 British 
general election promising social security and a national health service. The 
Conservative Party manifesto proclaimed that, 'National wellbeing is founded on 
good employment, good housing and good health', and that 'we are united in being 
determined to avoid in the future' the 'disastrous slumps and booms from which we 
used to suffer. 21 The Marshall Plan programme fitted the mood of the time in that it 
provided a legitimate capitalist answer to the challenges of this revolution of rising 
Tripartite Dinner Meeting, February 10 1945, p. 923. 
19 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 22. 
20 See, for example, Walter Kendall, The Labour Movement in Europe, London: Allan Lane, 1975, 
Socialist and Communist Election Results in Statistical Appendix, pp. 390-398. 
2'Conservative Manifesto 1945, in F. W. S. Craig (ed. ), British General Election Manifestos, 1918- 
1966, Chichester: Political Reference Publications, 1970, pp. 91 and 89. 
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expectations. 22 This was to be capitalism based on state intervention and a rising 
standard of livinp- for everyone through economic growth. As Ellwood notes, 
America expected its political, social, economic and cultural values to be taken up 
along with Marshall Aid, so the ERP gradually added to its equipment a 
remarkable set of tools for broadcasting the lessons of the American way to the 
Old World, a dimension of the Marshall Plan which has always been neglected. 23 
Thus, the Marshall Plan had its own associated ideology. Those in the US involved 
in the Marshall Plan hoped that not only would the reconstruction of Europe 'in the 
image of America' prevent internal dissension and strife, it would provide a bulwark 
against Communist expansion. It was to be a projection of many American ideas and 
ideals onto a Europe that was in a state of economic and political difficulties, the 
largest operation ever of its kind. 
A second main motivation behind the Marshall Plan was that it would provide the 
impetus necessary to replace economic nationalism with economic liberalism. 
Amongst the American 'internationalists', there was concern that peace would not 
survive if the international system was not based on a multilateral free trade regime. 
This kind of thinking was summarised by Cordell Hull, who had retired from his 
post as the US Secretary of State in 1944, and who, as Gaddis points out, 'provided 
much of the impetus behind American foreign economic PoliCy., 
24 Hull felt that, 
To me, unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and 
unfair economic competition with war. Though realizing that many other factors 
were involved, I reasoned that if we could get a freer flow of trade - freer in the 
22 Comment made by David Ellwood at 7he Marshall Plan and its Consequences: a 50 h Anniversary 
Conference, University of Leeds, 23-24 May, 1997. 
23 Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 16 1. 
24 John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins ofthe Cold War 1941-1947, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 18. 
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sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions - so that one country would not 
be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of all countries might rise, 
thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breed war, we might have a 
reasonable chance for lasting peace. 25 
Moves had been made to lay in place the necessary foundations for a multilateral 
free trade system, with the Bretton Woods conference of July 1944, at which the 
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development were established. However, the prevalent economic conditions in 
Europe did not support the establishment of free trade, with the dollar gap providing 
a block on world trade and reconstruction. The Marshall Plan would provide the 
opportunity to free up the system and to add impetus to recovery. 
Thirdly, some policy-makers in the United States were undoubtedly concerned about 
the plight of the European people. Since the end of the War, numerous reports had 
come out of Europe emphasising the difficulties and shortages faced by the 
population. While across Europe recovery was proceeding, it was taking far longer 
than people had expected. Marshall had been shocked at what he had seen during his 
time in Europe attending the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He 
I 
returned on April 28,1947, 'shaken by the realization of the seriousness and urgency 
of the plight of Westem Europe, where recovery had failed to proceed as expected 
and where something approaching total economic disintegration seemed now to be 
imminent. 26 As he put it in his radio address to the nation on the day of his return, 
25 Ibid., p. 19, citing Cordell Hull, The Memoirs ofCordell Hull, Volume 1, p. 8 1. 26 George Kennan, Memoirs, p. 325. 
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'The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. 27 Similar sentiments were 
expressed by William Clayton, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
who pointed out that, 
Europe is steadily deteriorating. The political position reflects the economic. One 
political crisis after another merely denotes the existence of grave economic 
distress. Millions of people in the cities are slowly starving. 28 
Thus, a desire to help the Europeans could have formed some part of the motivation 
for the Marshall Plan. 
Lastly, the Marshall Plan grew out of, and was an added stimulus to, the developing 
Cold War. While it was the view of the Policy Planning Staff that the Second World 
War was at the root of Europe's economic, political and structural problems, it 
recognised, 
that the communists are exploiting the European crisis and that further communist 
successes would create serious danger to American security. It [the PPS] 
considers, however, that American effort in aid to Europe should be directed not 
to the combating of communism as such but to the restoration of the economic 
health and vigor of European society. It should aim, in other words, not to combat 
communism but the economic maladjustment which makes European society 
vulnerable to exploitation by any and all totalitarian movements and which 
Russian communism is now exploiting. 29 
Thus, part of the rationale for the aid programme was to counter communism in 
Europe, or, as the special State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Sub-committee described 
itý 
To reduce or to prevent the growth or advancement of national or international 
27 FRUS, 1947, Vol. 111, p. 219, referring to Department of State Bulletin, May 11 1947, p. 919. 
28 Ibid., p. 230, Memo from Clayton to Under Secretary of State Acheson, May 27 1947. 
29 FRUS, 1947, Vol. 111, Policy with Respect to American Aid to Western Europe: Views of the Policy 
Planning Staff, from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of 
State (Acheson), May 23 1947, p. 225. Also Kennan, Memoirs, p. 336. 
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power which constitutes a substantial threat to U. S. security and well-being and to 
oppose programs of coercion and infiltration, especially when effected by the use 
of armed minorities. 30 
Thus, it was felt that, 
A planned program of assistance to foreign countries should enable the U. S. to 
take positive, forehanded, and preventative action in the matter of promotion of 
U. S. national interests by extending assistance under a system of priorities where 
it will do the most good from the standpoint of promoting U. S. security and other 
national interests. 31 
Similarly, the overall remit for the PPS had been 'to formulate and develop a long- 
, 32 term program for the achievement of American foreign policy objectives. At the 
second meeting of the PPS, on May 8,1947, the members discussed 'the main 
problem in United States security today. ' They agreed that this was, 
to bring into acceptable relationship the economic distress abroad with the 
capacity and willingness of the United States to meet it effectively and speedily; 
that with Greece and Turkey taken care of and the Korean problem now being 
posed, the greatest and most crucial problem is Western Europe; ... that the 
problem is both political and economic, and not military (except insofar as 
maintenance of U. S. military effectiveness is concerned); that the approach to the 
political problem for the moment must be economiC. 33 
As Miscamble puts it, 'the connection between American security and the necessity 
30 Ibid., pp. 205-206, Report of the Special 'Ad Hoc' Committee of the State-Navy-War Co-ordinating 
Committee, Enclosure, 'Policies, Procedures and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign 
Countries', April 21 1947. 
31 Ibid., pp. 205-206, Report of the Special 'Ad Hoc' Committee of the State-Navy-War Co-ordinating 
Committee, Enclosure, 'Policies, Procedures and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign 
Countries', April 21 1947. 
32 Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making ofAmerican Foreign Policy, 1947-1959, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 39, referring to the departmental regulation formally 
establishing the PPS, which is printed in Department ofState Bulletin, Washington: U. S. Dept. of 
State, 1947, May 18,1947, p. 1007. 
33 Miscamble, George F Kennan, p. 40, citing PPS Records, Box 32, Minutes of Meeting, May 8 
1947. 
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34 
of European economic recovery was clearly drawn'. Through the Marshall Plan, 
national security objectives could be achieved though economic and ideological 
means. 
At this point, Marshall and his colleagues did not fear Soviet military aggression as 
such, and in May 1947 'even the war planners in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
explicitly ruled out a Soviet attack. 05 However, they did see clear links between 
European recovery and strategic and geo-political factors, and in order to gain public 
and congressional support for the programme repeatedly drew on the fears of 
communist takeover in Europe. The emergence of the Marshall Plan into the public 
sphere in the US can thus be understood in terms of a disjuncture between the public 
utterances of the administration and their private outlook. Much of US opinion 
remained sceptical about involvement in Europe even as those within the foreign 
policy establishment became convinced of its necessity. As Leffler points out, 
In their testimony before congressional committees, in their public speeches, and 
in their confidential discussions, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Secretary 
of Commerce W. Averell Harriman, and Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal 
emphasized the economic importance of western Europe in terms of the 
fundamental national security interest of the United States. 36 
The result was that the nuances of the planning process were lots in a strident call for 
immediate action. 
34 Miscamble, George F. Kennan, p. 40. 
33 Melvyn Leffler, 'The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan', pp. 277- 
306, Diplomatic History, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1988, p. 279, referring to Joint War Plans 
Committee 474/1, 'Strategic Study of Western and Northern Europe, 13 May 1947, CCS 092 USSR 
(3-27-45), section 20, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, US National Archives. 
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To summarise, the Marshall Plan emerged from a context where US concerns about 
the advance of communism in Europe were interpreted in a way that explicitly linked 
economic prosperity with domestic and international stability, and the national 
security concerns of the US. As Paul Hoffman, the head of the Economic Co- 
operation Administration (the US body charged with administering Marshall Aid) 
made clear, the Marshall Plan was not just about exporting aid, but about exporting 
the American way of life to Europe. 37 He felt that that, 'In one very real sense, 
today's contest between freedom and despotism is a contest between the American 
assembly line and the Communist party line. 38 The result of this 'contest' was the 
establishment of America's leadership, or hegemony, as the US became more and 
more involved in underpinning Europe's recovery and the emerging international 
structure. Gaddis' view is that in the early Cold War years, the US intention was to 
strengthen Europe and prevent communist expansion, rather than to establish its 
domination per se. 39 'But intentions are one thing; actual policy is something else 
again, as the events of 1948-49 made clear. ' The result was the establishment of US 
hegemony in an incremental way, as the US became increasingly involved in Europe, 
and 'Circumstances gradually compelled the United States to create its own sphere 
of influence in Europe, despite its own profound misgivings about that course of 
AO 
action. 
36 Leffler, 'Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan, ' p. 278. 
37 Paul Hoffinan, Peace Can Be Won, London: Michael Joseph, 195 1, p. 9 1. 
39 Ibid., p. 76. 
39 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History ofthe Cold War, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987, pp. 60-6 1. 
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2.2 The Response to Marshall's Speech 
The response to the Marshall's speech has been seen as a turning point in postwar 
history. While Western Europe was enthusiastic to cash in on the offer of aid, the 
Soviet Union was left in a predicament, which ultimately led to a further step in the 
breakdown of relations between East and West. The response to the Marshall Plan 
was also reflected in internal politics: allegiance to European reconstruction could be 
measured in terms of whether or not the Marshall Plan was supported, an issue to 
which I shall return in subsequent chapters. 
The European Response to Marshall's Speech 
As Ellwood puts it, 'the European response to the new initiative was almost 
instantaneous and the American press was taken aback. 01 On June 13, eight days 
after Marshall's speech, Ernest Bevin addressed the Foreign Press Association in 
London, saying, 
We welcome the inspiring lead given to us and the peoples of Europe by Mr 
Marshall ... I can only say to other nations that when the U. S. A. throws a bridge 
to link east and west, it would be disastrous for ideological or other reasons to 
fmstrate her in that great endeavour. 42 
However, privately doubts were expressed about Britain being included on the same 
basis as continental Europe. At the first meeting with William Clayton to discuss the 
Marshall Plan, Cripps, the Chancellor, pointed out 'that there was a difference 
between the U. K. and other European countries because of U. K. trade with non- 
40 Ibid., p. 61. 
41 Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 86. 
42 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1946-1948, Vol. VI, London: Keesing's, 1948, p. 8659. 
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European countries. ' Bevin argued that, 
if the U. K. was considered just another European country this would fit in with 
Russian strategy, namely, that the U. S. would encounter a slump and would 
withdraw from Europe, the U. K. would be helpless and out of dollars and as 
merely another European country the Russians, in command of the Continent, 
could deal with Britain in due course. 43 
Clayton and other US policy-makers refused to accept that Britain should be treated 
differently from the rest of Europe, even though Bevin emphasised that Britain was 
in a unique position to assist in economic revival because of the British Empire. 
Furthermore, 'The British did not want to go into the program and not do anything - 
this would sacrifice the "little bit of dignity we have lefV'. A4 To have treated Britain 
as separate from Europe, Clayton argued, would have resulted in a 'piecemeal' 
approach, which had been rejected by Marshall at the time of his speech. 45 
Despite this disagreement, events were to move quickly. Bevin met with his French 
counterpart, Georges Bidault to discuss a first response to the embryonic Marshall 
Plan offer on 17-18 June. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, joined them on 27 
June. When Molotov arrived, he found that Bevin and Bidault had already set some 
of the terms for involvement in the plan. 'In this famous crisis of Cold War history 
they were confronted with the Western insistence on a jointly fonnulated and 
implemented recovery strategy treating the whole of Europe, including Germany, as 
43 FRUS, 1947, Vol. 111, Memorandum of conversation by the First Secretary of the Embassy in the 
UK (Peterson), of the first meeting of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) and 
ambassador with British cabinet members, June 24 1947, p. 27 1. 
44 Ibid., Memorandum of second meeting of Clayton with British cabinet ministers, June 25 1947, 
p. 277. 
45 Ibid., Memorandum of first meeting, 'Recapitulation of Main Points of Discussion', June 24 1947, 
p. 274. 
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a single economic entity. 46 This, as Bevin and Bidault presumably realised, would 
not be acceptable to the Russians as it would mean opening up the Soviet economy 
to Western inspection. This 'would have revealed the full extent of the Soviet's 
economic weakness, which was not known in the West at this time., Subsequently, 
Molotov walked out after three days, in a fanfare of negative publicity. The Soviet 
position was that 'Any attempt to compel the conference to engage in drawing up an 
all-embracing programme for the European countries - which will inevitably entail 
intervention on the part of some states in the affairs of others - cannot be accepted as 
a basis for co-operation among the European countries ., 
47 MolotoViS suggestion had 
been that each country should prepare its own estimates of its needs, submitting them 
by way of a co-ordinating committee to Washington. This proposal was the one that 
was subsequently put into operation; there were no formal commitments to European 
integration in the Marshall Plan, and each country drew up a list of its need 
unilaterally. 
48 
How sincere the American offer of aid to the Soviet Union had been is debatable. After 
a conversation with the British in Paris, Caffrey, the US Ambassador in Paris, sent a 
telegram on the 18 June to Marshall commenting on the state of the talks between 
Bevin and Bidault. Caffrey wrote that the, 
British feel that Russian participation would tend greatly to complicate things and 
46 Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 87. 
47 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. VI, p. 8683. 
48 Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 86. See also Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 
1945-51, London: Methuen, 1984, pp. 61-66, Hogan, The Marshall Plan, pp. 45-53, and Imanuel 
Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective, 
London: Greenwood, 1983, pp. 10-12. 
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that it might be best if Russians refused invitation. They tell me that French also 
offer (appear? ) [sic] to share this feeling. 49 
In a telegram later that day, Caffrey infortned Marshall that, 
Bevin and Bidault also both told me separately that they hope the Soviets will refuse 
to cooperate and that in any event they will be prepared "to go ahead with full steam 
even if the Soviets refuse to do so. "50 
Ellwood stresses that the 'French and British were relieved when Molotov walked 
out'. 51 This view is reiterated by Hogan, who notes that: 'the British did not want the 
Russians involved in the plan. But as soon as the Russians walked out ... the British 
fought "tooth and nail" against many of the same things - the collective program, 
sharing sovereignty - which the Russians had disliked. ' 52 The American vision of the 
Marshall Plan had been based around the idea of European integration. The 
American policy planners, even before Marshall's speech, had felt that it would be 
necessary 'to place strong pressure on the European nations to plan by underscoring 
their situation and making it clear that the only politically feasible basis on which the 
U. S. would be willing to make the aid available is substantial evidence of a 
developing overall plan for economic cooperation by the Europeans themselves, 
perhaps an economic federation to be worked out over 3 or 4 years. ' However, they 
were also aware of 'the dangers of appearing to force "the American way" on 
Europe'. 53 
49 FRUS, 1947, Vol. III, p. 25 8, Caffery to Secretary of State Marshall, 18 June 1947,4.00prn. The 
insert appears in the FRUS copy of the telegram. 
50 Ibid., p. 260, Caffrey to Secretary of State Marshall, 'l 8 June 1947,1 1.00pm. 
Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, pp. 86-7. 
Michael Hogan in discussion in Stanley Hoffinan & Charles Maier (eds. ), The Marshall Plan: A 
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Once the Russians left the negotiations, Bevin and Bidault drew up their programme. 
On 3 July they announced the decision to send a joint invitation to twenty-two 
European countries, asking them to participate in a conference to start on July 12 in 
Paris to discuss the European Recovery Programme. 54 The invitation was sent to the 
governments of Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
Spain was the only European country not invited, and the invitation to Gennany was 
sent to the Commanders-in-Chief of the four zones. Whilst the Soviet Union did not 
receive an invitation as such, Bevin and Bidault sent letters to the Soviet embassies 
in London and Paris 'expressing the hope that the U. S. S. R. would not finally refuse 
to participate. '55 
On 9 July, Bulgaria, Poland and Yugoslavia refused the invitation. On 10 of July, 
Czechoslovakia, having at first accepted, rejected their invitation. Albania, Finland 
Hungary and Romania also refused. 56 The Soviet Union could not afford their 
satellite countries to be a part of the Marshall Plan, and so the Conference for 
European Economic Co-operation began in Paris at the Quai D'Orsay on 12 July 
with no representatives from the Eastern bloc. The sixteen countries that were 
represented were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
53 FRUS, 1947, Vol. III, 'Summary of Discussion on Problems of Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Europe', May 29 1947, p. 235. 54 Keesing's Contemporary Archtves, Vol. VI, 1946-1948, p. 8684. 55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., p. 871 1. 
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Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and 
the United Kingdom. 57 At the opening session, Ernest Bevin was 'unanimously' 
58 
elected as its chairman. The delegates were either ministers of foreign affairs or 
trade in their national governments, or their country's ambassadors in Paris. This 
was therefore a high ranking diplomatic conference. On 13 July, the Conference 
passed a resolution to establish the Committee for European Economic Co-operation 
(CEEC), which was charged with creating an account of the resources and needs of 
the sixteen participating countries and of Western Germany for the period 1948-5 1. 
This report was to be drawn up 'on the basis of information freely supplied by the 
States participating', which was to be presented to the US administration by 
September I St. 59 Four special committees were also set up to study the particular 
requirements of the areas of food and agriculture; iron and steel; transport; fuel and 
power. Britain and France were the only countries represented on all four of the 
special committees. 60 
On 15 July the conference adjourned, and on 16 July the Committee for European 
Economic Co-operation (CEEC) met for the first time. The CEEC spent the next few 
months drawing up the report to be passed to the American administration. While 
the US initially allowed the Europeans to draw up their own list of requirements, the 
State Department became increasingly concerned about the CEEC's 'tendency to 
behave as a collection of autonomous national representatives and to put forward 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., p. 8712. 
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what seemed to the Americans to be inflated requests'. 61 As a result, the State 
Department took a closer interest in the CEEC discussions, sending George Keenan 
and Charles Bonesteel to Paris to keep track of events. As Carew points out, 
In particular, every opportunity was taken to impress upon European governments 
that the chances of getting the aid programme though Congress would be greatly 
improved if the would only pursue policies of financial orthodoxy and balance 
their national budgets. 62 
The CEEC report was signed in Paris on 22 September, having first been approved 
by William Clayton, the US Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, on behalf of the 
State Department. 63 The initial CEEC request for $28.2 billion had been rejected by 
the American policy-planners, and in it's place a programme for $17 billion aid was 
devised. 64 This programme was again scaled down to $13 billion as it passed through 
Congress as the 'United States Foreign Assistance Act', which was approved on April 
3,1948. In Britain, a two day debate was held on July 5 and 6 in the House of 
Commons on the motion to approve the Anglo-American Economic Co-operation 
Agreement and to reaffirm the House's support for the objectives of the Convention 
for European Economic Co-operation signed in Paris on April 16. The Convention 
had formally established the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation to 
carry on the work of the CEEC, which had been a temporary body. 65 The motion was 
60 Ibid. 
" Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987, 
PAL 
62 Ibid., referring to Karl G. Smith, 'From the Heart of the American Desert to the Court of St. 
James's: the Public Career of Lewis W. Douglas of Arizona, 1894-1974', unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Connecticut, 1977, p. 396. 
63 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1946-1948, Vol. VI, p. 8955. 64 Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, p. 25. 
65 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1948-1950, Vol. VIl, p. 93 8 8. 
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adopted by 409 votes to 14, the main objection being that Britain was subordinating 
itslef to the US. The votes against came from 7 Conservatives, 2 Labour, 2 
Independent Labour, 2 Communists and I Liberal National. The House of Lords 
approved the motion. The Anglo-American Co-operation Agreement was signed on 
July 6th at the Foreign Office by Ernest Bevin and Lewis Douglas (US Ambassador 
in London). 66 
The Response of the Soviet Union 
As we have seen, the Soviet Union left the Marshall Plan negotiations at an early stage. 
Their walkout also meant the rejection of the Marshall Plan by Eastern Europe. While 
the West made public their regret at this turn of events, it is clear that they were not 
anticipating Russian co-operation in the Marshall Plan programme. However, there is 
some evidence that the Marshall Plan was not rejected outright at the very beginning 
by the Soviet Union. According to Kennedy-Pipe, 'initially the Soviet leadership was 
cautiously welcoming to the prospect of Marshall Aid, not least for the reconstruction 
of certain pads of Eastern Europe'. 67 Kennedy-Pipe, drawing on recent archival work 
by scholars of the Soviet Union, builds up a picture of the Soviet Union at least 
considering the prospect of American aid. 68 
66 Ibid., p. 9389. 
67 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, 'Stalin and the Marshall Plan', paper presented to the International Studies 
Association annual convention, Toronto, March 1997, p. 1. 
68 Ibid. See also Anna Di Biagio, 'The Marshall Plan and the founding of the Cominform, June- 
September, 1947', in F. God and S. Pons, The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53, 
London: Macmillan, 1996, pp. 208-22 1; Scott Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, New Evidence ofthe 
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The evidence presented for this argument is that in early June, Molotov had asked 
Eugene Varga, an eminent economist, to assess American intentions with regard to 
the plan. Varga prepared a report and passed it back to Molotov on 26 June. His 
analysis was that whilst economic self interest motivated the Americans, not least 
their need for new markets in Europe, there could be possible benefits for Moscow, 
although he added there was a danger of political pressure. 69 Kennedy-Pipe argues 
that the fact that the Soviet leadership was initially serious in pursuing the offer of 
Marshall Aid was confirmed in a cable sent on 22 June to the Soviet Ambassadors in 
Warsaw, Prague and Belgrade. These Soviet officials were instructed to talk to 
Bierut, Gottwald and Tito and tell them to 'take the initiative to secure their 
participation in working out the economic measures in question, and ensuring that 
they lodge their claims'. 70 'Initial Soviet enthusiasm over economic opportunities 
however was tempered by concem over what exactly Marshall Aid might mean for 
Soviet control of Eastern Europe. ' 71 Anna Di Biagio argues that Moscow hoped to 
create a 'zone of economic exchange' under the auspices of the Marshall plan. In this 
zone it would be possible to continue the wartime policy of co-operation established 
by the Grand Alliance, while at the same time avoiding undue interference in each 
pp. 1371-86. 
69 Kennedy-Pipe, 'Stalin and the Marshall Plan', p. 10, referring to the Report of Academician Varga 
to Foreign Minister Molotov, 24 June, 1947, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 
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other's 'spheres of influence'. 72 
The Soviet desire for a 'zone of economic exchange' with the West disappeared 
when the West insisted that recipient countries should submit their economic 
conditions and plans to scrutiny. To do this would mean revealing to the West the 
full extent of devastation in the Soviet Union, which would have weakened the 
perception of it as a super-power. 'Molotov was concerned about the effect this 
might have on Soviet control of the East European economies. Moscow feared that 
East European leaders might be induced through this system to alter internal 
policies/priorities perhaps even to the extent of becoming dependent on the markets 
and systems of Western Europe and ultimately the United States. 73 As Di Baggio 
notes, 
Newly available archive material makes it clear that all the steps taken by the 
Soviet leadership in these [Marshall Plan] negotiations were guided by the 
determination to prevent the West from being able to exercise influence in 
countries within the Soviet sphere of influence. So Soviet leaders were extremely 
sensitive to the idea that states of the East might be induced to revise their internal 
policies, bringing them more in line with the free market, with the result that they 
would be more tied into a network of interdependence woven by the United States 
throughout Europe. 74 
There is also evidence that the West was aware of the Soviet Union's predicament. 
Pierson Dixon of the British Foreign Office noted on 2 July 1947 that, to have 
accepted American aid, or have allowed Eastern Europe to do so, would 'introduce 
western methods and ideas into the Eastern European systems, and thus undermine 
72 Di Biagio, 'Founding of the Cominfonn', pp. 209-210. 
73 Kennedy-Pipe, 'Stalin and the Marshall Plan', p. 11. 
74 Di Biagio, 'Founding of the Cominform, p. 210, referring to Narinsky, ISSSR i plan Marhsalla', 
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Soviet influence. It might even undermine the Soviet regime itself. 75 
By the time of the meeting of June 27, the Soviet view towards the Marshall Plan 
had hardened. Any 'welcome' that had initially been shown towards Marshall Plan 
Aid quickly turned to mistrust. On June 16, an article appeared in Pravda stating that: 
'Mr Marshall's plan is ... only a repetition of the Truman plan for political pressure 
with the help of dollars, a plan for interference in the domestic affhirs of other 
countries. 76 Apparently, Moscow had briefly considered a 'wrecking plan' for the 
proposed conference of July in which Europe would discuss its reaction to Marshall 
77 Aid, in a bid to encourage friction between the United States and Europe. In a 
telegram dated 5 July, addressed personally to all the East European Communist 
Party leaders, Molotov issued a directive telling them that their respective 
govermnents should all attend the Paris conference. This would not be in order to co- 
operate, but in order to 'demonstrate the unacceptability of the Anglo-French Plan, to 
prevent unanimous adoption of the Plan and then to leave the Conference, taking 
with them as many delegdtes from other countries as possible. ' However, within a 
few hours Moscow decided against such a course of action. 78 Presumably they feared 
that the East European leaders might decide to join the ERP at the last Moment. 79 
75 Dixon Diary, 2 July 1947, Pierson Dixon Papers, cited in Geoffrey Warner, 'From "Ally" to 
Enemy: Britain's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-8', p. 305, in God and Pons, The Soviet 
Union and Europe in the Cold War, pp. 293-309. 
76 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 194648, Vol. 6, p. 8659. 
77 Di Biagio, 'Founding of the Cominform, p. 2 10, referring to Molotov's telegram of 7 July in 
G. Takhnenko, 'Anatomiia odnogo politicheskogo resheniia (K 45 - letiyu plana Marshalla)', 
Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, 5,1992, p. 125. 
78 Ibid. 
79 See Di Biagio, 'Founding of the Cominform', pp. 210-1 1, and Kennedy-Pipe, 'Stalin and the 
Marshall Plan', p. 11. 
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Instead, its East European satellites were instructed not to attend the conference. 
As an exercise in anti-communism, the Marshall Plan was undoubtedly a success. 
This was partly because Marshall Aid was initially offered to the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. This gave the US a propaganda advantage in that they could deflect 
Soviet accusations of anti-communism with the evidence of this offer. However, it is 
highly unlikely that the Americans had any rational expectation of the Soviet Union 
accepting the offer of aid. The same can be said for Britain and France. If the Soviet 
Union had co-operated, then presumably the Marshall Plan would have floundered 
once the divisions between East and West intensified in the deepening Cold War. 
That the Marshall Plan was a key event in the history of the Cold War cannot be 
doubted. By 1948, 'Marshall Aid had become confirmation for Soviet leaders that 
Western leaders were determined to exploit Soviet economic weakness and "lure" 
Eastem Europe into a Westem camp. '80 
0 
2.3 The Marshall Plan, Britain and the Soviet Union 
It is commonly argued that the US used the Marshall Plan to swing Britain towards 
the American sphere of influence and so alter relations between Britain and the 
Soviet Union. However, the leaders of the British government had taken a more 
suspicious stance towards the Soviet Union even before the Second World War was 
over. Gamble points out that 'In the latter stages of the war British strategic thinking 
so Kennedy-Pipe, 'Stalin and the Marshall Plan', p. 1. 
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became preoccupied with contaimnent of Soviet power. '81 This cautious approach to 
the Soviet Union continued with the election of a Labour government. During 1945 
and the first half of 1946, the Americans had in fact resisted what they saw as British 
attempts to forge an Anglo-American front against the Soviet Union. 82 In early 1946, 
members of the British embassy had launched discrete efforts to toughen the 
American government's attitude towards the Kremlin. 83 By the autumn of 1946, the 
American position had changed. 'It was a major triumph for British policy after 1945 
when the Americans endorsed the idea that the Russians must be contained and 
isolated at all costs, for the security of the world order. ' 84 
Having helped push for the change in the US position towards the Soviet Union, the 
British government then had to explain to the US why it was not being more anti- 
Soviet in its rhetoric. One of the key reasons for this situation, was that public 
oPinion, and left-wing members of the British government, did not share the anti- 
communism being voiced by the central organs of government. For example, in 
November 1946 Richard Crossman, along with fifty-six other left-wing Labour MPs, 
forwarded an amendment in the House of Commons criticising the government's 
foreign PoliCY. 85 This reflected a rising tide of complaint from the left over the lack 
81 Andrew Gamble, Britain in Decline: Economic Polic)4 Political Strategy and the British State, (4h 
edn. ), London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 108. 
82 See Caroline Anstey, 'The Projection of British Socialism: Foreign Office Publicity and American 
Opinion, 1945-50', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 19, No. 3,1984, pp. 41745 1. 
83 E. Halifax to E. Bevin, 18 February 1946, including comments by 1. Berliri and J. Balfour on a 
memorandum by Joseph E. Davies. FO 115/4270. Cited in Anstey, 'The Projection of British 
Socialism', p. 433. 
84 Gamble, Britain in Decline, p. 108. 
95 Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard), 5h Series, London: HMSO, 1946, Vol. 430, col. 526, November 
1946. 
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of a 'socialist' foreign policy. Anstey points out that the Foreign Office had the 
problem of trying to satisfy public opinion in the UK and US at the same time. 
'Faced with an American public which was increasingly hostile towards the Soviet 
Union, and a British public which, according to the Foreign Office, "for the most 
part desires close relations and alliance with Russia7,86 aligning rhetoric with reality 
simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic became increasingly difficult. An 
answer of sorts lay in educating the British public to adopt a tougher stand, and in 
informing American officials of the nature of the Foreign Office's predicament. 87 
While Bevin asked the press to take a tougher anti-Soviet line, Waldemar J. 
Gallman, the minister at the American embassy in London, reported the predicament 
to the American Secretary of State, George Marshall, that, 
Foreign Office officials directly charged with Soviet affairs have recently and 
repeatedly indicated that while there is no change in substance United Kingdom 
policy towards USSF, every move must be carefully considered and planned from 
point of view of protecting Bevin from Labour Party rebels ... in light of Labour 
rebellion Bevin and Foreign Office now take greater pains to avoid creating 
impression he is ganging up with the United States against Russia. 88 
It appears that the United States changed its stance towards the Soviet Union in early 
1946. According to Gaddis, 'The period of late February and early March 1946, 
marked a decisive turning point in American policy toward the Soviet Union'. Up 
until then, attitudes towards the Soviet Union had developed on an ad hoc basis, with 
little consistency besides the assumption of shared basic interests in peace and 
96 W. Gallman to G. Marshall, 2 February 1947,841.00/2-2-47. Records of the Department of State, 
National Archive, Washington, cited in Anstey, 'The Projection of British Socialism', p. 434. 7 Anstey, 'The Projection of British Socialism', p. 434. 
8 W. Gallman to G. Marshall, 3 February 1947,841.00/2-3-47, cited in Anstey, 'The Projection of - 
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stability. 
89 It was not until after Kennan's Long Telegram of February 22,1946, that 
the US fully started to reconsider its position vis-A-vis co-operation with the Soviet 
Union. In the Long Telegram, Kennan set out his perceptions of the Soviet postwar 
outlook and the implications of this for American policy. The Soviet Union was 
described as, 
a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no 
permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal 
harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the 
international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. 90 
The conclusion was that the Soviet Union would not co-operate with the United 
States. The resulting policy was contaimnent. 
Kennan later wrote that whereas none of his previous communications 'had seemed 
to evoke even the faintest tinkle from the bell at which they were aimed, this one, to 
my astonishment, struck it squarely and set it vibrating with a resonance that was not 
to die down for many months. ' This was down to its timing: 'Six months earlier this 
message would probably have been received in the Department of State with raised 
eyebrows and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later, it would probably have 
sounded redundant, a sort of preaching to the convinced. '91 Difficulties in reaching 
agreement at the Council of Foreign Ministers' meetings in Paris also heightened the 
general perception that the Russians were becoming increasingly belligerent. It is 
also likely that there was some influence in this sea change in American attitudes 
British Socialism', p. 435. 
" Gaddis, The United States and the Origins ofthe Cold War, pp. 312-313. 
90 Kennan, Memoirs, Appendix C, 'Excerpts from Telegraphic Message from Moscow of February 
22,1946', p. 557. 
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from British sources. It should also be mentioned that Kennan was good friends with 
Frank Roberts, the British charge d'affairs in Moscow, and it is not entirely 
implausible that some of Kennan's analysis reflected the British point of view. 92 
Possibly of importance at this point was the role played by Churchill. While on a 
private trip to the United States, Churchill lobbied President Truman to take a 
tougher line towards the Soviet Union. Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech in March at 
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, helped to strengthen the swing towards 
anti-communism, though it did serve to embarrass the British government. 93 
Certainly the progress of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement seems to have 
benefited from a new realisation in Congress. 94 By the time it came to the final vote 
in Congress in mid-1946, leaders in both Houses of Congress presented the issue of 
the British loan as a political choice between good and evil. Rayburn, the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives, gave a short speech on the floor of the chamber as the 
laon to Britain was being debated: 
I do not want Western Europe, England, and all the rest pushed further into and 
toward an ideology that I despise. I fear if we do not cooperate with this great 
natural ally of ours, that is what will happen. If we are not allied with the great 
91 Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 294 & 295. 
92 Richie Ovendale, 'Britain and the Origins of the Cold War', talk given at the International Studies 
institute, University of Leeds, 2 May 1997. 
93 For ftirther information on the role played by the British in moving the US towards a firmer stance 
with the Russian, see Terry Anderson, The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944- 
1947, Columbia, 1981. 
94 Resulting in a US loan to Britain worth $3.75 billion. Keynes had led the British negotiations, 
which were difficult and protracted. A condition of the loan required Britain to make sterling fully 
convertible into dollars within one year of the agreement. The result of this was to exacerbate the 
drain on Britain's dollar reserves, with an exchange crisis in summer 1947. Convertability was 
suspended on August 20,1947. See Alec Cairnross, The British Economy since 1945, (2 nd edn. ), 
oxford: Blackwell, 1995, pp. 52-55. For detailed coverage see Richard Gardner, Sterlin&Dollar 
Diplomacy, (2 nd edn. ), New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. 
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British democracy, I fear somebody will be and God pity us when we have no ally 
across the Atlantic Ocean, and God pity them too. 95 
Events moved quickly to confirm American fears about the spread of communism. 
The severe winter of 1946/7 saw economic problems across Europe. With the fall of 
the French coalition government in May 1947, Washington feared the communists 
might exploit the situation and take power through force (however unlikely this may 
have been). Problems in Italy, Greece and Turkey led to the announcement of the 
Truman Doctrine. Whilst the Marshall Plan-originated out of the deepening Cold 
War, it in turn added its own impetus. Kennedy-Pipe notes that 'The first Soviet 
priority in response to the Marshall Plan was to tighten Soviet control over East 
European Communist Parties. 96 In September 1947, representatives of the 
Communist Parties of the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, France, Italy and Yugoslavia met in Poland to create the Cominform 
(Communist Information Bureau). To the chagrin of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain, it was not invited, as the Cominform was to consist of communist parties 
that were or, in the cases of Italy and France, had been in government. 
97 The 
Cominforni was to be act as an information bureau, designed to co-ordinate the 
activities of the Communist Parties and smooth out differences between them. 
Interestingly though, Di Biagio notes that the need to establish such an organisation 
" Cited in The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 
1947, pp. 368-9. 
16 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1995, p. 120. 
97 Noreen Branson, History ofthe Communist Party ofGreat Britain, 1941-1951, London: Lawrence 
& Wishart, 1997, p. 157. 
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had been discussed earlier, in June 1946, in a meeting between Stalin, Tito, and 
98 Dimitrov, that is, before the Marshall Plan had been announced. While Yugoslavia 
resisted Soviet attempts to centralise control, a series of bilateral treaties were 
imposed upon Eastern European states during early 1948. In February 1948, a 
communist coup in Czechoslovakia ousted the coalition government, and the Berlin 
blockade began in June 1948. 
Conclusion 
The Marshall Plan was undoubtedly in part a response to, and a development of, the 
growing Cold War. However, the Cold War was not something that originated in the 
United States. Britain had been pushing for a harder line to be taken towards the 
Soviet Union during 1945, and, arguably, during the final years of World War II. 
Thus, while the Marshall Plan originated out of an American perspective on the 
future of Europe, its inherent anti-communist aspect was not unwelcome or 
unexpected in Britain. The initial interest expressed by the Soviet Union did not, in the 
end, make any difference to the deepening suspicions of the West. The impact of the 
Marshall Plan on British trade unions can only be understood in terms of the climate of 
opinion that was forming at this time, namely that the Soviet Union would not co- 
operate with the West and could not be trusted. The next chapter concludes this first 
section of this study by analysing the overall scale and impact of the Marshall Plan in 
Britain. 
98 Di Biagio, 'Founding of the Cominfonn', p. 209. 
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Chapter 3 
The Scale and Impact of the Marshall Plan 
Introduction 
This chapter concludes my analysis of the overarching context of the Marshall 
Plan. It examines the scale of Marshall Aid, the form that the aid took, and the 
specific aims of the Marshall Plan, in order to assess the impact of the 
programme and the amount of leverage that this gave the US over the recipient 
states. It focuses in particular on Britain, as it forms the backdrop for the 
arguments developed in the second part of the thesis on British labour and the 
Marshall Plan. 
3.1 The Specific Aims of the Marshall Plan 
The US administration identified four prerequisites for achieving European 
recovery through the Marshall Plan. These were stated in the Foreign Assistance 
Act as 'a strong production effort, the expansion of foreign trade, the creation and 
maintenance of internal financial stability, and the development of economic co- 
operation. " This last objective was to include 'all possible steps to establish and 
maintain equitable rates of exchange and to bring about the progressive 
elimination of trade barriers. 2 The first two aims could easily be agreed on by all 
the states involved as necessary for economic recovery, and some success was 
attained with them. Production did increase, as did foreign trade. The combined 
1 'Foreign Assistance Act, 3 April 1948', in the Royal Institute of International Affairs' 
Documents on European Recovery and Defence, March 194 7 -April 1949, London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1949, p. 3 1. 
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Gross National Product for Western Europe had grown from $120 billion in 1947 
to almost $159 billion by 195 1, an increase of 32.5 percent. 3 By the end of 195 1, 
the index of industrial production for all participating countries had risen by 35 
percent above the 1938 level, which was higher than the target of 30 percent. 
While this increase in production varied from country to country (with West 
Germany having the poorest record), this was a remarkable achievement, as can 
be seen by the table below. 
Table 3.1 Indices of Industrial Production in Western Europe, 1948-1951, 
(1938 = 100) 
1948 1950 
istria 95 114 134 148a 
lgium 122 122 124 143 
nmark 1 ')5 143 159 160 
ance 111 122 123 138 
. Germany 
50 72 91 106 
reece 76 90 114 130 
eland 1 ')5 154 170 176b 
aly 99 109 125 143 
ixemburg 139 132 139 168a 
etherlands 114 127 140 147 
orway 125 135 146 153 
Neden 149 157 164 172 
urkey 154 162 165 163a 
nited Kingdom 120 129 140 145 
11 participating countries 99 112 124 135 
11 participating countries 119 130 138 145 
clusive of W. Germany 
L 
i 
N\ cra, -, c o I' first three (It iarters of 195 1 
b Average off irst t\No quarters of 195 1 
Source: First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, p. 75, cited in Wexler, The 
Marshall Plan Revisited, p. 94. 
2 Ibid. 
Imanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisite& The European Recovery Program in Economic 
Perspective, London: Greenwood Press, 1983, p. 250, using OEEC figures. 
4 Ibid., p. 93. 
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Some trade barriers within Europe were reduced, helped by the establishment of 
the European Payments Union. Between 1948 and 1951, trade within Western 
Europe rose by over 70 percent, and extra-European exports grew by 66 percent. 5 
However, despite this success, the third aim set out in the Foreign Assistance 
Act, that of financial stability, proved to be a more intractable problem. 
One of the main tools with which the US could influence recipient states, and 
influence financial stability, was through the counterpart funds. Under Section 
115, clause (b), part 6 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the recipient countries had 
to deposit sums of money in their local currency equal to the dollar value of the 
imports provided by the Marshall Plan. In all, roughly $8.6 billion was collected, 6 
known as the counterpart funds. 7 5% of these funds had to be paid directly to the 
US Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) for its own administrative 
costs, for the stockpiling of strategic materials, and other expenditures such as 
gathering and distributing information on the Marshall Plan. 8 The remaining 95% 
of counterpart funds could be used for 'purposes of internal monetary and 
financial stabilization, for the stimulation of productive activity and the 
exploration for and development of new sources of wealth', or for other 
expenditures which were 'consistent' with the purposes of the Foreign Assistance 
Act. ' The counterpart funds were one of the major ways in which the US was 
5 Ibid., p. 252. 
" Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, p. 87, citing First Report to Congress on the Mutual 
Security Program, December 31,195 1, pp. 62-63. 
7 On counterpart, see Jim Tomlinson, 'Another Lost Opportunity? Marshall Aid and the British 
Economy in the 1940s', paper presented to the Economic and Social History Division, University 
of Leeds, November 20,1996, forthcoming in Twentieth Century British Histo? y. 
8 This 5% of the Counterpart Funds was an important financial resource for the propaganda 
campaign which accompanied the Marshall Plan. 
' 'Foreign Assistance Act, 3 April 1948', in Documents on European Recovery and Defence, 
77 
able to exert influence over Europe, since the ECA Administrator, Paul Hoffman, 
had to approve the purposes to which counterpart was put. According to 
Hoffman, counterpart funds played a crucial role in the success of the Marshall 
Plan: 
I can say flatly that it made the difference between success and failure for the 
Marshall Plan in every nation that had a shaky government, and it helped 
mightily with those that had strong ones. It was, I believe, the indispensable 
idea - the essential catalyst. ' 0 
The ECA attempted to influence the policies of certain countries through the use 
of this 'essential catalyst'. In France, for example, Carew notes that 'the ECA 
applied strong pressure to force deflationary policies on the govermnent. 
However, there were limits to US influence, and 'the Americans were forced to 
soft-pedal their approach from time to time or risk the collapse of the French 
government and its replacement by one hostile to the United States. "' Financial 
stability was something that all the European states wanted to work towards, but 
they differed sometimes from the US in their views as to immediate priorities 
given the need to boost production at a time of shortages. As Wexler points out, 
the ECA could never reconcile 'the inherent conflict between the financial 
stabilization objective and the need to stimulate large-scale investments so as to 
increase production. ' 12 Hogan notes how the ECA's counterpart policy, 
also aimed to integrate economies and thus clear a path to greater 
specialization, more efficient use of resources, and economies of scale. Using 
counterpart funds to reduce national deficits and stablize currencies was one 
way to eliminate monetary barriers to intra-European trade and economic 
p. 5 1. 
10 Paul Hoffman, Peace Can be Won, London: Michael Joseph, 195 1, pp. 79-80. " Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1987, p. 14, and Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, pp. 100-7. 
'2 Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, p. 114. 
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integation. 13 
The one US aim that was articulated through the Foreign Assistance Act and 
which Europe and the US could not agree on was European economic co- 
operation. As Pollard puts it, 'The record on integration, or as Congress had 
vaguely called it, "unification, " was thus the least satisfactory. ' 14 Despite US 
efforts, and despite the rhetoric of the Committee on European Economic Co- 
operation (CEEC, later called the Organisation for European Economic Co- 
operation), the sort of co-operation that the US envisaged was never achieved. 
While the Europeans saw co-operation in terms of limiting trade barriers, the US 
vision was 'of an integrated Western European economy much like the large 
internal market that had taken shape in the United States under the Constitution 
of 1787. "5 Milward points out that 'The more enthusiastic advocates of a united 
Europe have seen the CEEC as the first solid, political step towards that goal, 
evidence that Western Europe could work and plan in harmony even if only on an 
inter-govermnental base. ' However, he concludes that the CEEC actually 
provides evidence of the very opposite of this: 
The CEEC did more to emphasize the lack of co-operation between European 
economies than their willingness to plan in harmony, and far from bringing 
Western Europe and the United States to a closer economic understanding it 
only served to emphasize how far apart they were. 16 
Milward emphasises the divisions and diversity between the CEEC states. Of the 
13 Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western 
Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 155. " Robert Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins ofthe Cold War, 1945-1950, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 166. 
'5 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 427. 
16 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, London: Methuen, 1984, pp. 69 
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CEEC report, he says this 'began to take the shape which would be least 
acceptable in Washington, a set of sixteen separate requests for aid, thinly and 
inadequately disguised as a common European programme and embellished with 
plentiful but singularly unhelpful statistics. ' 17 Certainly correspondence from US 
officials at the CEEC discussions to the US Secretary of State reveal a large 
degree of dissatisfaction and frustration, in particular at the 'lack of adequate 
progress towards a viable western European economy'. 18 Hogan, however, takes 
a slightly more positive view of the US achievements in this area, for while the 
economic integration pushed for by the US was not achieved by the Marshall 
Plan, 'it seems clear that American recovery policy helped to set the Europeans 
on a road that led from the economic autarky of the 1930s to the Common 
Market of the 1960s. '19 Hogan also stresses that the Europeans, 
refused to engage in genuine joint programming, adapt national production 
plans to European needs, or subordinate national sovereignties to the authority 
of a supranational organization [the OEEC]. Europeans favored the "Molotov 
Approach" and sought a recovery program that would limit the scope of 
cooperative action, meet their separate requirements, and preserve the greatest 
degree of national self-sufficiency and autonomy. 20 
Despite some differences in interpretation, it is generally accepted that the US 
administration's aim of economic integration was never achieved, despite the 
influence that the European Recovery Programme was meant to confer upon the 
US Economic Co-operation Administration. Thus, the issue of European 
integration illustrates that despite the massive advantage that the US had over 
Europe in terms of financial and productive resources, there were limits to what it 
and 70. 
"Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, p. 80. 
18 Foreign Relations ofthe United States, (hereafter FRUS) 1947, Vol. 111, Caffrey to Secretary of 
State, Paris, August 26 1947, p. 380. See also the correspondence from pp. 356435. " Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p-43 8. 
20 Ibid., p. 87. 
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could achieve. It was only able to influence recipient states to take a course of 
action when that course of action was not inimical to them. 
3.2 The Scale and Impact of the Marshall Aid Programme 
Debate has arisen over whether the injection of capital involved in the Marshall 
Plan was really large enough to make a significant difference to European 
recovery. The Europeans had initially been intending to request $28.2 billion 
over four years, but this was seen by Clayton, acting on behalf of the State 
Departm I ent at the Paris CEEC deliberations, as 'out of the question'. 21 By the 
time that President Truman sent his special message on the Marshall Plan to 
Congress, laying out the proposed programme of aid on December 19, the total 
requested was put at $17 billion. 22 By the time the Foreign Assistance Act had 
passed through Congress the request had been scaled down to approximately $13 
billion. 
The Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) announced on 3 July 1948 
the value of the first allocation of aid to Europe. Over the months of April to June 
1948, the first three months of the Marshall Plan, the allocation of aid had been 
$762,747,140 (this included aid to Trieste, and to China which was, somewhat 
confusingly, included in the Foreign Assistance Act under Title IV). The largest 
single amount of $226,066,200 went to Britain. 23 Aid received for the first five 
months of the ERP, from April 3 to August 31, consisted of purchases totalling 
21 FRUS, 1947, Vol. 111, Clayton to Lovett, August 25,1947, p. 377. 
22 Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, p. 25. Wexler notes that shortly after this the specific 
total of $17 billion was removed. 
23 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. VII, 1948-50, London: Keesing's, 1950, p. 9403. 
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$1,292,000,000 ($1.29 billion). The largest aid allocations were to France 
($337,700,000) and Britain ($334,100,000). The largest items in the list of 
commodities were wheat ($230,000,000), coal ($127,600,000) and petroleum 
products ($119,100,000). 
24 For the UK over this period, the largest items were 
wheat and wheat flour ($99,300,000), petroleum products ($44,000,000), meat 
($43,700,00) and dairy products ($35 '900,000). 
25 Thus, for Britain, by far the 
largest proportion of aid was received in the form of food imports. The 
allocations for the third quarter, from October to December, were 
$1,769,000,000, with Britain receiving the largest share with $500,000,000.26 
Table 3.2 Total net ERP aid after utilization of drawing rights, as a 
percentage of 1949 GNP 
Country At pre-September 1949 At post-September 1949 
Exchange rates Exchange rates 
France 9.9 11.5 
Italy 8.8 9.6 
Netherlands 16.1 23.1 
United Kingdom* 5.2 7.5 
West Germany" 4.7 5.9 
Source: Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, Table 16, p. 97. 
*GDP 
** 1950 
Between 1948 and 1952, goods equivalent to approximately $13 billion were 
received by the European countries involved in the ERP. The value of the aid 
received by each country, as shown in the table below, did not necessarily reflect 
the level of devastation. If this had been the case, one would have expected 
Germany to have received more, and for Greece to have received less. Neither 
did the value of aid received necessarily reflect the likelihood of the communist 
24 Ibid., p. 9537. 25 Ibid. 
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threat, since although this would explain the relatively large sums of aid for 
Greece, it does not explain why Britain received more than France and Italy. 
Table 3.3: Value of Marshall Aid received by major recipients, ($m) 
UK France Italy West Netherlands Greece Austria 
Gennany 
$3,176m $2,706m $1,474m $1,389 $1,079 $700 $700 
Source: Foreman Peck, A History of the World Economy, p. 246, based on Harry Price, The 
Marshall Plan and its Meaning, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955, pp. 88-90. 
In absolute terms Britain was the recipient of the largest share. An analysis of the 
first year of the ERP programme written by Harris in 1948, found that 'aid is not 
based primarily on need as indicated by national income or income per capita. ' 27 
Evidence given for this included the fact that, taking the aid calculations for the 
first fifteen months of the programme, the Netherlands was to receive aid equal 
to 16.8 per cent of yearly income and Italy only 8.5 per cent. This was despite the 
Netherlands' per capita income in 1946 being twice that of Italy's. Harris felt that 
'Obviously the deficit in the balance of payments with the Americas is decisive', 
28 
though even this did not fully explain the distribution of the aid. Foreman Peck 
suggests that, 'So far as there was a principle governing the allocation between 
nations, it was the volume of national foreign trade. 29 That the aid seems to have 
reflected patterns of trade and balance of payments deficits with the US suggests 
that one of the primary aims of Marshall Aid was to free up trade in order to 
protect US exports and to maintain markets. In fact, Section 112 of the Foreign 
26 Ibid. 
27 Seymour Harris, The European Recovery Program, Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1948, p. 158. 28 Ibid. 
" James Foreman-Peck, A History ofthe World Economy, Hemel Hempstead, Harts: Harvester 
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Assistance Act was specifically about the 'Protection of Domestic Economy'. 
Clause (a) stated that, 
The Administrator [of the ERP] shall provide for the procurement in the 
United States of commodities under this title in such a way as to (1) minimize 
the drain upon the resources of the United States and the impact of such 
procurement upon the domestic economy, and (2) avoid impairing the 
fulfilment of vital needs of the people of the United States. 30 
Aid was primarily received in the form of goods from the US rather than money. 
Through the Committee on European Economic Co-operation the European 
countries had put in a joint bid for grants for American goods which were then 
scrutinised by the ECA. The goods that the ECA authorised for export as part of 
the European Recovery Programme (ERP) did not always tally with the goods 
that the European states had requested. 31 Many of the requests were scaled down, 
or had items substituted. Harris noted at the time that, 
No competent observer of the ERP will gainsay the fact that it is in part an 
organization for dumping surpluses; and that the support for the ERP stemmed 
partially from those who viewed it as a source of additional markets. 32 
More agricultural products were offered than requested. Instead of sending the 
scrap and semi-finished iron and steel that Europe had asked for, much more 
finished iron and steel was sent than was wanted. Harris wondered whether the 
reason for this was 'the protection and favoring of markets of United States 
producers? 933 This suggests that the influence European recipients had over 
exactly what they received was limited, and does uphold the argument that, at 
least in part, the Marshall Plan was concerned with American markets rather than 
Wheatsheaf, 1995, p. 246. 
30 Foreign Assistance Act in Documents on European Recovery and Defence, p. 44. 31 Harris, The ERP, p. 12. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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European recovery for its own sake. These, however, were not alternatives, as US 
exporters would not have been able to gain access to European markets in the 
absence of European economic recovery. 
3.3 Britain and the Marshall Plan 
One of the abiding debates over the Marshall Plan concerns the extent to which it 
34 
was used to influence policy and politics in the recipient countries. Marshall Aid 
could be used as leverage in several ways: firstly, through control of who was to 
receive it, how much they were to receive, and what it was to be used for. For 
instance, Price noted in his work on the Marshall Plan in 195 5 that 'the ECA was in 
a position to influence policies and operations in the participating countries. ' He 
pointed out that 'The ECA's most obvious "leverage" was its power to determine 
the size of aid allotments and to approve authorizations for specific 
commodities. 935 In this sense, Marshall Plan aid could be used to exercise relational 
power between states. It can be argued that Marshall Aid was used, to a certain 
extent, for political leverage in the cases of France and Italy, where, according to 
Ellwood, the US government 'made it quite clear that Italy would not be a 
beneficiary if its government was made up of Communists and Socialists. 36 It is 
harder to uphold this argument in the case of Britain. 
One interpretation of the impact of the Marshall Plan on Britain has been that the 
" See, for example, John Saville, The Labour Movement in Europe, London: Faber and Faber, 
1988, p. 10 1-103. 
35 Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1955, p. 104. 
36 David Ellwood, 'From "Re-eductatioif' to the Selling of the Marshall Plan in Italy', in N. 
Pronay & K. Wilson (eds. ), The Political Re-education ofGermany and Her Allies after World 
War 11, London: Croom Heim, 1985, p. 226. He refers to Robert Holt & Robert van de Velde, 
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Marshall Plan was one of several momentous events in the postwar period when 
the British government gave way to superior US influence, the others being the 
1945 Washington loan agreement, the convertibility crisis of 1947, the 
devaluation of sterling in 1949, and the rearmament programme due to the 
outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950. Burnham refers to this as the 
6capitulation thesis'. 37 This line is strongly argued by those on the left such as 
Saville, for whom, 
the subordination of Britain to America and the acceptance of a client status 
arose in the earliest days of the postwar government when it became clear that 
to maintain bases overseas required American dollars if domestic social 
reform was to be implemented. 38 
A similar, but more refined argument is that presented by Brett, Gilliatt and 
Pople, that 'the "relative autonomy" of the state was decisively moderated not so 
much by the power of the domestic bourgeoisie as by that of its foreign 
counterparts in the US. 09 Another interpretation has been that the Marshall Plan 
was one of a number of causes, many of which were due to domestic structures in 
British politics, for 'the failure of the Attlee Government to make any significant 
progress towards the creation of its promised "socialist commonwealtW'. -)40 
According to this argument, Marshall Aid led to 'further constraints on the 
radicalism and freedom of manoeuvre of the Labour Government', in particular 
in the area of foreign policy. 41 
Strategic Psychological Operations andAmerican Foreign Policy, Chicago: 1960, Ch. VI 
37 Peter Burnham, The Political Economy ofPostwar Reconstruction, London: Macmillan, 1990, 
V 
John Saville, 'Labour and Foreign Policy 1945-1947: a Condemnation', Our History Journal, 
Journal of the History of the Communist Party, No. 17, May 1991, p. 30. 39 T. Brett, S. Gilliatt and A. Pople, 'Planned Trade, Labour Party Policy and US Intervention: 
The Success and Failures of Post-War Reconstruction', History Workshop, No. 13,1982, pp. 130- 
142. 
40 David Coates, The Labour Party and the Strugglefor Socialism, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975, p. 62. 41 Ibid., p. 68 
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This study, drawing on the detailed work of Burnharn and Milward, argues that 
the British government, while welcoming the stability that US hegemony 
provided, was largely able to resist unwanted American influence exerted 
through the Marshall Plan. This was true both in economic terms, for instance. 
over investment decisions and the issue of economic planning, and in political 
tenns, for instance over European integration and foreign policy orientation. This 
occurred for two major economic reasons, and one major political one, as 
outlined below. 
Firstly, British economy recovery was already progressing by the time Marshall 
Aid arrived. The economic and political impact of the Marshall Plan is often seen 
in terms of the depth of the economic crisis facing Europe, and the amount of 
money that was involved. For Britain, the economic crisis of 1947 was caused 
partly from the success of recovery itself, leading to a dollar shortage, and partly 
by short-term problems caused by the severe winter. Thus, the economic situation 
was not disastrous. Furthermore, while the amount of money that Britain received 
was large (approximately $3 billion), it was mostly used for imports of food and 
raw materials, and not for investment projects. This meant that the US had less 
say over what should be done with the money. Milward's study, based on trade 
and production figures has convincingly argued that, 
Marshall Aid was not in fact important enough to give the United States 
sufficient leverage to reconstruct Western Europe according to its own wishes. 
The main economic importance of Marshall Aid over the whole duration of 
the programme was the imports, particularly goods imports, which it 
permitted. 42 k 
42 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, London: Methuen, 1984, 
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In the case of Britain, this was particularly so. According to Burnham, the 
Marshall Plan 'was not indispensable to the Attlee government's economic 
objectives', and, 
Whilst it is inaccurate to assume that Marshall aid had no beneficial effect on 
British accumulation ... it is wrong to claim that it acted as an economic lifeline for the UK economy. 43 
This is because, 
Marshall aid disbursements to Britain were primarily used for food imports 
releasing resources to enable the already widespread domestic reconstruction 
programme to continue. 44 
About 50% of the aid was used for food imports, while only about 5% was used 
for industrial investment which was already high in Britain. 45 According to 
Harris, writing in 1948, 'a galaxy of British economists - all agree that 
investments are excessive. 46 While the US administration did not have a say 
over what was done with the goods received as part of Marshall Aid, it did 
control which types of goods were allowed for export. In this way, the US could 
have an impact on investment decisions and industrial policy in the European 
countries. Such impact was marginalised in Britain because the goods that were 
most needed were foodstuffs, which the US wanted to send, and not investment 
and capital good. This meant that the US would have less say politically and 
economically, for instance over investment and industrial policy, than if the aid 
had been used for capital equipment. 
p. 469. 
43 Bumham, The Political Economy ofPostwar Reconstruction, p. I 11. 
44 Ibid., p. 72. 
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The second main economic argument concerns the influence that the counterpart 
funds gave the US over policy. As has been noted earlier in the chapter, one of 
the main ways that US policy-makers sought to influence the recipient countries 
was over the use of counterpart funds, the local currency deposits equal to the 
value of the goods received under the Marshall Plan. The ECA only approved 
total withdrawals of $7.6 billion during its lifetime, leaving $1 billion worth of 
accumulated counterpart deposits at the end of the ERP period. " Britain, unlike 
most other countries, chose to use her Counterpart Funds for debt retirement, as 
shown in the table beloW. 
48 
Table 3.4 Uses of Counterpart Funds in Major European Countries 
Country Total deposits Debt retirement Production and 
(millions of or unutilized other purposes 
dollars) (per cent) (per cent) 
UK 1,67' 3 100 0 
France 2,295 8 92 
W. Germany 930 9 91 
Italy 917 14 86 
Norway 305 100 0 
Netherlands 722 62 38 
45 Tomlinson, 'Another Lost Opportunity? ', p. 10. 
46 Harris, referring to Harrod, Hicks, Henderson, Robbins, and Robertson, The ERP, p. 36. 
47 Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, p. 87, citing First Report to Congress on the Mutual 
&, curitv Program, December 31,195 1, pp. 62-63. 
'8 This decision, likewise that of receiving Marshall Aid in the form of food imports, was 
criticised by Correli Barnett in Ch. 19 of The Lost Victorýv, British Dreams, British Realities, 
1945-1950 (London: Pan Books, 1996). Barnett's argument has come under severe criticism from 
Jim Tomlinson, in 'Another Lost Opportunity? '. See also The Observer, 26 October 1997, p. 12. 
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Since Britain used its Counterpart Funds for debt retirement, this limited the 
amount of influence that the ECA had over British policy. Thus, as Carew points 
out, 
Britain, more than any other Marshall Plan country, was successful in resisting 
the pull of American "strings": the use of counterpart for debt retirement 
neutralised its potency as a vehicle of American interference. 49 
The ECA had initially been displeased by the idea of the money being used for 
debt retirement, preferring the money to be used for specific investment 
purposes. However, they did come to see that debt retirement would suit their 
own aim of international trade. 50 British debt retirement would help stabilise the 
sterling area, and provide the basis for the transition towards multilateral trade in 
the long run. Also, according to Carew, using debt retirement as a means of 
reducing liquidity was, 'in American eyes, forcing a measure of anti-inflationary 
discipline on the Labour government. Counterpart was not released to assist any 
British welfare or social programmes, and this helped to reduce the resources 
available for consumption by the Labour government. '" Of course, using 
counterpart funds for debt retirement would have enabled the government to 
channel money initially earmarked for that purpose into other areas such as 
welfare 
Politically, it has been argued that the 'strings' which accompanied the Marshall 
Plan resulted in a reorientation away from a radical, socialist agenda. As Carew 
goes on to say, 
49 Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1987, p. 98. 
50 Jim Tomlinson, 'Another Lost Opportunity?, p. 10, referring to National Record Administration 
(NRA), Washington D. C., RG469/392, ECA London Mission, UK subject files, box 10, 'Use of 
Counterpart Funds, para. 4,5 July 195 1. 
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Marshall Aid and the American influence in Britain that accompanied it 
certainly contributed to that mix of forces that was leading Labour to lose its 
sense of purpose and self-confidence as a radical reforming party in the late 
1940s. 52 
This is to overstate the situation, and this study rejects the argument that the 
Marshall Plan was used to influence the British government in terms of its 
political policies. Certainly, by today's standards, the Labour government was a 
radical refon-ning one. However, in certain areas it sought to maintain the status 
quo, particularly over foreign policy. The 1945 Labour Party election manifesto 
did not promise a socialist foreign policy. Rather, it stated that 'We must 
consolidate in peace the great war-time association of the British Commonwealth 
with the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. 53 This hardly differed from the Conservative 
Party's manifesto which stated that 'Our alliance with Soviet Russia and our 
intimate friendship with the U. S. A. can be maintained only if we show that our 
candour is matched by our strength. ' The Labour Party manifesto also stated that, 
'Our prevailing hope is that the foundations [of peace] will be laid on the 
indissoluble agreement of Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia. ' 54 
The only other Labour Party comment referring to the Soviet Union was, 
Let it not be forgotten that in the years leading up to the war the Tories were 
so scared of Russia that they missed the chance to establish a partnership 
which might well have prevented the war. 55 
This criticism did not commit the Labour Party to any 'socialist' foreign policy. 
While the Conservative manifesto gave greater emphasis to the British Empire 
51 Carew, Lahour Under the Marshall Plan, p. 14. 
52 Ibid., p. 99. 
53 Labour Party 1945 Manifesto, 'Let Us Face the Future', in F. W. S. Craig, British General 
Election Manifestos, 1918-1966, p. 104. 
54 Conservative Manifesto, 1945, in Ibid., pp. 87 and 88. 
55 Ibid., p. 104. 
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and to defence than the Labour one, the lack of comment by the Labour Party 
meant that it was left with greater freedom of action later on. In fact, Churchill 
himself had reassured the House of Commons, when he announced that Attlee 
would accompany him to the Postdarn conference, that he and Attlee 'have 
always in these last few years thought alike on the foreign situation and agreed 
together. ' At the conference 'there will be an opportunity for it to be shown that, 
although Governments may change and parties may quarrel, yet on some of the 
main essentials of foreign affairs we stand together. 56 That the Labour Party 
leadership was likely to take a strong line on the Soviet Union became clear at 
the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. James Byrnes, the US Secretary of State, 
noted that 'Britain's stand on the issues before the (Potsdam) conference was not 
altered in the slightest, so far as we could discern, by the replacement of Mr. 
Churchill and Mr. Eden by Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin. This continuity of Britain's 
foreign policy impressed me. ' Byrnes also wrote that at the first meeting with 
Attlee and Bevin, Bevin's manner towards the Soviet demands for East Prussia 
&was so aggressive that both the President and I wondered how we would get 
along with this new Foreign Minister. "' 
Anti-communism and a suspicion of the Soviet Union were also well entrenched 
in the leadership of the trade union movement. For instance, in 1941, Anthony 
Eden said to Churchill about Walter Citrine, the General Secretary of the TUC: 
You know Citrine's feeling about Communism, which he expressed again 
with undiminished emphasis, even going so far as to say that, were he given a 
choice between life under Nazi or Soviet rule, he would be in no doubt as to 
56 Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard), 5h series, Vol. 41 1, col. 1788,14 June 1945, London: 
HMSO, 1945. 
57 James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, London: William Heinemann, 1947, p. 79. 
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which to choose. 
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This anti-communist sentiment, while not usually presented in such an extreme 
fashion, was prevalent amongst the centre-right of the Labour government and 
the TUC leadership, with anti-communist speeches made regularly at annual 
Congress. 59 When, in 1943 at the height of the alliance with the Soviet Union, the 
General Council of the TUC reluctantly agreed to the removal of Circular 16, 
which from 1934 had prohibited members of the Communist Party from being 
accepted as delegates to the Trades Council, Walter Citrine had stated: 
The General Council are not convinced that the disruptive tactics of the 
Communist Party have been abandoned ... the Council will watch the 
position very carefully and will not hesitate to come to Congress with 
proposals for the re-imposition of the ban if they find that the disruptive 
tactics which led to its imposition are continued. 60 
The anti-communism of the trade union leadership arose from two main factors. 
Firstly, as MacShane points out, 
The anticommunism of labour leaders in 1945 did not emerge from malignant, 
right-wing personalities but was based on a quarter century of disappointed 
observation of the Soviet experiment. 61 
Secondly, and more importantly, the anti-communism of the trade union 
leadership also arose from their own experiences of dealing with communists in 
the labour movement at home. For the leadership of the Labour government, 'the 
Communist Party is not only a political party, but it is a conspiracy. Indeed, it is a 
little doubtfid as to whether it is not more of a conspiracy than a political pai ty., 62 
Ernest Bevin, the former General Secretary of Britain's largest trade union, the 
"' Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), PREM, 4/21/3, Eden to Churchill, August 22,194 1. 
59 For example, by Attlee in 1946: Trades Union Congress Report, 1946. 
60 Trades Union Congress Report, 1943, p. 339. 
61 Denis MacShane, International Labour and the Origins ofthe Cold War, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992, p. 285. 
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Transport and General Workers Union, had become a renowned anti-communist, 
in particular due to the 'attempt by the Communists to break up the Union that I 
built. 63 'Bevin, of course, was anti-Soviet from the beginning, and the gibe that 
he treated the USSR as a breakaway from the Transport Workers was not entirely 
nonsensical. '64 MacShane notes that, Bevin, like his friends in the American 
Federation of Labor, 'had a clear, if obsessive, idea of the Soviet Union and of 
communism, and it was their vision that was imposed on or became conflated 
with goverriment and diplomatic policy after 1945. -)65 
As noted in the previous chapter, during 1945 and 1946 the British had been 
urging the US administration to take a tougher line towards the Soviet Union, and 
were involved in the development of the Cold War, rather than having it forced 
upon them. In 1947 the Attlee government even established a secret Information 
Research Department (IRD) in the Foreign Office, charged with waging war 
against communism through 'grey' propaganda. 66 According to Wark, 
Although Bevin had been initially sceptical of the value of an anti-Communist 
propaganda campaign, experience of Soviet policy made him change his mind 
and by the beginning of 1948 he was prepared to sponsor the IRD with all his 
considerable authority. In turn, the IRD was influenced by Bevin's pugnacious 
spirit. ' 67 
62 Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1946, p. 169. 
63 Ibid., p. 167. 
64 Saville, 'Labour and Foreign Policy 1945-1947', p. 23. 
65 MacShane, International Labour, p. 284. 
66 See Richard Fletcher, 'British Propaganda Since World War Il -A Case Study', Media, Culture 
and Society, Vol. 4, April 1982, pp. 97-109; W. Scott Lucas & C. J. Morris, 'A Very British 
Crusade: The Information Research Department and the Beginning of the Cold War', in Richard 
Aldrich (ed. ), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51, London: Routledge, 
1992, pp. 85-110; Lyn Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda: the Information Research Department: 
1947-1977', Millennium, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 67-83; Wesley Wark, 'Coming in from the Cold: British 
Propaganda and Red Army Defectors, 1945-1952', The International History Review, Vol. 19, 
No. 1,1987, pp. 48-72; Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1988, pp. 207-219. 
67 Wark, 'British Propaganda and Red Army Defectors', p. 49. 
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Wark describes "grey" propaganda, 'the IRD's chosen weapon', as 'selecting and 
slanting information in order to combat the Soviet message: it was the truth 
imparted with a certain "spin". -)68 As Bevin informed the Cabinet, the aim of the 
IRD would be to take the offensive, and 'attack and expose communism and 
offer something far better'. 69 Taylor points out that Bevin originally had a 
different perspective than that of the Americans: he wanted to highlight the 
weaknesses of the Soviet system. 
[Bevin's] view was that American propaganda, by stressing the strength and 
aggressiveness of Communism, 'tends to scare and unbalance the anti- 
communists, while heartening the fellow-travellers and encouraging the 
communists to bluff more extravagantly'. British propaganda, on the other 
hand, 'by dwelling on Russia's poverty and backwardness, could be expected 
to relax rather than to raise the international tension'. 70 
The IRD provided government ministers, journalists and trade unionists, 
including Denis Healey and Herbert Tracey, the publicity director for the TUC 
and the Labour Party, with non-attributable anti-communist information for use 
in speeches and articles. 71 Tracey was also involved with other leading trade 
unionists, including members of the TUC General Council, in the Freedom First 
Committee. This organisation, in its newsletter, Freedom First, stated that, 
We have taken upon ourselves as an unofficial body the simple and 
straightforward task of unmasking Communism, to prevent the election of 
Communists to more executive offices in the unions, and to rid the unions of 
Communist representatives in any official capacity. ' 
ibid., pp. 50-51. 
Philip Taylor, 'The Projection of Britain Abroad, 1945-5 1 1, in Michael Dockrill and John 
Young (eds. ), British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, New York: St Martin's Press, 1989, p. 22, citing 
E. Bevin, 'Future foreign publicity policy', 4 January 1948, PRO, CAB 129/23, CP (48) 8. 
70 Ibid., p. 23, citing 'Future foreign publicity policy', as above. 
71 Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 216, citing Christopher Mayhew (head of the IRD) 
to Bevin, July 9,1948, Mayhew Papers, Private Collection. 
72 Daily Telegraph, 'Newsletter of the Defence of Democracy Trust Against All Forms of 
Totalitarianism', 24 April, 1948, cited in Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 217. 
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According to Weiler's study, Freedom First had direct links with the Foreign 
Office and the IRD through Tracey and other trade unionists. 73 
The anti-communism and suspicion expressed by the Labour government 
leadership was not due, therefore, to US influence, but was internally generated. 
This casts doubt on the argument expressed by those on the left at the time, that 
Marshall Aid was a tool wielded by the US to push Britain into an anti- 
communist and anti-Soviet camp. By contrast, this study will argue that the 
Marshall Plan was used by the Labour goveniment, with the support of the trade 
union leadership, to push its own domestic constituency into an anti-communist 
and anti-Soviet camp. While the Marshall Plan was used by the US to cement an 
anti-communist consensus amongst the West, this was a continuation of, and 
supported, the anti-communist and anti-Soviet policy already being carried out by 
the centre-right Labour government and trade union leadership. The distrust of 
communism and the Soviet Empire came from the centre-right's own experiences 
of dealing with communists as political and trade union rivals; from their 
experiences in government during the War; and from a continuing attachment to 
the British Empire which 'differed from the Tories only at the margin. 74 The 
leadership of the Labour Party and the trade union movement had their own 
brand of anti-communism, and did not need to import it from the United States. 
While sometimes the deep suspicion of communist aims and means arose from 
'socialist' leaders having been 'inoculated ... by having once been members of 
73 Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, pp. 218-219. 
74 Saville, 'Labour and Foreign Policy 1945-1947', p. 32. 
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the Communist Party themselves, 75 this tended to harden, not soften, the 
approach taken towards the hard left. 
This study differs from the arguments presented by writers such as Burnham and 
Milward in that it takes the analysis in a different direction. It argues that the 
Labour government, far from being pushed into a comer by Marshall Aid, 
actually was able to draw upon it to strengthen its position within Britain using a 
strategy that fits in with Bayart's argument about extraversion and with Putnam's 
on two-level games. The Labour government was able to mobilise resources from 
the external environment via the donor nation (the US) to consolidate its position 
domestically, 76 while using the 'reverberation of international pressures' in the 
positive sense to restructure domestic labour attitudes. 
77 For the centre-right 
leadership of the Labour government, the Marshall Plan could be used as an issue 
with which to change others' worldviews and persuade them of the Soviet 
Union's intransigence and ill will, and therefore as a valid reason for not having 
stronger links. It could be used to assure the ascendancy of the centre-right over 
the Labour left in the British political conjuncture, and ensure the implementation 
of their vision upon Britain. This was possible because of the relationship 
between the Labour government and the leadership trade union movement, which 
is analysed in the next chapter. 
75 Healey, The Time ofAly Life, p. 75. This comment is made in reference to continental European 
socialists, but applies equally well to British. 
76 See J. F. Bayart, The State in Africa, London: Longmans, 1993, pp. 21-23. 
77 Robert Putriam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Gaines', 
Appendix in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds. ), Double-Edged Diplomacy: 
International Bargaining and International Politics, Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1993, pp-454456. 
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Conclusion 
The first three chapters of this study have traced the background and context of 
the Marshall Plan. This last chapter has introduced a more British focus to the 
argument. It proposes that rather than perceiving those, such as Britain, on the 
receiving end of US hegemony and US aid, as being passive and as shaped by the 
conditions of the international regime, it is more useful to see the British 
government as taking strength from the circumstances of the Marshall Plan. 
Much of this did tie in with the aims of the US administration, namely to increase 
production and trade, and to strengthen its leanings towards anti-communism. 
The next section of this work traces the particular focus of the study. Chapter 4 
examines the relationship between the Labour government and the trade union 
movement. Chapter 5 traces the reaction of the trade unions to the Marshall Plan. 
Chapters 6 and 7 then focus on the particular organisational apparatus, the 
European Recovery Programme Trade Union Advisory Committee and the 
Anglo-American Council on Productivity. 
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Chapter 4 
The Government and the Trade Unions in Postwar Britain 
Introduction 
The following chapters turn to the main, British, focus of this study. Chapters 4 and 
5 discuss the relationship between the Labour goverment and the trade unions in 
Britain in their domestic and international context. They show how the centre-right 
leadership used the Marshall Plan to bring about the short-term marginalisation of 
the left-wing of the movement, in particular the far left, and so gain more control 
over central trade union issues and organisational structures. Chapters 6 and 7 then 
turn to the organisations that were built up around the Marshall Plan that would then 
assure the long-term marginalisation of the left. 
This chapter looks at the 1945 Labour government and focuses on the main area of 
discontent voiced by the left of the Parliamentary Labour Party, that of Bevin's 
foreign policy. It describes the nature of the trade union movement in the immediate 
postwar period, and examines the relationship between the Labour government and 
the unions. The nature of this relationship is crucial to understanding the difficulties 
that the Labour government faced. The Labour Party at this time relied on the trade 
union movement for much of its electoral support and funding. In order to be able to 
oversee successful postwar reconstruction, the Labour government needed to 
maintain its support. However, the left and more militant sections of the trade union 
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movement at this time posed a problem for the goverrunent, for not only did they 
have high expectations about the implementation of socialist policies, but were also 
well organised. Thus, the Labour government needed to be able to manage and 
control this section of its own social base. In part, the study will argue that the 
Labour government was able to do this by drawing on the international situation, the 
strength of the United States, and the deepening of antagonisms towards the Soviet 
Union. The Marshall Plan provided a key initiative in this respect, since it not only 
suggested to the public the generosity of the United States, but also the malevolence 
of the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan mobilised cross-national collaboration 
between like-minded government officials, business leaders, and, crucially, trade 
unionists, which provided ftirther support and encouragement for those on the 
centre-right of the labour movement in Britain. This aspect of the machinery of the 
Marshall Plan will be examined in the following chapters. Firstly, there will be an 
examination of the structure of the Labour movement in Britain, and an analysis of 
the most important issues over which the Labour government needed to exert its 
control. 
4.1 The 1945 Labour Government 
The Labour goverment was elected in 1945 on a wave of euphoria. The Labour 
victory had not been widely anticipated, but was decisive: the Labour Party polled 
47.8% of the votes and won 393 seats, compared with the Conservative's 39.8% of 
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the votes and 213 seats. ' Many policies had not been worked out in detail before the 
election, 2 for instance with regard to economic strategy 'there was no blueprint 
which the 1945 government could implement', 3 but there were expectations of wide- 
ranging change amongst the Labour Party's supporters in the trade unions, from 
workers control in the nationalised industries to a socialist foreign policy. However, 
the leadership of the Labour government and the trade union movement were, on the 
whole, on the centre-right of the labour movement. As Seyd has pointed out, from 
the early days of the Labour Party, 'a tension has existed between those who regard 
the Party's purpose as being to transform the relationships between capital and 
labour and those who view it as being the need to improve the efficiency and temper 
A 
the inhumanity of capital. Different, but complementary tensions, have also existed 
'between those believing in the need to transform international relationships by 
pursing principled positions involving cooperation and harmony between states and 
those observing the competitive nature of international politics and concluding that 
realism rather than idealism must be the guide. '5 The structure, the development, and 
the diverse groupings within the Labour Party meant that it was unusually prone to 
factionalism. 
Ideological argument has been a common feature of the Party's politics and has 
provided the basis for an intra-Party Left/Right factionalism. The factional 
differences can be summarised as being the contrast between the pursuit of 
1 D. Butler and G. Butler, British Political Facts, 1900-1985, (6'ý edn. ), Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1986, p. 226. 
David Coates, The Labour Party and the Strugglefor Socialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975, p-62- 
' Michael Cunningham, "'From the Ground Up"?: The Labour Governments and Economic Planning', 
in Jim Fyrth (ed. ), Labour's High Noon: The Government and the Economy 1945-51, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1993, p. 5. 
Patrick Seyd, The Rise and Fall ofthe Labour Left, London: Macmillan, 1987, pp. 1-2. 
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transformation and amelioration of society, between the visionary and practical 
approach to politics, between an emphasis upon class and nation, and between 
support for industrial militancy and industrial harmony. 6 
This tension between left and right within the Labour Party affected perceptions on 
all policy areas, but as Pelling and Reid have pointed out, 'by far the most 
contentious areas of policy within the Labour Party itself were foreign affairs and 
defence. 0 Although the 1945 Labour Party election manifesto, Let Us Face the 
Future, had made no specific mention of a socialist foreign policy, many on the left 
believed that Labour's foreign policy would involve a reorientation away from the 
United States towards the Soviet Union. 8 The success at the 1945 election meant that 
the Labour Party was in a unique position of having a majority government, and so 
the opportunity of putting its vision to the test. The realities of governrnent, however, 
meant that it was the centre-right pragmatists who were to have their vision of 
socialism implemented. As Weiler points out, Bevin's famous remark of 'left 
understands left' did not actually imply a more sympathetic attitude towards the 
Soviet Union. 9 In fact, given the extent of support for left-wing views within the 
labour movement, 'Bevin and other Labour leaders frequently had to temper what 
they said in public if they wanted to avoid criticism'. 10 Criticism, that is, from the 
more left-wing sections of the Labour Party and trade union movement. As Hinton 
6 Ibid. 
Henry Pelling and Alastair Reid, A Short History ofthe Labour Party, (116, edn. ), London: 
Macmillan, 1996, p-91. 
I Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1988, p. 189. 
9 Ibid. 
'0 Ibid. 
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notes, 'Those who in 1945 thought they were on the threshold of a gradual transition to 
socialism were to be sadly disappointed. "' 
This disappointment was reflected in a rising tide of complaint from the left, which 
6was almost totally preoccupied with questions of foreign policy. ' 12 At the 1946 
Labour Party Annual Conference, out of six resolutions on foreign affairs, only one 
was positive, and that was on the United Nations. 13 Criticism was made of the 
'Government's apparent continuance of a traditionally Conservative Party policy of 
power politics abroad'; 14 of the lack of changes in Foreign Service personnel; over the 
barriers of Jewish immigration to Palestine; of the continued diplomatic relations with 
the Franco regime in Spain; and over relations with the Soviet Union: 
This Conference is of the opinion that world peace can only be based on a British 
foreign policy directed to ensure firm friendship and co-operation with the 
progressive forces throughout the world, and in particular with the U. S. S. R., and 
that such a policy should over ride British Imperial interests! 5 
While all the critical resolutions were either withdrawn before being voted upon, or, 
like the one above, were defeated, they still carried a worrying message to the 
government, representing the growing campaign for a 'Third Force'. 
The repeated protest from the left of the Parliamentary Labour Party was that, 
" James Hinton, Labour and Socialism: A History ofthe British Labour Movement 1867-1974., 
Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983, p. 16 1. 
12 Coates, The Labour Party and the Strugglefor Socialism, P. 190. For more detailed information on 
the Labour left's attitude towards foreign policy, see Michael Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in 
Labour's Foreign Policy, 1914-1965, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969; Jonathan 
Schneer, Labour's Conscience, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988. 
13 Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1946, p. 150. 
14 Ibid., p. 15 1. 
13 Ibid., p. 157. 
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It is felt that when our policy meets with such hearty approval from the Opposition, 
there must be something wrong with it. It is felt that if the Tories applaud it, it 
cannot be a Socialist Foreign Policy. 16 
Instead, the advocates of a Third Force called for a foreign policy which would 'chart a 
middle way between America and Russia', as Britain's 'historic role' was to 'become 
the leader of a Third Force in world affairs, politically democratic, economically 
socialist, capable of mediating between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. '17 The frustration 
with Bevin's foreign policy reached a climax when in November 1946 fifty-seven 
back-bench MPs tabled an amendment to the Debate on the King's Speech. Richard 
Crossman, speaking on behalf of them, expressed, 
the urgent hope that His Majesty's Government will so review and recast its 
conduct of International Affairs as to afford the utmost encouragement to, and 
collaboration with, a Nations and Groups striving to secure full Socialist planning 
and control of the world's resources and thus provide a democratic and constructive 
Socialist alternative to an otherwise inevitable conflict between American 
Capitalism and Soviet Communism in which all hope of World Government would 
be destroyed. ' 8 
After the debate, which included a strong defence from Attlee on behalf of Bevin who 
was in the US at that time, Crossman backed down and unsuccessfidly tried to 
withdraw this amendment. While none of the Labour MPs voted in favour, 19 
'something like 90 members of the Parliamentary Labour Party had shown their 
disapproval of the Government's foreign policy by abstaining from a vote. 20 
" Comment by Hutchinson, MP for Rusholme, Manchester, Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard), 50' 
Series, London: HMSO, 1946, Vol. 419, col. 1322,21 February 1946. 
17 Jonathan Schneer, 'Hopes Deferred or Shattered: The British Labour Left and the Third Force 
Movement, 194549', Journal ofModern History, Vol. 56, No. 2,1984, p. 198. 
Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard), 5h Series, Vol. 43 0, col. 526,13 November 1946. 
ibid., cols. 591-2. 
20 Tribune, November 22,1946, cited by Schneer, 'The British Labour Left, p. 206. 
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There was also a growing level of discontent being expressed by the left of the trade 
union movement, again particularly over foreign policy. At the 1946 annual Trades 
Union Congress, only one resolution was forwarded on foreign policy, and this was 
highly critical of the government. This came from a communist member of the 
Electrical Trades Union, and stated that 'Tbis Congress views with serious concern 
aspects of the Government's foreign policy. ' This concerned policy regarding Greece, 
SPain, de-Nazification in Germany, and the Soviet Union, since 'the isolation of the 
Soviet Union, along with the tying of the economy of Britain with that of Capitalist 
America is in our view extremely dangerous' .21 This resolution was defeated by 
3,557,000 votes to 2,444,000. However, it sufficiently annoyed the Prime Minister, 
Clement Attlee, that he made direct reference to it in his speech to the Congress, saying 
the resolution was 'filled with the kind of misrepresentation to which we have become 
accustomed from the members of the Communist Party, their dupes and fellow 
tmvellers. 
22 
There were also numerous resolutions forwarded at trade union meetings that were 
critical of Bevin's foreign policy. One such example was the National Union of 
Railwaymen's (NUR) Annual General Meeting of 7 July, 1947, when three resolutions 
were put forward complaining of the development of 'a position of dependence on the 
United States of America with a consequent worsening of relations with the 
U. S. S. R., 23 The proposal was that, 
21 Trades Union Congress Report (hereafter TUCR), 1946, p. 469. 
22 Ibid., p. 416. 
23 National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) files, Modem Records Centre (MRC), Warwick University, 
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the only alternative compatible with Socialist ideology is a policy based on co- 
operation with the U. S. S. R. and the most progressive nations within the fi-amework 
of the United Nations, and instructs the Executive Committee to press this view to 
the Labour Patty and the TUC. 24 
At this NUR meeting, all three of the resolutions criticising Bevin's foreign policy 
were defeated, while the one expressing support as approved by the union's Executive 
Committee was accepted: 
That this conference declared its loyal support for the Labour Government and 
endorses the policy which is being carried out both at home and in the field of 
foreign affhirs. It welcomes the acceptance of the Marshall offer and the recent 
Trade Agreements with Russia and other European countries, believing that these 
measures ensure the means whereby the economic rehabilitation of Europe can be 
effected. 25 
However, despite this apparent success, the number of critical resolutions being 
forwarded, combined with criticism from the Left of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 
must have caused alann to the Labour leadership. Denis Healey, the Labour Party's 
International Secretary, noted later that 'communist influence in the Labour Party and 
unions remained a major obstacle in my task of winning support for the Government's 
foreign PoliCy., 26 
One particular concern for the labour leadership was the application in 1946 by the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) to affiliate to the Labour Party. This was, as 
expected, rejected at the Labour Party's annual conference. On Healey's suggestion, 
Herbert Morrison successfully moved an amendment to the Party constitution, to 
MSS 127/NU/PO/l /10 AGM, 7 July 1947, resolution No. 32, proposed by the Polmadie Branch. 
24 Ibid. Other very similar critical resolutions were forwarded by the Warrington Branch, and the 
Glasgow No. 9 Branch. 
25 NUR files, MRC MSS 127/NU/PO/ I/ II AGM 7 July 1947. 
26 Denis Healey, The Time of* Life, London: Penguin, 1990, p. 75. 
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prevent the situation arising again. 27 This stipulated that, 
Political Organisations not affiliated to or associated ... with the Party on January 1, 
1946, having their own Programme, Principles and Policy for distinctive and 
separate propaganda, or possessing Branches in the Constituencies, or engaged in 
the promotion of Parliamentary or Local Government Candidatures, or owing 
allegiance to any political organisation situation abroad, shall be ineligible for 
affiliation to the Party. 28 
The aim was 'to end the possibility of communist affiliation once and for all', 29 since, 
as Seyd explains, 'individual membership of the Party is not possible for anyone 
belonging to an organisation which is deemed ineligible for Party affiliation'. Thus this 
constitutional change 'provided the Party leadership with the means to control the 
extent of organised factionalism within the Party. 30 
This factionalism, organised and unorganised, was a problem for the government. 
There was a gap between the expectations of the rank and file of the Labour Party 
and the unions and their respective leaderships. As Schneer points out, 'Some of 
Attlee's sharpest and most effective critics were on the Left, and belonged to his own 
party. 931 Thus, as expected, in many areas, the views of the rank and file of the 
labour movement were to the left of their leadership. This occurred within the 
Labour Party and the Labour government, most notably amongst the group of left- 
wing backbenchers, who in May 1947 produced the pwnphlet Keep Left. Written by 
Richard Crossman, Michael Foot and Ian Mikardo, Keep Left was critical of the 
government's domestic, and, in particular, foreign policy, repeating the call for a 
27 Ibid. 
28 Labour Party Conference Report, 1946, p. 174. 
2' Healey, The Time ofMy Life, p. 75. 
30 Seyd, The Rise and Fall ofthe Labour Left, p. 7. 
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Third Force. However, Keep Left was careful not to appear to be allying itself with 
the extreme left. Thus, 'Although the "Keep-Left" position showed some sympathy 
for the Soviet Union, it also contained a good deal of scepticism about the USSR. 32 
No Member of Parliament who was concerned about their future political career 
within the Labour government could afford to be accused of co-operating with the 
Communist Party. The authors of Keep Left were MPs who 'saw their role as being 
that of a "ginger group" rather than implacable rebels', and 'even if they had been 
willing to carry their dissent to greater lengths and risked certain expulsion from the 
PLP, the Communist Party would scarcely have constituted an attractive potential 
-) 33 ally . The Keep Left initiative was to be short lived, for the arguments over foreign 
policy collapsed with the announcement of Marshall Aid in the summer of 1947. 
Once the Soviet Union had refused to participate in the Marshall Plan, Schneer notes 
that there was a 'revolution' in the attitudes of the parliarnentary left towards the 
US. 34 Thus, the Keep Left rebels came back within the fold, muting their criticism 
over foreign policy, coming to accept the economic necessity of Marshall Aid, as 
relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated and 'avoiding the stigma of "fellow- 
travelling" became a priority for many Labour MPs'. 35 Cliff and Gluckstein have 
noted that 'Keep Left holds the record as the shortest-lived left rebellion in the 
31 Schneer, Labour's Conscience, p. 2. 
32 G. Norris, 'Communism and British Politics, 19444 81, unpublished MA thesis, University of 
Warwick, 198 1, p. 105. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Schneer, 'The British Labour Left', p. 220. 
3' Norris, 'Communism and British Politics, 194448', p. 106. 
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history of Labour. Marshall Aid from America killed it stone dead. 06 According to 
Crossman in the House of Commons, it was the Marshall Plan that changed his 
opinion over the goverment's policies: 
I will be frank. My own views about America have changed a great deal in the last 
six months. Many members have had a similar experience. I could not have 
believed six months ago that a plan of this sort would have been worked out in 
detail with as few political conditions. 37 
Only a handful of 'hard left' MPs continued with their criticism of Bevin's foreign 
policy, most notably Konni Zilliacus, D. N. Pritt, and John Platts-Mills. They were 
among the six MPs who were either marginalised, expelled by the Parliamentary 
Labour Party or denied support for re-election by Labour's National Executive 
Committee. 38 
While this left-wing rebellion was limited and short-lived, the 'rebelliousness' of the 
left in the trade union movement was more problematic, being more widespread and 
long lasting. Harrison notes that 'most of the votes cast in opposition to the 
government's policies came from the unions' and 'During this period the unions 
were ftirther to the left than usual - perhaps even slightly to the left of the local 
parties. 39 While much of the criticism from the constituency and Parliamentary 
Labour Party came from 'soft' left socialists, the non-communist and more moderate 
left was weak in the trade unions, and there was a 'militant and well disciplined 
36 Tony Cliff and Donny Gluckstein, The Labour Party, a Marxist History, (2 nd edn. ), London: 
Bookmarks, 1996, p. 284. 
37 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 5"' series, Vol. 446,23 January 194 8, col. 566. 
38 Schneer, 'The British Labour Left, pp. 213-214. 
39 Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party Since 1945, London: Allen & Unwin, 1960, 
p. 224. 
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Communist minority'. 40 Trade unionists, however, were more of a threat as they 
were harder to control and regulate, and accusations of communism or fellow- 
travelling were not necessarily seen as a problem by large sections of the 
membership. Thus the Communist Party's 'potential contribution to an anti-Bevin 
alliance would have been its strength in the trade unions and its ability to organise 
extra-parliamentary activity and protest. A1 The govemment required support from 
the unions over their policies, and could not afford to lose a public confrontation 
with the militant left. Alan Bullock, Bevin's official biographer, has pointed out that, 
The importance of union support to the government extended beyond the 
industrial and economic sphere; it was an essential element in enabling Bevin to 
carry out his foreign policy and the key to holding steady behind the government 
the political support of a party which was liable to ideological division. 42 
The gap in expectations between left and right in the unions had a greater potential 
for harm than that in the Labour Party, since it was not under their control, or subject 
to the same kinds of constraints as Members of Parliament. In order for the Labour 
government to be able to govern effectively, it needed to breach this gap and to be 
able to control these expectations, whilst maintaining the co-operation and support 
of the trade unions. For the trade union leadership, it was a case of finding a way of 
controlling the more militant sections of the working class in order to consolidate its 
own hegemony within the movement, and prevent internal dissent. That this could be 
achieved was due to the nature of the trade union movement in Britain and the 
40 Bernard Hennessy, 'British Trade Unions and International Affairs 1945-53', unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1955, p. 3 85. 
41 Norris, 'Communism and British Politics, 194448', p. 105. 
4' Alan Bullock, Life and Times ofErnest Bevin, Vol. 3, Heinemann, 1983, p. 215. 
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relationship between the unions and the Labour govenunent. 
4.2 The Trade Union Movement in Britain 
In some respects, the immediate postwar period can be seen the coming of age of a 
responsible trade union movement. The advent of a majority Labour government at 
this time meant that the unions thought they could achieve many of their aims 
regarding their role, not only in industrial relations, but in wider policy issues such as 
the nationalisation of major utilities and the implementation of a policy of full 
employment. However, having a Labour government also meant increased 
responsibility for the trade unions in that they felt that they needed to support and act 
in the interests of the goverment. This viewpoint was partly due to the nature of the 
trade union movement and of its leadership at the time. While this provided 
opportunities for the unions, in terms of representation on government committees, 
consultation on industrial questions, and for the govenunent in terms of leverage 
over the unions, it also posed problems. 
One key example is that of strike activity. Despite an actual decline in strike activity 
in the years from 1945 to 1950,43 there was a realistic concern that union criticism 
and industrial unrest could prove debilitating for the government. As Hyman points 
out, 'After the Second World War, relative price stability helped prevent major 
conflicts [i. e. strikes]; but the actual number of stoppages (despite some decline from 
"' See J. Durcan et. al, Strikes in Post- War Britain, London: Allen & Unwin, 1983, especially table 
6.1. 
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the peak of 1945) was at a record level. In this sense, the Attlee government presided 
over a period of exceptional conflict. 44 Also of concern would be the worry of a 
repeat of the situation after the First World War, when the number of strikes and 
number of working days lost had been high. 45 On average, during the years 1919 to 
1922,41 million working days had been lost. 46 Thus, while the Labour government 
did preside over a period of falling strike activity in the late 1940s, the level of strike 
activity was still comparatively high, which lead the goverriment to look for ways to 
control it. 
One method was the continued use of legislation. The 1940 Conditions of 
Employment and National Arbitration Order, No. 1305 was kept in place. This 
meant that practically all strikes that occurred were unofficial, and therefore not 
recognised by the Executive Committee of a union. 47 This provided the government 
and the trade unions with the perfect opportunity to condemn such strikes as due to 
pernicious communist activity. According to Hyman, 'Government hostility to 
strikes frequently stemmed - at least after 1947 - from a manichaen vision of 
industrial relations as a battleground between a national effort for economic survival 
44 Richard Hyman, 'Praetorians and Proletarians', in Jim Fyrth (ed. ), Labour's High Noon, The 
Government and the Economy 1945-51, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1993, pp. 179-180. 
4' For information see British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstract 1886-1968, London: HMSO, 
1971, Table 197. 
41 See John Sheldrake, Industrial Relations and Politics in Britain 1880-1989, London: Pinter, 199 1, 
p. 44; and E. Wigham, Strikes and the Government 1983-1981, London: Macmillan, 1982 (2nd ed. ), 
chapter 6. 
47 See J. F. B. Goodman and T. G. Whittingharn, Shop Stewards in British Industry, London: McGraw 
Hill, 1969, p. 173, citing K. G. J. C. Knowles, Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict, Oxford: Basil 
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and a systematic communist campaign of sabotage. 48 The Labour government went 
so far as to twice evoke the 1920 Emergency Powers Act, the first time that it had 
been used since the 1926 General Strike, in response to unofficial dock disputes. 49 In 
fact 'Between 1945 and 1951 troops were introduced during no fewer than eleven 
separate strikes. Never before, or since, has a government intervened on such a 
massive scale during industrial disputes. 950 
The unofficial nature of most strikes meant that the government had an obvious 
target at which to aim their condemnation. It also affected the union leadership's 
reaction to the strikes. According to Davis Smith, 
The readiness of the union leadership to accept the deployment of troops was due 
in large measure to the unofficial nature of the disputes. Union leaders were as 
anxious as the government to stamp out unofficial organizations and reaffirm 
51 union discipline. 
However, it also meant that the 'responsible' union leaders had less control over the 
grievances of their members who felt that they were not being represented. The 
union leaders' co-operation on Order 1305, their condemnation of unofficial strikes, 
and support for the government's wages policy, meant that they were open to the 
charge by their left-wing critics of being part of the governing structure rather than 
acting in the interests of their members. Continuing strikes also highlighted the 
weakness of the union leaderships' ability to regulate and control their members. 
48 Hyman, ' Praetorians and Proletarians', p. 18 1. 
49 Cliff and Gluckstein, The Labour Party, p. 234; see also Justin Davis Smith, The Attlee and 
Churchill Administrations and Industrial Unrest, 1945-1955: A Study in Consensus, London: Pinter, 
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Trade Union Organisation 
The British trade union movement has long been marked by. its fragmented and 
decentralised nature, which meant that the first line of defence for union members 
were the shop stewards in the workplace. During World War II, the shop stewards 
had gained in stature, and tended to be on the left of the union movement. 52 They 
were well organised, with their own publications and meetings. 53 This situation 
threatened the trade union leadership's continuing acceptance of the anti-strike 
legislation. While the mass of trade union members were loyal, unofficial strikes still 
broke out despite the exhortations of their leadership, and resolutions critical of 
government economic, industrial and foreign policy were forwarded. To some 
extent, this was due to the distance between those on the shop-floor, and the full time 
trade union officials working at the union headquarters. As Taylor has noted, 'an 
enormous gulf remained between the perceptions of full-time trade union officials 
and their mass memberships. '54 This view has been established in the work of Vic 
55 Allen, and of Goldstein, who carried out research into the structure of the 
Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) in the late 1940s. According to 
Goldstein, the TGWU was 'an oligarchy at every level of its structure, failing to 
elicit the active participation of its members. ' He went on that, 'In treating the rank 
For information see Richard Croucher, Engineers at War, 1939-45, London: Merlin Press, 1982; 
James Hinton, 'Coventry Communism', History Workshop, Issue 10,1980, pp. 90-118, and Hinton, 
Shop Floor Citizens, Aldershot, Hants: Elgar, 1994. 
53 For instance, regular publications from the shop stewards in the engineering industry were The 
Conveyor, The A eroplane and The New Propeller. 
54 Robert Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p. 45. 
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and file as cogs in the union's administrative machinery, the psychological nexus 
between the member, his union leader and official union policy has been broken. ' 56 
In some respects, this led to the strengthening of shop stewards, of which many were 
left wing and who could prove reluctant to fall into line with the union leaders. 
The Main Unions 
The main characteristics of the trade union movement in Britain at this time were the 
overall number of individual trade unions, the domination of the movement by a 
few, very large unions, and the clecentralisation of the shop stewards system. In 
1945, there were as many as 781 registered unions, with 7,875,000 members. Of 
these unions, 192 were affiliated to the British trades union national centre, the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC), covering 6,671,120 trade unionists. 57 It was felt in 
many sectors that the trades union structures and organization needed to be reformed 
and modernised, but the TUC was reluctant to tackle the problem as it was aware of 
the danger of appearing to infringe on trade-union autonomy'. 58 Thus, 
While so many European labour movements were of necessity constructed anew 
after 1945, Britain remained uniquely characterised by a multiplicity of mainly 
tiny associations overshadowed by a handful of competing giants. 59 
Half of the 192 unions affiliated to the TUC had less than 5,000 members, while 
there were nine unions with over 100,000 members each, which accounted for nearly 
" Joseph Goldstein, The Government ofBritish Trade Unions, London: Allen & Unwin, 1952, p. 27 1. 57 Pelling, A History ofBritish Trade Unionism, p. 326. 51 Ibid., p. 224. 
59 Hyman, 'Praetorians and Proletarians', in Jim FYrth (ed. ), Labour's High Noon, The Government 
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65 per cent of total trade union membership. 60 There were six unions with over 
250,000 members each, which together contained more than half the total 
membership of the TUC. 61 These unions, the 'big six', had a clear majority of votes 
at any Congress meetings. These were the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), 
the National Union of General and Municipal Workers (NUGMW), the National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), and the Union of Shop, 
Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW). The TGWU was by far the biggest with 
975,000 members. 62 
The leaders of these largest unions were, on the whole, on the right of the labour 
movement, anti-communist, and conservative in their attitudes. They were strongly 
supportive of the Labour government and its policies, strongly dismissive of its 
critics, and they 'joined forces to present the Labour Govenunent with solid 
institutional support throughout its life'. 63 The TGWU was led by Arthur Deakin, 
who also went on to play an important role in the international trade union 
movement, and the GMWU by Tom Williamson. Both of these men were anti- 
communist and fiercely loyal to the TUC and to the Labour Party. 64 Jack Tanner, 
initially a left-winger who after the War 'became convinced that communism was a 
60 Ken Coates, 'The Vagaries of Participation', in Ben Pimlott & Chris Cook (eds. ), Trade Unions in 
British Politics, London: Longman, 1982, p. 17 1. 
61 Pelling, A History ofBritish Trade Unionism, p. 225. 
' Coates, 'The Vagaries of Participation, p. 173. 63 Ibid. 
' See, for example, the biographical information in Robert Taylor, The Trade Union Question in 
British Politics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, Appendix 1, pp. 348-360. 
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threat to the British labour movement, and thenceforward joined forces with the 
other union leaders', 65 led the Engineers. The Miners' leadership was split: Arthur 
Homer, its General Secretary was a communist, whilst William Lawther, its 
President, had shifted from being a fellow traveller to an anti-communist during the 
1940s. James Figgins, a left-winger who had pro-Soviet attitudes, became General 
Secretary of the Railwaymen in 1948.66 However, it was those on the right, such as 
Deakin, Lawther, and Williamson who held the balance of power amongst these 
union leaders. 
The Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
The leaders of the largest unions also sat on the TUC General Council. This 
provided a phalanx of support for the General Secretary of the TUC, who played a 
very important role both within British and international trade unionism. Vincent 
Tewson replaced Walter Citrine, who had been the General Secretary since 1926, in 
1946. Both Citrine and Tewson were staunch anti-communists, who, despite the 
necessity of co-operating with the Soviet trade unions towards the end of the Second 
World War, saw themselves as far more closely aligned to the non-communist 
unions of the West than the communist unions of Eastern Europe. 
The TUC saw itself as the central pillar of the union movement, but due to the 
decentralised nature of the unions it actually had little real power of regulation and 
control. The most that the TUC could do was to revoke a union's affiliation. Like the 
65 Coates, 'The Vagaries of Participation', p. 174. 
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largest unions, the TUC had also become increasingly oligarchic and hierarchic in 
nature, seeing any challenge to its leadership as evidence of subversion. Its newly 
found respectability and responsibility resulting from its close relationship with the 
Labour government probably added to the sense of conservatism permeating its 
leadership. The outcome was a strong emphasis on 'loyalty', not only to the TUC, 
but to the Labour govenunent as well. This resulted in the position whereby the 
leadership was ever more protective of its position and resentful of any activity that it 
saw as damaging to its image, or as a challenge to its leadership. As Taylor points out, 
'The union leaders at the top of the TUC in the years immediately after 1945 were 
tough, dependable right-wingers who often treated the opposition in their own ranks 
as nothing less than subversion. 67 In many ways this confirms Michels' 'Iron Law of 
oligarchy,. According to Michels, once the Socialist Party (or in this case the trade 
union movement) gains a sense of responsibility, 
it reacts with all the authority at its disposal against the revolutionary currents which 
exist within its own organization ... [and] becomes increasingly 
inert as the 
strength of its organization grows; it loses its revolutionary impetus, becomes 
sluggish, not in respect of action alone, but also in the sphere of thought. 68 
Also, as Attlee had pointed out, 
There are Unions in which the everyday work is so much a matter of co-operation 
with the employers that their leaders tend to forget or ignore the ultimate aims of 
the movement. They have become so constitutional that they are in essence 
Conservative. 69 
The tendency for an organisation of this size and type to become increasingly 
66 Ibid. 
67 Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics, p. 38. 
68 R. Michels, Political Parties, New York: Dover, 1959, p. 37 1. 
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hierarchic, inert and conservative, combined with the intense loyalty that the TUC 
felt towards the Labour government (in return for which it expected full employment 
and a new social contract), explains the stance taken by the TUC on many issues. It 
was repeatedly argued that the social refonns of the Labour government could only 
be maintained 'if there is the fullest co-operation and loyalty on the part of the 
workers of the nation'. 70 The TUC not only supported the government's policy of 
continuing wartime anti-strike legislation, and fervently condemned any unofficial 
action as communist inspired, but also went on to support a wages policy. Based on 
the 1948 White Paper, the Statement on Personal Incomes, Costs and Prices (Cmd. 
7321,1948), this largely amounted to a wages freeze. The trade union leadership 
accepted this policy in early 1948, even though they had previously been vehemently 
against any interference in their right to collective bargaining over wages, with 
Arthur Deakin declaring at the Labour Party annual conference in May 1947 that, 'I 
do want to utter a word of warning [on] ... the idea of an incomes policy. We will 
have none of that. 97 1 As Pelling points out though, a policy of wage restraint was a 
'dangerous one for the unions to pursue, particularly in peace-time. 72 This was 
because, 
It threatened to drive a wedge between union officials and their members, just at a 
time when there was a good deal of rank-and-file suspicion of those of their 
leaders who took, or wanted to take, posts on the boards of the nationalised 
" Attlee, The Labour Party in Perspective, p. 65. 
70 TUCR, 1948, p. 337. 
71 Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1947, p. 146. On the wages policy, and Deakin's role in 
particular, see Vic Allen, Trade Union Leadership, London: Longmans, 1957, p. 13 1. See also Hugh 
Clegg, A History ofBritish Trade Unions, V61.111 1934-1951, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, 
pp. 363-365; and Leo Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy: the Labour Party, the 
Trade Unions and Incomes Policy, 1945-19 74, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 
1 Pelling, A History ofBritish Trade Unionism, p. 230. 
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industries. 73 
The wages policy was a point of major contention when agreed in 1948, and fell 
apart after eighteen months. 
Both the government and the trade union leadership presented disobedience as due to 
communist influence. While the Attlee government could 'justify' its anti-strike 
policy as 'an economic necessity', 'it also sought to justify its action by pointing to 
the fact that the disputes were not legitimate trade disputes but communist 
conspiracies. 74 For example, Bevin, in a speech to the United National General 
Assembly on 25 September 1950, announced that Britain's recovery had been 
hampered 'at every stage by the Fifth Column ... led by the Cominfonn and 
75 instigated by Moscow to produce chaos, strikes and difficulties of all kinds'. Such 
condemnation was also made by the trade union leadership, with, for example, Tom 
Williamson of the NUGMW forwarding a successful resolution condemning 
unofficial strikes at the 1948 TUC annual congress. He argued that small numbers of 
mischief-makers were instigating the strikes, which were undermining trade union 
solidarity and responsibility as well as national recovery. 76 
Many trade union officials at the lower levels of the movement were communists, 
and communists were the strongest organised force among the shop stewards. 77 
73 Ibid. 
74 Davis Smith, The Attlee and Churchill Administrations and Industrial Unrest, p. 94. 
75 Ibid. 
76 TUCR' 1948, pp. 337 & 338. 
77 Hinton, Labour and Socialism, p. 166. 
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Because of their positions as local trade unionists on the shop floor, communists 
must have played some role in organising strike activity. However, the argument that 
they were responsible for strike activity at this time is not particularly persuasive. 
From the time that the Soviet Union had entered the war to the middle of 1947 (a 
time when strikes were rising), the British Communist Party had done its best to 
prevent strikes, arguing that everybody should produce more to help the war effort. It 
was not until the middle of 1947 that the CPGB reversed this line, but, after this 
point, strikes fell. However, it was more the perception of a communist threat than 
the reality that was important in terms of driving certain actions by the centre-right 
leadership of the labour movement. 
The Far Left and the Anti-Communist Campaign 
Attlee had surnmarised the view held by many in the labour movement in 1937 that 
'Nothing has done so much to create hostility to the Communist Party as their 
underground activities on the industrial field. 08 For the centre-right of the union 
leadership, one of the most significant problems in dealing with trade unionists who 
were also CPGB members was that they were supposed to put the interests of the 
Party before those of the individual union and to use the unions as an instrument for 
political change. While an authorised account of the CPGB points out that 'The party 
had never made any secret of its industrial activities or the way in which they were 
organised, 09 communist activists were still perceived as a threat by the centre-right 
78 Clement Attlee, The Labour Party in Perspective, London: Victor Gollancz, 1937, p. 64. 79 Noreen Branson, History of the Communist Party ofGreat Britain, 1941-1951, London: Lawrence 
& Wishart, 1997, p. 183. 
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of the trade unions. This was because they felt that communists could not be trusted 
as their allegiance lay outside the confines of the respectable left, to a party which 
was under the influence of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the communist within the 
unions were a problem because 'the Labour Party itself had no equivalent industrial 
organisation through which it could propagandise arnongst or mobilise factory 
workers. '80 The very efficiency with which the CPGB members were organised, the 
strength of communism within the rank and file of the labour movement, and their 
allegiance to a body outside that of the Labour Party, caused concern to the union 
leadership. In Healey's words, the CPGB, 
was itself a negligible factor in Parliament, with only two avowed MPs, though a 
handful of Labour MPs were thought to be secret communists, and there were a 
larger number fellow-travellers ... who always took the communist line on foreign policy. 
In the trade unions, however, the Communist Party had power out of all 81 
proportion to its membership. 
There was a strict line of information running between trade unionists on the ground 
and the CPGB's leadership. CPGB members met to discuss 'not only immediate 
issues concerning wages and conditions, but how to spread the wider political 
message. 82 The industrial work of Communist Party members was co-ordinated by 
District Committees covering the regional areas concerned, and was in turn overseen 
by the party's Industrial Department at 16 King Street, London, the CPGB's 
headquarters. This Department maintained contact with leading CPGB members via 
Croucher, Engineers at War, p. 370. 
'Healey, The Time of* Life, pp. 74-75. 
2 Branson, History ofthe CPGB, 1941-1951, p. 183. 
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a number of Industrial Advisory Committees. There were, for example, a Mining 
Committee, a Rails Advisory Committee and a National Agricultural Committee. 
'These advisory committees not only discussed urgent questions; they drew up plans 
for the future of the industries concerned, setting out what they believed to be the 
way forward. They also discussed union affairs, including which candidates should 
be supported in union elections. ' 83 The election of communist officials in the unions 
were also seen as a problem by the centre-right leadership, who felt that communists 
benefited by 'exploiting the pitifully low proportion of trade unionists who bothered 
to vote in union elections. ' 84 
Communists in the unions were also seen as a problem by the anti-communist trade 
union leadership because of the extent of communist sympathy at this time. The 
wartime alliance with the Soviet Union meant that the Soviet Union in particular, 
and communism in general, had gained a legitimacy that it had not previously 
enjoyed in the eyes of the British public, and there were many communists and 
85 
communist sympathisers active in the trade union movement. Communists were 
particularly well represented amongst the shop stewards, who, due to decentralised 
wage bargaining and Joint Production Committees,, had grown in influence. 86 CPGB 
membership had shot up from 22,783 in December 1941 to 56,000 in December 
83 Ibid., p. 184. 
4 Healey, The Time ofMy Life, p. 75. See also the Morgan Phillips circular cited below. 5 See, for example, James Hinton, 'Coventry Communism', History Workshop, Issue 10,1980, 
pp. 90-118. 
36 Willie Thompson, The Good Old Cause: British Communism, 1920-1991, London: Pluto Press, 
1992, p. 76- 
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1942, though it dropped to 42,123 by 1946.87 The CPGB had also been attempting to 
make their relationship with the Labour Party official, having decided at its 1945 
November Congress to again apply for affiliation to the Labour Party. Herbert 
Morrison spoke on behalf of the Labour Party's National Executive Committee 
against the motion. The arguments he used included that the CPGB was not 
democratic but a 'dictatorship', not a political party but a 'conspiracy', that the 
CPGB would be an 'embarrassment to the Government, and that 'they do only what 
Moscow wants them to do. 88 Not unsurprisingly, the motion on their affiliation was 
89 
rejected by 2,678,000 votes to 468,000 . 
Whilst most trade unions in at this time were led by anti-communists, there were a 
considerable number of unions with a communist leadership. According to a survey 
of Communist Party influence in the trade unions published in The Times in 
February 1948, the CPGB and its supporters controlled four out of the seventeen 
largest unions with a membership of over 100,000, and exercised 'appreciable 
influence' in a further six. The four were the Electrical Trades Union, the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Civil Service Clerical Association and the 
Tailors and Garment Workers' Union. The six were the TGWU, NUM, NUR, the 
Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, the Union of Post-office Workers and the 
National Union of Teachers. " The accuracy of this survey is questionable, since, for 
87 Figures taken from Branson, History ofthe CPGB, 1941-1951, Appendix 1, p. 252. 8 Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1946, pp. 169-173. 
9 Ibid., p. 174. 
90 The Times, February 8 and 9,1948, cited in G. Norris, 'Communism and British Politics, 194448', 
Appendix 4, 'The CPGB and the Trade Unions, pp. 148-9. 
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example, the TGWU had mostly anti-communists at the top of its leadership. In 
1948 there were eight communists on the TGWU's executive, 91 but these 
represented very specific geographical regions, most notably the London busworkers 
who were led by Bert Papworth. He was a member of the CPGB's Executive 
Committee while also being a member of the TUC's General Council. Dennis 
Healey's view was that the Communist Party 'had total control of a few unions 
which had vastly expanded their size during the war, like the Fire Brigades union. In 
many others its members got into key positions'. 92 
The CPGB had taken a positive attitude towards the Labour goverment when it was 
first elected, but this had changed during 1947. The timing of this reflected 
international events, with the hardening of the Cold War following the deliberations 
over the Marshall Plan, and 'The rejection/opposition to Marshall Aid marked a key 
change in the Communist Party's overall approach to post-war reconstruction. '93 As 
far as they were concerned, the Marshall Plan 'was intended both to forestall the 
possibility of economic crisis leading to greater communist influence in Western 
Europe and to tie those states more firmly to the US chariot. 94 
The change in the British communists' approach towards the Labour government 
also reflected the establishment of the Cominform by the Soviet Union in the autumn 
91 Branson, History ofthe CPGB, 1941-1951, P. 179. 
92 Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 75. 
93 Stephen Parsons, 'Communism in the Professions: the Organisation of the British Communist Party 
among Professional Workers, 1933-1956', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 1990. 
9" Thompson, The Good Old Cause, p. 78. 
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of 1947. Branson's official history of the CPGB at this time notes that 'there was no 
doubt that its [the CPGB's] policies would be influenced by the attitudes taken up by 
95 
such a body'. At the October 1947 meeting, the CPGB's Executive Committee 
welcomed the nine parties' Cominform declaration and its 'call for the strengthening 
of the forces of peace and democracy in the struggle against the plans of American 
imperialism for the enslavement of Europe. ' It also said that it would intensify its 
campaign for a reorganisation of the government and the removal of 'those Ministers 
responsible for the present disastrous position'. 96 Branson notes that 'ironically, the 
executive was adopting the very tactic it had repudiated two years earlier when the 
"Bevin must go" policy suggested by Bill Rust was rejected. ' A ftirther irony, as 
indicated above, was that the CPGB was not included in the Cominform, as it was 
not a party of goverment. 'The British party was not represented in the Cominform, 
nor did it play any part in its deliberations though, as some party members were later 
to recall, Pollitt was privately somewhat annoyed that it had not been asked to 
participate. 97 At the CPGB's 20th Party Congress, held in February 1948, the new 
anti-government line was 'agreed unanimously', and there was a call for the 
dismissal of the government's right-wing leaders and the formation of a 'Labour 
Government of the left'. 98 The Communist Party, 
thus found itself pitched into the front line of the Cold War conflict and confronted 
with the necessity for even further intensification of its attack upon US stooges in 
the British [labour] movement. The Labour leadership was now denounced for 
craven subservience to the dictates of Washington and Wall Stree09 
95 Branson, Histor y ofthe CPGB, 1941-1951, p. 157. 
96 World News and Views, 22 October 1947, cited in ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 'For Britain Free and Independent: Report of the 200' Congress', p. 3 8, cited in ibid. 
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The Anti-Communist Campaign 
The actions of the centre-right leadership of the labour movement reveal that 
communism within the unions was a cause of concern for them. At the 1946 annual 
conference the National Executive of the Labour Party had secured its amendment to 
the constitution to prevent the CPGB from reapplying for affiliation. On 21 
December 1947, a circular from Morgan Phillips, the Secretary of the Labour Party, 
was sent out to every affiliated organisation. 'The Communists: We Have Been 
Warned', urged Labour Party members to fight against communist influence in the 
unions. The circular accused the Communist Party of 'slavishly following' 
Cominfonn policy, and warned that it would try to use its influence to 'sabotage' the 
Labour government. 'In all countries ... the Communists use the trade unions to 
attack and disintegrate the Labour movement' by taking advantage of members' 
(apathy' and their own 'iron discipline' to gain control! 00 
Now is the time to go out on a great campaign against communist intrigue and 
infiltration inside the Labour movement. ... It would be a tragedy if the 
communists, who have been rejected time and time again by a free vote of the 
electors, were to win political power and influence through the back door of trade 
union branch meetings. 101 
According to Branson, the charge of communist infiltration of the unions was 
absurd, as 'Most of the party's male members had, indeed, been keen trade unionists 
before they joined the Communist party., 102 Despite the plea from the Labour Party, 
100 Manchester Guardian, December 22,1947, p. 3, cited in Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, 
ff. 174, p. 368. 
'01 Branson, History ofthe CPGB, 1941-1951, p. 177. 
102 Ibid., p. 178. 
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Branson points out that communists were still elected to positions within trade 
unions, and within the Trades Councils. 103 
This circular was preceded by a number of speeches and pamphlets criticising the 
communists and reasserting the government's line on domestic and foreign policies. 
This reflected an increased willingness from the government by spring 1947 to 
publicly confront their left-wing critics rather than trying to placate them. 
104 The 
Labour backbenchers' Keep Left was quickly followed by Healey's Cards on the 
Table, an official Labour pamphlet which sought to rebut the criticisms of Bevin's 
foreign policy. This stated that 'The idea that we should have extricated ourselves 
from the quarrel between Russia and the USA does not make sense; during the 
period under review, Britain was the main target of Russian hostility, while until a 
few months ago America was an undecided spectator. "05 It argued that it was 'both 
undesirable and impractical' for Britain to remain completely independent of both 
Russia and the US after the War since 'Britain herself was too weak to cut herself off 
from American aid'. 106 The arguments in Cards on the Table were reinforced by the 
unfolding external events of the Marshall Plan, which provided concrete evidence of 
the difficulties of finding common ground with the Soviet Union, and the realities of 
an increasingly fraught international situation in which it was impossible for Britain 
to maintain some kind of 'third way'. Thus, one of the most significant short-term 
"' Trades Councils were associations of members from a variety of unions operating within a 
geographic area, and were one area where communist members were very active. 
104 Gordon, Conj7ict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy, p. 139. 
'05 'Cards on the Table', p. 112 in Denis Healey, When Shrimps Learn to Whistle, London: Penguin, 
1990. 
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impacts of the Marshall Plan was to reinforce the anti-communist campaign and the 
marginalisation of the hard left already being implemented by the Labour 
govermnent. 
Another confrontational action from the Labour government was the banning of 
communists from holding office in the civil service. Attlee announced on 15 March, 
1948, that the government had decided to ban communists, or those associated with 
communism in such a way as to raise legitimate doubts about his or her reliability, 
from being employed in connection with work that was vital to the security of the 
state. 107 While the same applied to fascists, this was widely taken to be an attack on 
the left and on the Civil Service Clerical Association. Those 'purged' would be 
moved to less sensitive posts, if they could be found, otherwise they would be 
sacked. While this move raised protests from amongst the trade unions, especially 
since those removed were not allowed to be represented by a trade union official if 
they appealed, this was not successful! 08 By including fascists in the ban the 
goverment could argue that this policy was not biased, and it was difficult for those 
on the left to argue that members of the CPGB were not subject to a dual loyalty, that 
is, to the British and Soviet governments. Thus, by 'choosing its targets with care, 
the government employed anti-communist purges to split the left-wing popular front 
106 Ibid., p. I 11. 
107 For more information on this, see Schneer, Labour's Conscience, pp. 13 6-13 9; Weiler, British 
Labour and the Cold War, pp. 219-228. 
10' See, for example, TUCR, 1948, pp. 305-6 of the General Council's Report, and the resolution on 
p. 532 
129 
and discredit its trade-unionist critics. ' 109 
The TUC also played its part in limiting the influence of communists within the 
union movement. The General Council issued a 'Warning to Trade Unionists' on 
October 27,1948. This urged union executive, district and branch committees, 
to counteract every manifestation of Communist influences within their unions; 
and to open the eyes of all workpeople to the dangerous subversive activities 
which are being engineered in opposition to the declared policy of the Trade 
Union Movement. ' 10 
The TUC issued a ftu-ther statement on 24 November, which was published as a 
pamphlet entitled Defend Democracy. 'This asserted that it would be fatal to the 
trade union movement if it permitted its democratically determined policies to be 
disrupted at the behest of an outside body. ' It noted the change of the CPGB's line 
on production, and suggested 'that unions should investigate the extent to which 
"interference" had gone in their own particular industries. "" Many union leaders 
regarded shopfloor militancy at this time as due to communist agitation and 'as 
nothing less than national treason'. 112 Democracy versus Communism, a pamphlet 
comprising anti-communist speeches made by Arthur Deakin of the TGWU at union 
conferences in 1948, was also published. Comments included 'Cominform. dictates 
policy to communists', and the 'Communist Party in this country has declared war 
on Labour. " 13 This was followed in March 1949 by a TUC pamphlet called The 
109 Schneer, Labour's Conscience, p. 136. 
"0 Cited in The TUC and Communism, London: TUC, 1955, p. 3. See also Trades Union Congress 
Report, 1949, pp. 274-5. 
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Tactics of Disruption, and one based on a statement by representatives of the TUC, 
the American Congress of Industrial Relations and the Netherlands' Confederation 
of Free Trade Unions, Free Trade Unions Leave the W. F. T U. This laid out the 
reasons for their withdrawal from the international trade union body, the World 
Federation of Trade Unions, one of them being the Russians' refusal to discuss the 
issue of Marshall Aid. 
The anti-communist campaign gained further momentum when at the TGWU's 
biennial conference in July 1949 Arthur Deakin put forward a proposal to bar 
communists from holding any office in the TGWU. This was passed by 426 votes to 
208. This meant that the eight communist members of the TGWU's General 
Executive Council could no longer stand for election, including Bert Papworth, the 
only communist on the TUC's General Council, from which he was also removed. 
According to Clegg, 'Deakin almost certainly decided to moye against the 
Communists in his union because of the cold war', 114 though Deakin had been 
staunchly anti-communist for years. Deakin also encouraged other unions to take the 
same line, though unions that were more tolerant towards communism, such as the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union refused. By this time, the divisions between the 
communists and non-communists within the trade unions were hardening into 
distrust and enmity. The removal of the only communist on the TUC's General 
Executive Council gave the, TUC the ability to proceed with its policies with the 
minimum of dissent, both nationally and internationally. It was helped in all of this 
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by the anti-communist campaign pursued by the government. 
The Icadcrship of the Labour govcmmcnt, with the support of the bulk of the tradc 
union leadership, sought to control not only industrial relations, but wider aspects of 
trade union opinion through a process of consolidation and change. Through the 
appropriation of notions of progress and growth arising out of the climate of opinion 
generated by the implementation of the European Recovery Programme, the 
leadership of the labour movement was able to control the parameters of political, 
economic and industrial debate amongst the left in Britain. Crucial to the success of 
this was the nature of the relationship between the Labour government and the trade 
unions, particularly their leadership, at this time. 
4.3 The Trade Union/Government Relationship 
The relationship between the trade unions and the first Labour government to have a 
majority in the House of Commons was close but complex. The TUC, the TGWU 
and the Labour Party shared headquarters at Transport House at this time, which 
gave the unions easier access to the Labour Party, if not the Labour Goverment. 
Ernest Bevin, from the Transport and General Workers Union, was Foreign 
Secretary, there were five other union-sponsored MPs in the Cabinet, and out of the 
total of 393 Labour MPs, 120 of them were trade union sponsored. The TUC was 
represented on sixty government committees. ' 15 The trade unions had a large section 
114 Clegg, History, Volume 1111934-1951, p. 308. 
113 V. L. Allen, Trade Unions and the Government, 1960, pp. 260,263-4. 
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on the Labour Party's National Executive Committee (NEC) and a massive block 
vote at the annual party conference. 
While Roberts has argued out that 'of all the pressure groups to which the Labour 
Government might be vulnerable the trade unions were the most powerful and the 
most awkward to deal with', ' 16 Tomlinson has pointed out that 'The existing 
historiography generally paints a picture of a compliant trade union movement, 
almost always anxious, in some eyes over-anxious, to support "its" government 
through thick and thin. ' 117 Pelling notes how 'responsibility' became the 'keynote' 
for the unions throughout the 1940s. 1 18 As Pelling points out, 
The leadership had become closely integrated with the government at every level; 
in return for the privilege of being consulted and of taking part in innumerable 
administrative decisions, it gave up, albeit only temporarily, some of its own most 
precious rights, including the right to strike! 19 
Clegg has argued that in relation to their influence in the wartime coalition under 
Churchill, trade unions' political influence declined. 'It may seem paradoxical to 
assert that the political influence of the trade unions declined in the post-war years, 
despite the increase in union membership and the replacement of the wartime 
coalition by a Labour government; but it was so., 120 This was partly due to the 
change in personnel at the top of the trade union leadership, with many of the most 
116 B. C. Roberts, National Wages Policy in War and Peace, London: Allen & Unwin, 195 8, p. 62. 117 Jim Tomlinson, 'Labour and the Trade Unions, 1945-5 1 1, in Nick Tiratsoo (ed. ), The Attlee Years, 
London: Pinter, 199 1, p. 9 1. 
11g Pelling, A History ofBritish Trade Unionism, p. 236. 
119 Ibid. 
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able figures leaving to take up other posts, often in the nationalised industries. 
In the immediate post-war years, therefore, the top leadership of British trade 
unions fell below the standard of its predecessors who had led the unions before 
the war and, with the exception of Bevin, through the war years. This change 
affected both the conduct of union business and the influence of trade unions on 
the government. 121 
Allen also notes that the role of trade unionists declined over the lifetime of the 
Labour government, reflecting a shortage of competent trade unionists. 122 'IbUS, in 
their dealings with the govermnent, trade union leaders did not necessarily have the 
swne skills as their predecessors. 
The political influence of the unions also declined because of the tension that existed 
between the interests of the two wings of the labour movement, and even within the 
trade union movement itself. Attlee himself had analysed this in his book published 
in 1937, The Labour Party in Perspective. He noted that trade unions worked within 
the capitalist system 'in order to defend its members from injustice and to gain for 
them advantages. ' But, the trade union movement also acted as 'an opposition to the 
existing system of society which it seeks to alter. ' 123 Thus, the union movement has 
to find a 'balance' between the sectional interests of its members and its wider 
political aims. With the election of a Labour government, this actually became 
harder as the trade union leadership identified with, and strongly supported, the aims 
and the policies of the goverranent. This could lead to a confusion of roles. For 
instance, the Political and Economic Planning Report on British Trade Unionism of 
121 Ibid., pp. 318-319. 
122 Vic Allen, Trade Unions and the Government, London: Longmans, 1960, p. 265. 
123 Clement Attlee, The Labour Party in Perspective, pp. 62-63. 
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1948 found that, 
The national [trade union] official or member of the national executive is in 
constant touch with the T. U. C., the Ministry of Labour, and perhaps the 
Government itself. He becomes impressed with the Government's point of view 
and feels himself responsible, as it were, for the good behaviour of his union; the 
militancy and drive which made a name for him in his days as a branch or district 
committee member gives way as he grows older in his job to increasing 
caution. 124 
This report also made the point that 'since the end of the war several disputes have 
occurred in which, had the same grounds for complaint existed in pre-war days, the 
strikes would certainly have received official backing. ' Moreover, it found that 
IT. U. C. support of Government policy is sometimes baldly conveyed and 
inadequately defended. ' 125 
In Zweig's postwar study of The British Worker, he noted that that 'The trade unions 
have become not only trade organisations but also political bodies supporting the 
Labour Party. The leaders are supposed not only to represent the members but to 
support the Labour Goverment. 126 Confusion and tension over the role of trade 
unionists arose because of this. As one union official said in Zweig's study, 
This close co-operation with the Government is a golden opportunity for us ... 
but it deprives us of independence, and you know what independence means to a 
movement like ours. It makes us have a double loyalty. The loyalties clash all the 
time and no one has yet told us how to combine them. 
Another complained that, 
We were not meant to be public servants to guard the interests of the nation; we 
were appointed to protect our members and to guard and further their interests 
124 Political and Economic Planning Report on British Trade Unionism, PEP: London, 1948, p. 170, 
cited in Knowles, Strikes, p. 95. 12' Knowles, Strikes, p. 95 
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within the framework of the law. Does anyone ask the employer to have the 
national interest in mind instead of the interests of his firm? It is all right having 
the national interest in mind but we are not the right people to have it. 127 
The TUC simply ignored this confusion by repeatedly calling for the unions to act in 
the national interest, collapsing the notion of the unions' sectional interest not only 
with the nation but also with the interests of the Labour government itself, namely to 
stay in power. Vic Allen's conclusion from his study of this period was that, 
The main advantages from a trade union and Labour Government relationship 
have gone to the Government. Trade unions from 1945 to 1951 were loath to 
exert pressure on the Government, because they did not want to embarrass it and 
they made concessions to enable the Government to implement its policy. 128 
The policy issues that were involved in this were many, from the question of 
workers' control in the nationalised industries, to Britain's relationship with the 
United States. 
Overall, the trade union leadership was intensely loyal to the Labour goverment. 
Minkin notes that 'A tight alliance between major Ministerial figures and major 
trade union leaders ... from 1949, organised and co-ordinated every major vote at 
the [Labour Party] Conference'. 129 Hyman argues that 'Any potential challenge 
within the Party to the Govenunent's policy decisions was finnly despatched by a 
96praetorian guard" of major right-wing union leaders. ' 130 Walter Citrine, in his last 
speech as the General Secretary of the TUC said at the 1946 Congress that the 
127 Ibid., pp. 182-3. 
"' Vic Allen, Trade Unions and the Government, p. 312. 
12' Lewis Minkin, The Labour Party Conference, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978, 
p. 24. 
130 Hyman, 'Praetorians and Proletarians', p. 166. 
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unions 'have passed from the era of propaganda to one of responsibility. ' 131 why 
was this? 
Firstly, the trade union leadership was prepared to provide solid support for the 
Labour government and full co-operation in return for the promise of full 
employment and social reform. Secondly, the leaderships of the Labour government 
and of the trade union movement had much in common in terms of their viewpoints, 
interests and instincts. Both were inherently anti-communist and suspicious of the 
militant left, both wanted to maintain their position of hegemony over a troublesome 
constituency. As Taylor writes of the co-operation of the trade union leadership with 
the Labour goveniment, 
This was no slavish, unthinking obedience to whatever the Labour government 
wanted, but at the same time there was a recognition that on the broad range of 
economic and social policy no genuine division of opinion existed between the 
Attlee Cabinet and the TUC Establishment. 132 
Morgan argues that there was an 'intimate symbiosis between unions and the Labour 
Party'. He sees the main causal factor for this being a 'community of outlook 
between the ideas and instincts of the Labour Party and the TUC at every stage, from 
1945 onwards. ' 133 This included a common vision of what a Labour Britain should 
be like. This was not to be based on social revolution, but on social reorganisation 
leading to a slightly fairer sharing of power and resources and the improved running 
of the capitalist economy. is resu ted in the unions acting both as a powerfor their 
13 1 TUCR, 1946, p. 269. 
132 Ibid., p. 39 
133 Kenneth 0. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-1951, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 79. 
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members and a power over their members. 134 They were part of the goveming 
structure, but were implicitly critical of it due to their sectional interest. From the 
government's point of view, it was able to use its relationship with the unions to help 
in the governing process. This is demonstrated by the next three chapters of the 
thesis. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that reactions and attitudes towards the Marshall Plan were 
to provide the litmus test of loyalty to the Labour goverm-nent, and a vital weapon 
with which to fight communists at home. The Marshall Plan gave the government 
the opportunity to present British communists, and those who sympathised with 
them, as taking orders from another country and as trying to block British recovery. 
In this way, the domestic fight against communists tallied with the growing 
suspicion of the Soviet Union, especially since the main grievance articulated by the 
left-wing was over the Labour goverment's abandomnent of a 'socialist' foreign 
policy. That the government was able to defeat the far left rested on the nature of the 
relationship between it and the leadership of the British trade union movement, 
which was, on the whole, on the right of the movement. These actors, through both 
their domestic and international actions, shaped trade union attitudes towards the 
134 As Richard Hyman points out, 'If a union is to be effective in wielding powerfor its members and 
against the employer, the possibility exists that this organisation power will be exerted over them, 
possibly on behalf of external interests. Precisely because the secure existence of unionism appears to 
require at least the acquiescence of governments and major employers, these "significant others" can 
influence union representatives to eschew policies which may invite repression, and event to transmit 
their own imperatives back down to the membership. ' The Political Economy ofIndustrial Relations: 
Theory and Practice in a Cold Climate, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 40. 
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Marshall Plan and the nature of postwar Britain, and the postwar international 
situation. Thus, throughout this next section, the common thread is that the Labour 
government and the leadership of the trade union movement used the Marshall Plan 
to manage the more militant section of the working class. 
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Chapter 5 
The Trade Union Response to the Marshall Plan 
Introduction 
In order to understand the impact of the Marshall Plan on British trade unions, it 
is necessary to put events into their international as well as domestic context. 
This chapter looks at the British and international trade union response, and 
argues that the Trades Union Congress (TUC) effectively used the Marshall Plan 
to push forward the split in the international trade union movement, successfully 
manipulating the response of the communist unions in order to portray them as 
hostile. The result of this was to finther isolate the far left in Britain by removing 
them from their main form of external trade union support. In this way, the 
domestic and international impacted upon each other to a very significant extent. 
For this to be successful, it meant that the overwhelming British trade union 
response to the Marshall Plan had to be positive. This chapter starts by examining 
the TUC's role in the international trade union movement at this time, and the 
links between the TUC and the Foreign Office. The chapter then examines the 
response of British trade unions to the Marshall Plan. It shows that the response 
successftdly divided the labour movement into communist and anti-communist 
camps, as those on the left were forced to chose between the US and the Soviet 
Union, which they had avoided up to this point. It argues that the resulting split in 
the international trade union movement was important in that it not only reflected 
the split between East and West but also helped to cement it, strengthening the 
hand of the British government. 
140 
5.1 British Trade Unionism and its International Role 
The British trade union movement has had a long history of involvement in 
labour affairs overseas, and in the international trade union movement! This was 
partly due to Britain having been the first highly industrialised nation, and partly 
due to Britain's position in the world with its extensive Empire. In 1945, the 
Trades Union Congress came to the peak of its position in the international trade 
union world, and London had become the wartime refuge of several national 
trade union movements and international bodies, such as the International 
Transport Workers Federation (ITF). 
Historically, there had been two forms of international trade union organisation, 
both of which emerged around the turn of the twentieth century. Firstly, there 
were the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs). These were transnational 
associations of unions in a given industry, which tended to focus their activities 
in areas directly related to their industrial sector. The second type of international 
trade union organisation consisted of federations of the national trade union 
centres of various countries such as the TUC in the UK and the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) in the US. 2 While the ITSs tended to focus their 
1 For general information on the international trade union movernent, see Gary K. Busch, The 
Political Role of International Trade Unions, London: Macmillan, 1983; Robert Cox, 'Labour 
and Transnational Relations, special issue of International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 3,1971, 
pp. 554-584; Lewis Lorwin, The International Labour Movement, New York: Harper, 1953; John 
P. Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement, 1940 to 1953, Ithaca, 
N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954, and Windmuller, 7he International Trade Union 
Movement, Deventer: Kluwer, 1980. 
2 In 1945, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was the larger of the two trade union national 
centres in the US, the other being the more recently established Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO). These were rivals until the mid- I 950s when they merged. See, for example, 
Windmuller, The International Trade Union Movement. 
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activities on industry specific questions, the federations had a more active 
political role. This was largely because the federations of national congresses 
tended to parallel the division of the labour movement into communist and non- 
communist camps. Before the Second World War, the two main federations were 
the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), a non-communist 
federation consisting of some European centres and the American Federation of 
Labour (AFL), and the communist Profintem, also known as the Red 
International of Labour Unions (RILU), which had been set up in the early 1920s. 
This organization was in direct competition with the IFTU, and as the RILU 
affiliates were charged with the task of infiltrating and taking over their national 
trade union centres, great hostility existed between the two. MacShane highlights 
that it was the establishment of the Profintern, rather than events after the Second 
World War which led to an irreconcilable split in the international trade union 
world, and that, 
the trade unions' international experience and institutional memory dating 
back to the 1920s that were the main source for the elaboration of labour- 
movement thinking and policy after 1945.3 
This situation had apparently changed in 1945, when an increased desire for, and 
optimism about, international solidarity led to the formation of the World 
Federation of Trade Unions (VvTTU), which, uniquely, included communist and 
non-communist unions. The decision to set up this new International was taken at 
the World Trade Union Conference, convened by the TUC for February 6-17, 
1945, and held in London. The conference was attended by 164 delegates and 
3 Denis MacShane, International Labour and the Origins ofthe Cold War, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992, p. 279. 
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forty observers from sixty-three trade union organisations. 4 Winston Churchill 
sent his greetings, and Clement Attlee, then Deputy Prime Minister, addressed 
5 the conference, thus providing an official seal of approval. 
However, the decision to hold the conference, and to establish a new 
International, was not to everyone's liking. Some members of the TUC had 
certain doubts about co-operation with the Soviet Union, but 'felt that it was at 
least desirable to try, through the medium of some international organization, to 
cultivate the friendly relationships with Soviet Russia which had developed 
during the dark days of the war. ' 6 Bevin and the Foreign Office were against the 
idea of the World Conference, but felt it best not to interfere. 7 Bevin advised 
Arthur Deakin against holding a post of authority in the resulting International, as 
he was concerned that it would 'gradually move over into the Russian sphere of 
influence', and that the non-communist members 'would be used to give an 
appearance of unity which in fact would be non-existent. 8 The American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) notably refused to be involved as they objected to the 
presence of Soviet trade unionists. The AFL's view, as stated by George Meany, 
its Secretary-Treasurer, was that co-operation with the Soviet Union entailed 
(grovelling in the dust of a false unity which would simply replace one form of 
totalitarianism with another'. 9 Instead, the AFL's main rival, the Congress of 
4 Trades Union Congress Report, (hereafter TUCR), 1945, p. 101. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Arthur Deakin, 'The International Trade Union Movement', International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 2, 
April 1950, p. 168. 
7 Victor Isaac Silverman, 'Stillbirth of a World Order: Union Internationalism from War to Cold 
War in the US and Britain, 193949', unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, 1990, 
F. 150. 
Vic Allen, Trade Union Leadership, London: Longmans, 1957, p. 290. 9 MacShane, International Labour, p. 80, citing J. Goulden, Meany, p. 125. 
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Industrial Organizations (CIO), attended as the US representatives, thus boosting 
their international profile and further annoying the AFL. According to Sydney 
Hillman of the CIO, a new international was needed in order to establish, 
a powerful international labour organisation which can speak, and act with 
authority on behalf of the workers and the common men and women of the 
world ... The workers, who have had so great a part in winning the war, 
cannot leave to others - however well-intentioned they may be - the sole 
responsibility for making the peace. 10 
It was felt that if workers across the world could not find common ground upon 
which to build a constructive relationship, then governments would never be able 
to do so. However, although the WFTU was to last several years, the differences 
between the viewpoints of communist and non-communist unions were never 
reconciled, and both sides had their own vision of the role that the new 
International was to play. Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the TUC, was 
clearly unhappy with the new International, but felt that it was better to be on the 
inside controlling events than an onlooker. At the Paris October conference to 
draw up the new constitution, he gave a note of caution about the political 
aspirations of the new organisation. 
[L]et us always remember that our job here is to build a trade union 
International, an International to carry on practical day-to-day trade union 
work, to guide the activities of our different trade union centres and to secure 
practical results for the individual members of our unions. I say that because 
some of the speakers seem to be under the impression that ourjob is to build a 
political International. 
He went on to warn, somewhat prophetically, that, 
If once we get into the maze of politics, as surely as I am standing here on this 
rostrum, this International will perish. It will split because the different 
10 Betty Wallace, World Labour Comes ofAge, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1945, p. 143. 
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conceptions of political aspiration, desire, method and policy are so wide that 
they would divide us. " 
Despite Citrine's warning, many of the delegates insisted that the new labour 
International must be concerned with both political and trade union affairs. Any 
effort to separate them was, according to the leader of the Ceylonese trade union 
delegation (and head of the Ceylonese Communist Party), 'attempting to divide 
the indivisible. ' 12 As a consequence, the constitution of the new International, 
drawn up between February and September, 1945, reflected the wider concerns of 
the union movements at this time. The prime purposes of the WFTU were 'to 
organise and unite within its ranks the trade unions of the whole world', but also 
'to carry on the struggle for the decisive defeat of the fascist powers and for the 
extermination of all fascist forms of government and every manifestation of 
fascism, under whatever form it operates and by whatever name it may be 
known'. To 'plan and organise the education of trade union members on the 
question of international labour unity', and also 'to combat war and the causes of 
913 war and work for a stable and enduring peace. 
it has been pointed out that nobody at the end of World War II was likely to 
disagree with these goals, which were stated in such general tenns that even the 
AFL could have endorsed them. 14 Indeed, in the US, despite initial fears, the 
11 TUC files, Modem Records Centre (hereafter MRC), University of Warwick, MSS 292/910/2, 
doc. Ref. R. 1853, History of the World Federation of Trade Unions. 
12 Morton Schwarz, 'Soviet Policy and the World Federation of Trade Unions, 1945-49', 
unpublished PhD thesis, Colombia University, 1963, p. 1 19, citing the Report ofthe World Trade 
Union Conference Congress, p. I 11. 
" Constitution ofthe World Federation of Trade Unions, published by the WFTU, no date, 
'Preamble - aims and methods', pp. 7-9; also printed in TUCR, 1945, p. 109. 14 Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement, p. 62. 
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Office of Strategic Services (OSS, the wartime precursor to the Central 
Intelligence Agency), in May 1945 told Truman that the structure drawn up for 
the WFTU would limit Soviet strength, and so the OSS felt confident the 
Russians would not dominate the organisation. 15 In 1945, it was fascism, and not 
communism, that exercised most people's minds. The constitution of the WFTU 
would not seem so acceptable to the West once the Cold War was underway. The 
WFTU became one of the first sites of Cold War tension, and, as Hyman puts it, 
The uneasy existence of [the] WFTU reflected an interplay of ideology and 
opportunism: all the main union movements were guided by the foreign policy 
goals of their respective government, but were caught up in the rhetoric of 
international unity and reluctant to assume primary responsibility for a 
breakdown. 16 
The associations between the trade unions and their own countries' foreign 
policy, which will be examined next, meant that the WFTU could not last once 
relations between the communist and non-communist states had broken down. 
The TUC and Foreign Policy 
For the British TUC, its international role was not confined to participation in 
international trade union bodies, but also included direct involvement in state 
diplomacy and direct involvement in activities of the trade unions of other states. 
Harrod notes that 'unions have served the nation both knowingly and 
unknowingly in the exercise of its foreign policy through cooperative as well as 
independent activity. ' 17 In general, the foreign policy of the TUC rested on the 
belief that it should play a major role in the international trade union movement, 
15 Silverman, 'Stillbirth of a world Order', p. 279, citing OSS, 'Memorandum for the President, 
13/5/45, Declassified Documents Retrospective, 316E Fiche 803, pp. 5 & 9. 16 Hyman, 'Praetorians and Proletarians', in Jim Fyrth (ed. ), Labour's High Noon, London: 
Lawrence& Wishart, 1993, p. 177. 
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and that it's activities should not in any way embarrass or conflict with those of 
the Labour government. One example of how the TUC's foreign activities could 
be seen to be in contradiction with its supposed trade union ideals was over its 
attitudes towards the left in Greece. In the immediate postwar years it acted to 
curtail WFTU protests over suppression of Greek trade unionism by the ultra- 
right (and British backed) government and to keep them low-key. ' 8 According to 
Weiler, in Greece the British government 'stymied the communists' in Greek 
politics and the trade unions, and 'eventually remade the trade union movement 
into a conservative force'. He points out the 'The TUC cooperated with the 
British state in this process, providing yet another example of its growing 
corporatist role in foreign policy. '19 For Silverman, the TUC's foreign policy at 
this time 'oscillated between the necessity ... of embracing the perspective of 
international labor and the contrasting compulsion to defend the country's 
national interest. ' 20 
With the advent of a Labour government, the TUC's contact with the Foreign 
Office increased. Bevin provided a direct channel of influence and as Bullock 
notes, 'Throughout his ten years of office as a minister, Bevin kept in constant 
and close touch with Arthur Deakin ... and other members of the TUC's General 
Council. ' 
These were not men of straw - they could not have carried their unions with 
them if they had been - but they were prepared to listen to Bevin not only on 
foreign affairs, but on economic, industrial and political issues, as they would 
17 Jeffrey Harrod, Trade Union Foreign Policy: A Study ofBritish andAmerican Trade Union 
Activities in Jamaica, London: Macmillan, 1972, p. 46. 
18 MacShane, International Labour, pp. 126-7. 
19 Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988, 
p. 136. 
'0 Silverman, 'Stillbirth of a World Order', p. 116. 
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have done to no other minister because they regarded him as still one of 
themselves. In return, Bevin's position in the Government gave them access to 
the Cabinet, inside knowledge of what was happening and a guarantee that their 
point of view would never go unrepresented. 21 
Bevin's Private Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Roderick Barclay, 
commented that 'Ernie undoubtedly felt stronger loyalty towards his old Trade 
Union colleagues than towards the Labour Party as a Whole. ' Bevin often spoke 
with Arthur Deakin, who would seek his advice over union affairs, and 'When, as 
sometimes happened, he failed to appear at the Foreign Office at the expected 
time after lunch, we usually discovered that he had gone off to Transport House 
for a goSSip., 22 It was not likely, however, that the trade union leadership would 
actually have much opportunity to provide any critique of foreign policy, as 
Bevin had a 'tendency to personalize his views and policies'. This 'inhibited 
some responsible criticism of foreign policy because those who knew Bevin were 
wary of saying anything which he might interpret as an attack upon himsclf. )23 
There was a constant flow of infonnation between the TUC and government 
departments, in particular the Foreign Office, and advice and support from the 
government over political and economic developments that were of interest to the 
TUC in its national and international role. Labour Attachds, appointed from 1946 
onwards to the various British Embassies, were provided with information from 
the TUC. In return, the TUC received reports by the Attaches which were felt to 
be very useful as 'they provided information which was not obtainable from any 
21 Allan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, 
pp*58-59* 
2 Sir Roderick Barclay, Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office, London: Roderick Barclay, 1975, 
F; 80. 
Bernard Hennessy, 'British Trade Unions and International Affairs 1945-53', unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1953, pp. 162 & 163. 
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other source. 24 The relationship between the trade unions and the Foreign Office 
was further strengthened when in April 1947, Hubert Gee, who had been a 
member of Bevin's wartime Ministry of Labour staff, was appointed as a special 
Labour Relations Officer at the Foreign Office. His remit was to liaise between 
the TUC and the Labour Party. This was to be done through Denis Healey, the 
Party's International Secretary. Healey had been a conununist in his youth, but 
had been moving increasingly to the right and by 1947 was firmly in the anti- 
communist camp. 25 Gee was also to keep in direct contact with Bevin's office. 
According to Carew, while this might, 'on the surface, have seemed a progressive 
move to enable party and union thinking to filter into Foreign Office policy- 
making circles, ' the reality was somewhat different. 
In fact the intention was quite the reverse, to create a mechanism for keeping 
the Labour Party and the TUC on a course approved by the Foreign Office. 
From an early stage it was clear that the job would be mainly concerned with 
combating the thrust of Communism in the international field. 26 
One of Gee's tasks was to brief trade unionists travelling abroad, 27 while Denis 
Healey had responsibility for anti-communist propaganda and publicity. 28 Healey 
was in contact with the Information Research Department (IRD), the covert anti- 
communist propaganda agency created in 1947. Healey was involved in tasks 
24 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/900/5, 'Labour Attaches 1946-601, letter to TUC International 
Department, 24 February 1949; memo of interview, at the Ministry of Labour, between Tewson, 
Ernest Bell (head of TUC International Department), and H. Watkinson, MP (Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Minister of Labour), 30 October 1952. 
25 Denis Healey, The Time ofMy Life, London: Penguin, 1990, Chs. 2&4. 
26 Anthony Carew, 'The Schism within the World Federation of Trade Unions: Government and 
Trade Union Diplomacy', International Review of Social History, Vol. 29, No. 3,1984, pp. 298- 
299. 
" Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 299; see also Public Records Off ice, Kew, London, 
(hereafter PRO), Foreign Office files (hereafter FO) 371/67613 for information regarding Gee's 
ost and activities. 
8 Healey was also good friends with Ernest Bell, the head of the TUC's International Department, 
with whom he had been a student at Oxford. Healey, The Time ofMy Life, p. 73. 
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such as providing favourable publicity for the Marshall Plan (including writing 
an article for the Labour Party publication, Labour Woman) '29 and helping with 
anti-communist propaganda. One example of this activity was the drawing up of 
a 'Memorandum on the Use of Words in Publicity about Communism' to be used 
in public statements, news bulletins and so on. While the term 'Dictator' was to 
be encouraged, as 'this proved very useful against Hitler and is suitable for 
general audiences', 'Red' was out as 'This is liable to cause confusion with 
Socialist Parties and tends to be used as a term of reactionary abuse'. 'Kremlin 
imperialism' could be used as 'This is a graphic and sinister term that can be 
employed to cover the entire field of Soviet foreign policy', but 'protectorate', 
'dependency' and 'colony' should be avoided as 'These are technical terms for 
our own possessions and should therefore not be used to describe areas under 
Kremlin control'. 30 
The closeness of the relationship between certain trade union leaders and the 
Foreign Office can be demonstrated by the way that the response of the trade 
union movement to the Marshall Plan was shaped to reflect the policy of the 
government. The Marshall Plan gave rise to the most comprehensive 
international intervention and mobilisation by British and other Western trade 
unions, in terms of involvement in the international trade union movement, 
engagement in state diplomacy and direct intervention in overseas trade unions. 
29 Labour Party Archive at the National Labour History Archive, Manchester, Labour Party 
International Department, Denis Healey files, Box on Anti-Communist Propaganda 1947-50. 
30 Labour Party Archive, Manchester, Labour Party International Dept., Denis Healey files, 
Articles Box 1947-50, File for 1949, PR 704/G. 
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Before these activities can be analysed, it is necessary to chart the trade union 
response to the Marshall Plan. 
5.2 The Trade Union Response to the Marshall Plan 
For the Marshall Plan to succeed in its economic and political aims the support of 
the trade unions in Europe was vital. As Weiler points out, this was realised by 
the American policymakers from the beginning, who felt that the Marshall Plan's 
4success or failure [would] depend in great part on the attitude of European labor 
movements. 31 Workers were needed to transport and unload the Marshall Aid 
goods, and strike activity wnongst dockworkers in particular could have caused 
considerable problems. In late 1947 strikes broke out in France and Italy, which 
seemed to be in part a response to Marshall Aid. It was Victor Reuther's view 
that the Soviet Union was mounting attacks on the European Recovery 
Programme not only though political channels but through the communist- 
controlled unions in France and Italy. 
They were clearly out to undercut Western Europe's chances for industrial 
recovery. Specific examples were the flooding of the mines in northern France 
and the efforts to prevent the unloading of crucial supplies on the docks of 
southern France. 32 
As Weiler points out, 'Communist trade unionists abandoned the cooperative 
attitude they had maintained for the first two years after the war and began to 
organize working-class opposition to the ERP and to all measures calling for any 
-1 
Peter Weiler, 'The Uni ted States, International Labor, and the Cold War: The Breakup of the 
World Federation of Trade Unions', Diplomatic History, Vol. 5, No. 1,198 1, p. 13, citing Cleon 
Swayze to Paul Nitze, 23 July 1947,851.504/7-2347, Decimal Files, Department of State, US, 
National Archives. 
32 Victor Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story ofthe UA W, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1976, p. 330. Victor Reuther was the CIO's European Representative at this time, while his 
brother, Walter Reuther was the leader of the powerful United Automobile Workers. 
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form of wage freeze. 33 The importance given to the need to get labour support 
for the Marshall Plan was reflected in the appointment of a number of US trade 
unionists and labour experts to the Economic Co-operation Administration 
staff. 31 
Such was the US concern over communist dominated trade unions in Europe, 
that in France, Irving Brown from the American Federation of Labor not only 
channelled AFL money to the breakaway, non-communist union, Force Ouvri&e, 
but also money from the recently established Central Intelligence Agency. 35 In 
Italy, the Soviet Union and the Cominfonn 'provided massive aid' to the 
communist trade union national centre 'through the donation of money from the 
WFTU', while the US provided assistance to the breakaway non-communist 
unions through Irving Brown, 'ostensibly from union funds but primarily from 
the CIA'. 36 According to Reuther, Brown also used CIA money to pay 'the 
notorious Ferri Pisani and his entourage of Corsican thugs' for breaking 
'Communist instigated strikes in Marseilles [which were] an effort to block the 
unloading of Marshall Plan supplies'. 37 
33 Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 103. 
34 For information, see TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/2 'Notes on ERP' by Lincoln Evans at the 
TUC, no date; also Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1987, p. 82. 
35 Weiler, 'International Labor and the Cold War', p. 14; Radosh, American Labor, pp. 310-25; 
Reuther, The Brothers Reuther, p. 412. For more information see Richard Fletcher, 'How CIA 
Money Took the Teeth out of British Socialism', in Philip Agee & Louis Wolf (eds. ), The CIA in 
Western Europe, Secaucus, NJ: 1978, pp. 188-200; Sallie Pisani, The CIA and the Marshall Plan, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 199 1. For a more general approach, see Trevor Bames, 
'The Secret Cold War: the CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946-1956: Part V, 
Historical Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2,198 1, pp. 399-415. 
36 Gary Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trade Unions, London: Macmillan, 1983, 
rp.. 64-65. 
Reuther, The Brothers Reuther, p. 412 
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In Britain, the trade unions were less likely to cause so many problems, or require 
such drastic action from the US. However, support was needed to contain and 
limit communist and non-communist far left criticism of the Marshall Plan 
within the unions; to prevent this from spreading to the 'soft' left; to prevent 
sympathetic strikes breaking out in the docks or the mines, where the more 
militant left was well organised; and to bolster the line being taken by the Labour 
government, that Marshall Aid was not intended to divide Europe and the Soviet 
Union. Hennessy's study shows that 'at least in their more public 
pronouncements', 
the [Labour] Party and the unions often attempted to soften the implications of 
Western orientation connected with support for Marshall Aid with expressions 
of their desire (sincere, no doubt, at least up until 1950) for greater trade with 
38 the U. S. S. R. 
Support was also needed from the trade union movement for the TUC to effect a 
withdrawal from the World Federation of Trade Unions without being placed in 
the compromising position of seeming to sacrifice the ideal of world trade union 
unity for the politics of the developing Cold War. 
The Response of the Trade Union Leaderships to the Offer of Marshall Aid 
The response that the TUC and trade union leadership took was of crucial 
importance, since it would set the tone for the rest of the trade union movement. 
The TUC, once it had decided to commit itself, came out in near unanimous 
support for the Marshall Plan, forging for itself a central role in the Marshall Plan 
machinery and creating positive propaganda and support from trade unionists. 
However, unlike other trade union national centres, the TUC was not to make a 
38 Hennessy, 'British Trade Unions and International Affairs, p. 226. 
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public statement about the Marshall Plan until December 1947. This was 
surprising given that Tewson, the TUC's General Secretary, had been involved in 
discussions in June for a proposed meeting of the Independent League of 
European Co-operation to discuss 'what action can be taken to support the 
Marshall offer'. 39 Furthermore, communist trade unionists had referred to the 
Marshall Plan as a 'Marshall Plot' at the 1947 TUC congress in September and, 
unsuccessfully, had called for Bevin to 'resist the pressure of dollar diplomacy'. 40 
The AFL, at their annual convention in September, came firmly out in favour of 
the Marshall Plan, while the President of the CIO spoke in favour of the plan at 
its annual convention in October. The International Transportworkers' 
Federation, which had its headquarters in London and close links with the TUC, 
passed a resolution at the end of November stating that it 'Welcomes the renewed 
willingness of the United States of America to come to the aid of the countries of 
Europe', and pledged 'the willingness of the I. T. F. to cooperate in the execution 
of that Plan'. 41 It also announced the decision to convene its own conference on 
the Marshall Plan for the following April. 42 
According to Carew, the TUC refrained from making any announcement before 
this point because, with the last attempt to settle the German question in the 
Conference of Foreign Ministers due for November-December 1947, the TUC 
39 A comprehensive trawl of the TUC files did not throw up any references to discussions on the 
ERP before 16 December, 1947, apart from the reference to the proposed meeting of the 
Independent League of European Co-operation. Tewson was initially on the list of British 
committee members to be invited to the conference, along with Harold Butler, Harold Macmillan, 
and four others, TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/1, 'Independent League of European Co-operation 
Action to be Taken on Marshall's Offer, 23 June 1947. 
40 TUCR, 1947, pp. 427 & 487-9. 
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wished 'to avoid any step that would antagonise the USSR and embarrass 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin'. 43 Another likely explanation is that the TUC 
was waiting for the Soviet trade unions to commit themselves to an anti-Marshall 
Plan line before they made their announcement. This came when the newly 
established Cominform issued a statement on 5 October referring to the Marshall 
Plan as a Wall Street plot aimed at dominating Europe. This signalled an end to 
the policy of a united front in the labour world, represented most clearly by the 
V*TTU, branding the non-communist labour movements as the 'reactionary 
forces of capitalism'. 44 
The TUC's announcement on the Marshall Plan came following the December 17 
General Council meeting at which they approved a statement drawn up by the 
TUC's International Committee and the newly created 'Special Committee on the 
Economic Situation'. This proclaimed that the TUC's General Council 'regard 
the principles put forward by the United States Secretary, Mr. Marshall, in his 
speech on June 5,1947, as being a statesmanlike approach to the problems of 
Europe' . 
45 They congratulated 'American labour on the contribution they have 
made in their work on the Harriman Committee', and stated that, 
The General Council instruct their representatives on the World Federation of 
Trade Unions to urge acceptance of the principle of aid to Europe, and of co- 
operation among Trade Union Centres of the countries concerned in an 
41 International Transportworkers' Federation (ITF) files, MRC, MSS 15911112n 'Document 
MPC (Marshall Plan Conference) 5', referring to ITF General Council meeting, 25-27 November 
1947. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan, pp. 73-74. 
44 Ibid., P. 73, based on an article in Bolshevik, 15 November 1947, reported'in British 
Ambassador, Moscow, to Hankey, 17 December 1947, PRO, FO 37 In 1648. 
45 TUC files, MRC, MSS 292/901/8, First meeting of the Special Committee on the Economic 
Situation (E. S. C. ) and the International Committee (I. C. ), 'Relief and Rehabilitation of Europe', 
16 December 1947. The statement was approved and released by the TUC's General Council the 
following day. 
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examination of the practical steps to be taken to ensure the most effective 
utilisation of such aid. )46 
Thus, this statement not only set the tone for the British trade unions response to 
Marshall Aid, but also drew out the battle line to be taken with regard to the 
WFTU, who were refusing to discuss the issue of the Marshall Plan. The 
statement was printed in full in the WFTU's Febniary Information Bulletin. 47 
The main public justification that the TUC gave for its support for the Marshall 
Plan was that, 
The attitude of the American Trade Unions on this question is an almost 
sufficient answer to the accusation that the offer of American aid to Europe 
disguises a deep-laid Wall Street Plan for an expansion of 'dollar 
imperialism'. The essence of the Marshall Plan is self-help. 48 
While for those on the left this argument would not have been of great comfort, 
for the American trade unions were not generally perceived as a neutral judge of 
American policy, for others such information on the American unions 
unequivocal stance on the issue of Marshall Aid may have been reassuring. This 
ties in with Putnam's argument that messages from abroad can provide what he 
calls 'suasive reverberation' in terms of changing minds and moving the 
undecided, and they are 'often cited by participants to domestic audiences as a 
, 49 way of legitimizing their policies. In this instance, the point was also made 
repeatedly that if there was anything to be concerned about, then British trade 
unions would not have involved themselves in the European Recovery 
46 Ibid. 
47 WFTU, Information Bulletin, No. 3 (53), 15 February 1948, held in Warwick University 
Library. 
48 Labour, TUC, December 1947, p. 105 
49 Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', 
Appendix in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds. ), Double-Edged Diplomacy. ý 
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Programme. At the 1948 Trades Union Congress, Florence Hancock in her 
President's Speech said, 
Let us be clear about this if we are in doubt about anything else - that if the 
offer of American aid to Europe could be perverted from its declared purpose 
of protecting the political integrity of the European nations and promoting 
their economic recovery, then the British Trade Union Movement would have 
no part in it. 50 
This despite the fact that the TUC had itself pointed out, in a memo 'to help the 
General Council of the TUC reach a conclusion on the proposed US aid', that 
from a reading of the Harriman Report issued in the US on 9 November 1947, it 
was obvious that the aid proposals 'are not entirely altruistic in their 
conception'. 51 
The TUC publicly maintained the line that Marshall Aid was not intended to 
divide Europe, and that they did not intend to divide the international trade union 
movement, countering such suggestions with references to their role in 
establishing the WFTU and their support for the campaign for greater East-West 
trade. 52 Secretly, however, it was accepted by the Foreign Office that the 
Marshall Plan was a political issue over which a communist/anti-communist split 
could be pushed within the trade union movement. For instance, soon after the 
TUC's Marshall Plan announcement, Bevin had instructed the British 
Ambassador in Washington to reassure the AFL about the TUC's anti-communist 
aims: 
International Bargaining and International Politics, Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1993, p. 455. 
50 TUCR, 1948, p. 79. 
11 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564-1/1 memo, joint meeting of E. S. C. & I. C., 16 December 1947. 
52 A fairly comprehensive examination of trade union demands for East-West trade can be found 
in Hennessy, 'British Trade Unions and International Affairs', pp. 226 & 354-375. 
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I hope that the American Federation of Labour will have noted the steps which 
the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party are taking here to deal with 
the problems of communist infiltration before it becomes a danger. Among 
other things the Trade Union Council recently passed a resolution with only 
53 one dissentient vote to back the Marshall Plan. 
Bevin also told Secretary of State Marshall at the Council of Foreign Ministers 
Conference in London in December - on the same day that the TUC made its 
public pronouncement of its support for the Marshall Plan - that he had been 
'much fortified' by a decision of the TUC General Council, with one dissenting 
voice, to approve his foreign policy and pledge its support for the Marshall Plan. 
It had also 'decided to oppose the communists resolutely if they attempted to start 
any trouble here. ' He reassured Marshall that 'He might be able to say more 
about this' on the next day, 'after he had discussed the position with Mr. 
Deakin'. 54 Given the extremely close links between the TUC and the Foreign 
Office at this time, and the frequent conversations between Bevin and Arthur 
Deakin, who had by that point become the President of the WFTU, it is unlikely 
that the TUC saw the Marshall Plan as an apolitical issue. This, however, was the 
way that it was presented to the trade union membership. 
All of the largest trade unions followed the line set by the TUC, though most 
announcements were not made until the spring of 1948. According to Hennessy, 
the 'big-six' unions were waiting until the expected controversy with the VVTTU 
was over before making their official statements. 55 Nevertheless, despite the 
53 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Kew, FO 800/493, Bevin to British Ambassador in 
Washington, 23 December 1947. The 'dissentient' vote belonged to Bert Papworth from the 
TGWU, who was also an Executive Committee member of the Communist Party of Great Britain. 
54 Foreign Relations ofthe United States, (hereafter FRUS), 1947, Vol. 11, Washington: 
Department of State, memo of conversation between Secretary of State Marshall and Bevin, held 
on December 17,1947, p. 8 16. 
55 Hennessy, 'British Trade Unions and International Affairs', p. 227. 
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efforts of the anti-communist trade union leadership therevere criticisms made 
of the Marshall Plan. 
Discontent Amongst the Rank and File 
Unions that tended to express concern over the Marshall Plan were those where 
there were left-wingers in positions of authority, such as the AEU, or where there 
was a strong militant presence in the union branches. 56 For example, as noted in 
the previous chapter, at the National Union of Railwaymen's 1947 AGM, three 
resolutions highly critical of Bevin's foreign policy and which contained direct or 
indirect reference to Marshall Aid, which were all defeated, were put forward by 
regional branches. 57 The London Branch of the Sign and Display Trade Union 
sent the TUC a resolution at the end of July 1947 stating, 
That our present Foreign policy is detrimental to the well being of our country, 
and must change away from the American reactionaries, (with their high 
prices, Anti-Labour Bill and coming slump), who seek to impose on Europe 
an American economic domination by the Marshall Plan, which upholds the 
policy of a powerful Germany controlled by American big business. 
8 
This suggests that for some trades unionists, at least, the issue of Marshall Aid 
was seen as important, though this does appear to have been a minority. 
Many more criticisms were voiced through the trades councils. For example, 
during 1947/8, Coventry Trades Council passed only resolutions criticising 
56 The Marshall Plan is not an issue that often arises in the trade union archival holdings, except in 
terms of resolutions being sent in from their membership expressing either support or concern 
over Marshall Aid, or resolutions sent from the unions to the TUC. For example, in the case of the 
National Union of Railwaymen, the files of the Political Office of the General Council contain 
hardly any direct references to the Marshall Plan. 
57 National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) files, MRC, MSS 127/NU/PO/1/10 AGM, 7 July 1947, 
resolutions proposed by the Polmadie, Warrington and Glasgow No. 9 branches. 
58 TUC, MRC MSS 292/564.1/1 Secretary of London branch of Sign and Display Trade Union to 
TUC, July 31 1947. 
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Bevin's foreign policy and the Marshall Plan. At the Executive Committee 
meeting of August 7 1947, 'American Dollar Donation was discussed and it was 
felt that sacrifice was being made by the nation which was out of all proportion to 
benefits gained'. Instead there should be a British Soviet Trading Agreement. 59 
While Coventry may have been unusually politicised and leftwing (the 
Communist Party was strongly represented within the engineering unions), the 
extent of the discontent was significant. At a delegates meeting of 21 August, 
1947, a request from the 51155 TGWU branch for support for the following 
resolution was agreed 'as this was in line with the policy of the Trades Council'. 
The resolution stated that the delegates 'demand' a 'complete change in the 
British Foreign Policy': 
The present Foreign Secretary's subservience to the Dollar Diplomats and 
isolation of European and Russian Trade proposals can only mean a further 
demand on the overtaxed workers of this country. We also congratulate the 
Labour MPs who are forcing the Socialist Programme promised at the last 
election. 60 
At the Coventry Trades Council special meeting to discuss the economic crisis in 
September 1947, at which between 150 and 160 trade unionists were present, 
delegates called for a complete change of foreign policy and one 'suggested that 
[the] finest gesture to be made to the Movement was the removal of Ernest Bevin 
from the Foreign Office'. 61 Such resolutions were also passed by other trades 
councils, such as the Horsham and District Trades Council and the Barrow and 
District Trades Council. 62 
59 Coventry Trades Council files, MRC, MSS 51113, p. 106, Executive Committee meting of 7 
August 1947 
60 Coventry Trades Council, MRC, MSS 5/l/3, p-I 11, Delegates meeting 21 August 1947 61 Coventry Trades Council, MRC, MSS 51113, p. 1 17 Special delegates meeting of 2 September 
1947 
62 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/1 Horsham and District Trades Council to TUC, 4 February 1948, 
and Baffow and District Trades Council to Tewson, 20 March 1948. 
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Many of the left's criticisms over foreign policy and the Marshall Plan followed 
the same formula: that Marshall Aid was a form of American imperialism; that 
Britain should have closer trading links with the Soviet Union; and that the issue 
of Marshall Aid was likely to split the international trade union movement. These 
were the points repeatedly made by the CPGB. Branson notes that 'From the start 
British party leaders were sceptical about the Marshall Plan. ' John Gollan, a 
member of the Party's Political Committee, pointed out in early June that 'dollar 
assistance would be made available only to countries willing to toe the American, 
anti-Communist line'. 63 Palme Dutt, a leading Party member, called it a plan 
which the advocates of the Truman Doctrine 'hope to use for promoting a dollar- 
dominated Western European Bloc against democracy in Europe with Western 
Germany as its main base and Britain as the American agent to put it through. '64 
Branson notes that 'In Britain, the attitude of the Soviet Union to the Marshall 
Plan helped to confirm the belief of Communist Party members that it was a 
device to enable the Americans to dominate Europe, and should therefore be 
opposed. "65However, the very fact that it was the far left which criticised the 
Marshall Plan most vociferously, and that the language used - for example 'dollar 
imperialism', 'Wall Street plot', 'American reactionaries' - reflected the 
terminology to be found in Soviet and Communist Party statements, indicates 
that those who opposed the Marshall Plan could be branded as communist 
trouble-makers. This gave the TUC the perfect opportunity to marginalise those 
63 WorldNews and Views, the CPGB's paper, 14 June 1947, cited in Branson, History ofthe 
CPGB, 1941-1951, p. 153. 
'4 Labour Monthly, July 1947, p. 194. 
65 Branson, History ofthe CPGB, 1941-1951, p. 154. 
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who raised concerns about the Marshall Plan, both communists and non- 
communists. 
The strength with which the trades union leadership could fight back against this 
criticism arose through its strong links with the Labour government and the way 
with which it was ablc to isolatc its critics as bcing pro-Sovict and communist. 
Any opposition from the 'soft' left in the unions could be easily dealt with, since 
it was not well represented or organised, whereas the stronger opposition from 
the far left could be easily condemned. After 1947 the far left became 
increasingly isolated as the lines for the Cold War were drawn, and those who 
were equivocal about the Marshall Plan and links with the Soviet trade unions 
were forced to chose sides or be branded as 'traitors' by the TUC or the CPGB 
respectively. This was to occur not only nationally within Britain, but 
internationally as well, resulting in the split in the International established in 
1945 with the aim of international trade union unity, the World Federation of 
Trade Unions. 
5.3 The World Federation of Trade Unions 
Many accounts of this organisation see its demise as inevitable, given the 
inherent differences between the ideological outlooks of the unions involved, and 
between the centralism of the Soviet trade unions and the (relative) de- 
centralisation of Western unions, without even the intervening factor of the 
deepening of the Cold War, which meant that 'the cohesion of the WFTU in its 
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existing form was doomed. 1,66 MacShane argues that the split in the WFTU came 
from within, and that, 
Instead of seeing the WFTU fall victim to global power politics, diplomatic 
chicanery, or the Cold War it would be better to admit that it was set an 
impossible task - that of expressing international working class interests at a 
moment 
67 
when these were being most effectively asserted in the national 
context. 
Accounts that do not see the WFTU's split as inevitable come from the far left, 
and tend to see it as a victim of national government cold war politics enforced 
from above. 
68 
Studies of the WFTU are more deeply divided over the aims of the various trade 
unions (and their respective governments). While some see the VVTTU as a 
genuine attempt at world trade union unity, others feel that the Soviet Union 
wanted to use the VvTTU to gain access to the industrial working class in Europe, 
and 'until it split in 1949, the WFTU was the most substantial of the postwar 
Communist "frorif 'operations. 69 Deakin himself felt the changing venues of the 
various WFTU Executive Bureau meetings were designed to bolster Soviet 
policy, given that the Bureau would take the opportunity to address mass trade 
union demonstrations. At the June 1947 meeting in Prague, communist and non- 
communist WFTU executive members supported a communist mass trade union 
66 Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trades Unions, p. 66; see also Anthony Carew, 'The 
Schism within the World Federation of Trade Unions: Government and Trade Union Diplomacy', 
International Review ofSocial History, Vol. 29, No. 9,1984, p. 335; Peter Weiler, 'The United 
States, International Labor, and the Cold War: The Breakup of the World Federation of Trade 
Unions', Diplomatic History, Vol. 5, No. 1,1985, p. 22. 
67 MacShane, International Labour and the Origins ofthe Cold War, p. 282. 
6" Richard Saville, 'Politics and the Labour Movement in the Early Cold War', Our History 
Journal, Journal of the History Group of the Communist Party, No. 15, April 1990, p. 3 1; 
Silverman, 'Stillbirth of a World Order', p. 327. 
69 Schwartz, 'Soviet Policy and the WFTU', p. vi. 
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rally. Deakin was later to believe that this was in fact a 'full-scale dress- 
rehearsal' for the communist coup in February 1948 . 
70 As Vic Allen points out, 
The presence of Deakin and other non-Communist trade union leaders at the 
demonstration helped to give credulous masses the impression the 
Communists wanted to convey to them - that the cause was an internationally 
supported one. To this extent Bevin's warning to Deakin was correct. 71 
Whatever the interpretation of the activities of the VYTTU, it is clear that it was 
the issue of the Marshall Plan that caused the actual split within the WFTU. With 
the announcement of Marshall Aid, the very ideals of the WFTU became 
untenable, based, as they were, on the improvement of 'the living and working 
conditions of the people of all lands. 72 As far as the non-communist unions of 
the West were concerned, despite the 'strong resolutions adopted by the WFTU 
to support rehabilitation programs, the Soviet bloc managed to use the WFTU as 
an instrument to sabotage the efforts of both Europe and the US' and, in spite of 
the efforts made by the US and European trade unionists, the WFTU refused to 
support the Marshall Plan. 73 It was soon clear that 'the very situation against 
which [Citrine] had twice warned the participating countries in 1945 was rapidly 
approaching. 74 
The issue of the Marshall Plan was first raised within the VvTTU at the 
November meeting of its Executive Bureau in Paris. At this meeting, James 
Carey of the American Congress of Industrial Organizations had proposed that 
70 Allen, Trade Union Leadership, p. 292. 
71 Ibid. 
72 TUCR, 1945, Constitution of the WFTU, 'Preamble', p. 108. 
73 Reuther, The Brothers Reuther, pp. 330-33 1. 
7" Walter Citrine, Two Careers: A Second Volume ofAutobiography, London: Hutchinson, 1967, 
p. 238 
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the WFTU should endorse the Marshall Plan. It was agreed that the Marshall 
Plan should be left for discussion at the next meeting, as it had not been on the 
agenda. 75 However, it then proved impossible to agree on a date for the meeting, 
as the communist members of the executive wanted to delay such a vote for as 
long as possible as it was one which would publicly divide the WFTU leadership 
between communists and non-communists. Tensions rose, with both sides trying 
to gain the propaganda advantage. While the TUC was producing its publicity 
statement and calling for the WFTU 'to acceptance the principle of aid to 
Europe, 76 the communist unions were producing their response. This was that, 
The concrete expression of U. S. A. expansion tendencies are the so-called 
'Truman Doctrine' and 'Marshall Plan' ... Labour leaders and other Right 
Wing Socialists give active assistance to the realisation of the Marshall Plan. . 
. One of the chief aims of the Marshall Plan is to revive imperialist power in 
the new democracies and bring about the severance of their intimate economic 
and political collaboration with the U. S. S. R. 77 
While such statements could only act to irritate the TUC and other non- 
communist national centres, it also provided them with the necessary ammunition 
with which to present international trade union criticism of the Marshall Plan as 
communist inspired (which of course could be added to the anti-Marshall Plan 
statements of the British Communist Party). This was especially so given that the 
above article concluded, 
In order to strengthen the forces of democracy it is necessary to make use of 
all social organisations created during and after the war, amongst them - the 
W. F. T. U. - the most numerically important labour organisation ... It is thus 
obvious that the [World] Federation is called to fight not only for the 
75 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/901/8 I. C. minutes, 21 January 1948, 'Report of November 1947 Paris 
Executive Bureau of WFTU'. 
76 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/901/8 joint E. S. C. and I. C. meeting (no. 1),, 16 December 1947. 
77 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/918/1 copy of December 1947 issue of the Soviet publication Trade 
Unions. 
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economic but for the political interests of working people of all lands as 78 
well. 
This could be read as a threat, and of course did imply that the communist faction 
of the WFTU would try to take it over and use it for political ends. By the end of 
December 1947 several powerful trade union centres, in particular both the AFL 
and CIO in the US, and the union centres in the Benelux countries, were calling 
for an international conference of trade union national centres to discuss the 
Marshall Plan. 
The Marshall Plan Conference, March 1948 
The decision to convene the conference to discuss the Marshall Plan signalled the 
break-up of the WFTU, although this was not to officially occur for another 
twelve months. This provoked deep concern from left-wing unionists in Britain, 
who passed resolutions deploring the 'present effort of the American Federation 
of Labour, to undermine the newly formed World Federation by convening a 
sectional conference to discuss the Marshall Plan. 79 It also revealed the tensions 
already developing within the international community of trade unions who were 
united in their support for the Marshall Plan, resulting in the intervention by both 
the British Foreign Office and the US State Department. Because of this high 
level intervention, the decision to organise the conference will be mapped out in 
some detail. 
78 Ibid. 
79 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1 /1 Maidenhead and District Trades Council to Vincent Tewson, 24 
November 1947. Similar resolutions were sent in from the Crayford branch of the AEU to the 
TUC on 4 February 1948, and the Secretary of the Barrow and District Trades Council to TUC on 
20 March 1948. 
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The idea of convening an international trade union conference to discuss the ERP 
was first put forward by the American Federation of Labour. 80 At its October 
1947 Convention it published a statement to this effect, and it is obvious from the 
tone of this statement that the AFL saw this as the preliminary to a new 
international trade union movement: 
Because the World Federation of Trade Unions is controlled by Communists, 
we must give free unions an international organisation through which they can 
operate, so they will not be used against themselves by the Soviet Union. The 
A. F. L. as the strongest body of free unions in the world, is taking leadership. 81 
Reluctantly, the AFL decided to wait before calling a conference until it was 
clear that the European trade unions especially the TUC, were ready and able to 
co-operate. They were impatient however, as Busch points out, as 'both the CIO 
and the AFL wanted to demonstrate to the US Congress that the European labour 
movements supported the Marshall Plan which was scheduled to come to a vote 
in Congress in April 1948t. 82 In December the executive of the Belgian trade 
union centre passed a resolution in which they proposed calling an international 
trade union conference to discuss the ERP, though it was realised by the TUC 
and the Foreign Office that 'the whole proposal for the Conference was hurriedly 
thought up to get rid of the likelihood of A[merican] F[ederation] of L[abour] 
auspices. ' 83 The TUC General Council, however, urged that no action be taken 
on convening a conference until the matter had been considered by the World 
go TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1 /1 letter from Irving Brown of the AFL to Tewson, 29 December, 
1947 
81 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.18/1, cited in memo on the 'ERP International Trade Union 
Machinery', March 1949 
" Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trades Unions, p. 67. A similar point was made by 
the WFTU once the CIO had left it, in Free Trade Unions Remain in the WFTU, Paris: WFTU, 
1949, p. 4 1. 
83 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/1 note from A. E. C. of phone call from Gee, 31 December 1947. 
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Federation of Trade Unions' Executive Bureau due to meet in February 1948.84 
Belgium and the other Benelux trade union centres which were also in favour of 
a conference, decided to defer to this wish and wait until after this event. They 
wanted the TUC to add its signature to the conference invitations and to 'contact 
AFL and CIO and call for their eventual collaboration'. 85 The implication was 
that they would rather such a conference be in the hands of the TUC than the 
American union centres. 
The American Federation of Labor became increasingly impatient, and at the end 
of November Irving Brown made a 'personal and social visit' to Mr Tracey of the 
TUC Publicity Department during which the idea of an ERP conference was 
discussed. 86 Anthony Carew point out that this 'appeared to be an attempt to 
bounce the organisation [TUC] into the arms of the AFL. ' 87 The problem was felt 
to be sufficiently delicate to warrant the interference of Ernest Bevin. On 23 
December Bevin cabled the British Ambassador in Washington about the WFTU 
and how the British and American trade union centres should act. He pointed out 
that the TUC had to be seen to be loyal to the WFTU and so could not at this 
point take part in a trade union conference on the Marshall Plan. Neither could it 
push the WFTU too hard to discuss the Aid without losing support amongst the 
trade union members in Britain. Rather, the TUC should wait until the proposed 
WFTU Executive Bureau meeting in February. Bevin pointed out that, 
84 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.18/1 memo on the 'ERP International Trade Union Machinery', 
March 1949. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
97 Anthony Carew, 'The Schism within the World Federation of Trade Unions: Government and Trade Union Diplomacy', International Review ofSocial History, Vol. 29, No. 1984 p. 307 
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At that meeting they [the TUC] are going to back the Marshall Plan and, if it 
is avoided or there is a refusal to discuss it, or any steps are taken to block it, it 
looks very much as if it will lead to a break-up. In that case their [TUC] hands 
would be clean and this would carry the Trade Unions in this country with 
them. If on the other hand they did as the American Federation of labour 
suggested, they feel they would be unlikely to get the desired support. 88 
Bevin ftuther instructed the British Ambassador, revealing a clear interplay 
between union and foreign policy interests, and between union and foreign office 
diplomacy, that, 'In speaking to the American Federation of Labour people on the 
above lines, you should emphasise that the difference between us is not one of 
objectives but one of tactics. ' He went on that 'I am sure that the TUC will show 
itself ready and determined to act in the international field at the right time'. 89 
The issue of what to do about the WFTU was a delicate one, for whereas the 
TUC centre-right leadership wanted to withdraw from an organisation that, to 
them, had become a liability, to do so successfully they needed to carry with them 
the sentiments of the British trade union members. The WFTU was a popular 
body amongst the rank-and-file, as evinced by the number of resolutions put 
forward at meetings and conferences praising the very existence of the inclusive, 
international trade union body. At the 1948 and 1949 annual TUC congresses, 
resolutions were moved expressing regret at the breakdown of the WFTU and 
requesting that the TUC remain within it. 90 Although both came from unions 
with a strong far left presence and were easily defeated, in 1948 the TUC was so 
88 PRO, FO 800/493, cable from Bevin to British Ambassador in Washington, 23 December 
1947. 
89 Ibid. 
90 TUCR, 1948, pp. 441-451; TUCR 1949, pp. 329-339. The vote for the 1949 resolution, from the 
Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, was combined with that for a resolution welcoming the 
TUC's withdrawal from the WFTU from the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, 
(p. 327). The resolution supporting the TUCs policy received 6,258,000 votes, while that against 
only received 1,0 17,000 votes, (p. 339). 
169 
concerned that if put to a vote trade unionists would vote in favour of remaining 
in the WFTU, that they went to considerable lengths to 'keep this question off the 
floor of Congress ... [and] persuade the people responsible for this resolution to 
withdraw it. '91 Deakin managed to side step the issue by making a passionate 
speech in which he asked for the issue of WFTU membership to be left in the 
hands of the TUC. 92 The British trade union leadership, if it was to assert its 
dominance and prevent communist challenges to its authority, needed to be able 
to act with the blessing of the bulk of its members, otherwise it would hand its 
opponents a valuable propaganda weapon. 
While the TUC did not want to work at the same speed as the Americans, they 
did go so far as to endorse the recommendation of the TUC International 
Committee on 28 January 1948 that the WFTU be given an ultimatum. This was 
that if the WFTU Executive Bureau did not meet by the middle of February to 
discuss the Marshall Plan, the TUC would feel free to participate in or to convene 
a conference to do so. 93 This ultimatum was not met, with Saillant, the 
communist General Secretary of the VvTTU, offering to convene a meeting of the 
Executive Bureau in the first fortnight of April. The AFL had become impatient 
by this point, and tried to force the Belgian trade union's hand, informing them at 
the beginning of February that if they did not send out invitations for a 
conference within eight days, they would act independently. 94 Subsequently the 
TUC held talks with Benelux representatives and on 18th February the TUC 
91 TUCF, 1948, p. 446. 
92 Allen, Trade Union Leadership, pp. 306-7; TUCR, 1948, pp. 446-451. 93 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.18/1 memo on the IERP International Trade Union Machinery,, 
March 1949 
94 Ibid. 
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General Council endorsed the International Committee's recommendation that 
invitations should be sent out for a trade union conference on the ERP to be held 
95 between the 8th and I Oth March. The AFL were not pleased however, feeling 
that the TUC had stolen the ground from under their feet and that the AFL were 
being sidelined. George Meany, the anti-communist Secretary-Treasurer of the 
AFL was said to be 'absolutely mad', and the AFL initially refused to attend the 
conference as they were due to have a meeting of their Political Committee at 
96 
that time. 
The above situation proved highly awkward, to the extent that the Foreign Office, 
the State Department and embassy staffs in Washington and London intervened 
to try and patch up the quarrel. Ernest Bevin cabled reassurances directly to the 
AFL, and to the British Ambassador in Washington, giving a message to be 
passed on to the AFL setting out the delicacy of the situation. He emphasised that 
the TUC had been forced to act because of their obligation to be seen to be doing 
the right thing by the WFTU, and that he himself had told the TUC not to delay 
holding the conference later than 9th March. 97 This high level intervention was 
eventually successful, with the AFL eventually agreeing to send a delegation to 
the conference. While this revealed the ways in which the links between the 
Foreign Office and the TUC could be used to good effect, it also revealed the 
tensions that existed between trade union national centres even when they were 
on the same side, each unwilling to be sidelined by the others. 
95 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/901/8 meeting of the International Committee, 17 February 1948. 
96 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564-18/1 report of phone call from Oldenbroek, leader of the 
international Transport Workers Federation to the TUC, 19 February 1948. 
97 PRO, FO 371/71806, cable from Bevin to the British Ambassador in Washington, 19 February 
1948. 
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It was not only the timing of the conference that proved contentious. Tensions 
also existed over the purpose of the conference. Publicly, the TUC maintained 
that it was purely to discuss the ERP, proclaiming that, 
The Conference will be explanatory and consultative in character, having as 
its sole aim the correlation of trade union views in the various countries before 98 
the United States legislation is finally completed. 
Privately, of course, it was seen as a way of engineering a split in the WFTU. 
This was necessary since it was not possible for the non-communist unions to 
control the WFTU and force the communists out. Neither was it possible for the 
non-communist unions to remain within the WFTU as it would have given 
valuable propaganda to the Soviet Union and its very existence would have 
promoted sympathy for the Soviets from the working class world-wide. As it 
was, the concern that was being generated over the fate of the international trade 
union movement was shown by the level of interest that it produced amongst 
Foreign Office and State Department staff. For instance, the US Ambassador in 
London cabled Lovett, the Under-Secretary of State in the US, about the matter: 
March 8-9 conference on ERP represents first step in break-up of WFTU and 
formation of new international trade union centre ... we think AFL presence 
essential in order to strengthen anti-Communist and anti-WFTU elements in 
TUC and other European trade unions who have always been suspicious or 
hostile to WFTU, sympathetic to AFL position, and who wish to use 
conference in order [to] lay groundwork for new bona fide trade union 
international. ... Ultimate break-up of WFTU` seems to us to be inevitable but AFL can accelerate break-up if they act skilfully at this time. 99 
Labour, London: TUC, March 1948, p. 197. 
Cable from US Ambassador in London to Lovett, February 21 1948, quoted in Carew, 
'Schism', P. 314 
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This makes it clear that the issue of the Marshall Plan was being used to draw the 
lines of demarcation and to split the trade union world into their communist and 
anti-communist camps. The labour conference to discuss the Marshall Plan was 
successful in this in that it did provide the opportunity for establishing a new, 
temporary international body, the European Recovery Programme Trade Union 
Advisory Committee, which shall be examined in the next chapter. This 
organisation not only shaped the response of the non-communist trade union 
world to the Marshall Plan, but to the developing Cold War, eventually turning 
itself into the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The 
ICFTU was in direct competition with the WFTU. Not only did the British TUC 
play a prominent role in this, but it also used the international split to further 
entrench its own leadership in Britain and abroad, using along with the other 
powerful national centres the international situation to get rid of communists and 
establish the hegemony of the centre-right trade unionists. Before we turn to a 
detailed analysis of this organization, it is necessary to comment on the final split 
of the WFTU. 
The WFTU Splits 
As we have seen, the convening of the conference to discuss the international 
trade union response to the Marshall Plan marked the end of the pretence at 
international trade union unity, although the WFTU was to stumble on for 
another year. At the meeting of the WFTU Executive Committee and Bureau in 
Rome at the end of April 'prolonged and acrimonious discussions on the general 
administration of the VVTTU' were brought to a conclusion with the acceptance 
of a compromise proposal aimed at 'curbing the powers of the [communist] 
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Secretary General and other officials and preventing them from assuming 
political attitudes opposed to the opinions of affiliated unions'. 100 The TUC and 
the CIO also protested against the WFTU's 'May Day' message to the world that 
had condemned the Marshall Plan, and which was embarrassing for them to be 
associated with. 101 That the meeting was tense was shown by the Foreign Office 
report, which said of the British TUC delegation that, 
Tewson worked hard - too hard for he wore himself out and was nervy at the 
end ... There were moments when all three [TUC representatives], Tewson, Deakin and Tom O'Brien were at cross purposes with one another ... 
102 
However, it was not until January 1949, after the TUC and others had already put 
in place the machinery for a new trade union international, that the WFTU was to 
split. According to Busch, the TUC was reluctant to 'just quit the WFTU and 
leave behind the money, the assets and the presses of the rump organisation in the 
hands of its opponents. ' 103 At the January 1949 meeting of the WFTU Executive 
Bureau Deakin proposed that the WFTU be suspended for twelve months. The 
communist representatives for the Soviet Union, Italy, China, and Louis Saillant, 
the French General Secretary of the WFTU tried to prevent this, and with 'much 
screaming and waving of the constitution in Deakin's face they refused to be 
swayed. ' 104 Deakin insisted on putting the matter to the vote. The British, 
American and Dutch representatives duly voted to suspend the WFTU, while the 
others refused to take part in the vote. The long-awaited stalemate had been 
reached. With Deakin declaring the meeting closed, he and Tewson, along with 
" Keesings Contemporary Archives, VOL VI, 1946-8, London: Keesings, 1948, p. 9294. 
'01 Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trades Unions, p. 67. 
102 PRO, FO, 371n2855, UNE 2315/387/93, note from W. Braine at the British Embassy in 
Rome to Herbert Gee, the Labour Official at the FO, 14 May 1948. 
103 Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trades Unions, p. 68. 
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the CIO and Dutch members, led by James Carey and Evert Kupers, swept out of 
the room. The rest of the Executive Bureau continued with their meeting. 
Within a few weeks, the TUC and others had launched a publicity campaign 
explaining why they had left the WFTU, and other non-communist unions 
quickly followed. The TUC, with the CIO and the Dutch trade union centre, 
produced the pamphlet Free Trade Unions leave the WFTU, which was 
circulated amongst the western unions. This urged the 'Free Trade Union 
Movements of the world' to consider 'their own position in the W. F. T. U., now 
completely dominated by Communist organisations, which are themselves 
controlled by the Kremlin and the Cominform. ' 105 The British Communist Party 
responded with their pamphlet, Wreckers! while the remaining VIM unions 
produced their parnphlet, Free Trade Unions Remain in the W17U. This in turn 
accused the British and US trade union centres of wanting to dominate the 
WFTU, the CIO of trying to use the WFTU 'to pursue a policy inspired by the 
American State Department aimed at economic expansion based on the control of 
foreign markets', and of ultimately splitting the VVTTU, for which Deakin, 
Tewson, Carey and Kupers would 'carry as a stigma to the end of their lives. ' 106 
All of the other non-communist unions were also soon to withdraw from the 
VYTTU, the last being Finland who decided to leave on May 25,1949.107 Insult 
was added to injury when the French government ordered the exile of the WFTU, 
104 Ibid. 
'05 TUC, CIO, NVV, Free Trade Unions leave the WFTU, London: TUC, 1949, Forward, p. 3. 106 WFTU, Free Trade Unions Remain in the WFTU, Paris: WFTU, 1949, pp. 13,2 & 5. 10' Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol, VII, 1948-50, p. 10760. 
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as it was one of several 'agencies of Soviet propaganda acting against the 
interests of France. ' 
108 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that the short run effects of the Marshall Plan were to 
result in the division of opinion within the trade unions reflecting that of the 
wider world between communists and non-communists. The linking of the Aid 
package with the developing Cold War resulted in criticism of the Marshall Plan 
being seen as the result of a destructive communist wing. In Britain, this gave 
the TUC the opportunity to strengthen its hand against its left-wing critics, and to 
isolate the far left from any 'soft' left support. British communist trade unionists 
were further isolated once the TUC used the issue of the Marshall Plan to 
withdraw from the VvTTU, which was a main source of their international 
support. For the Western trade unions, as for their governments, their continued 
involvement in the WFTU would have proved embarrassing at the very least 
since it would have provided the semblance of international unity which Bevin 
had warned against. It would also have undermined the anti-communist 
campaigns being waged domestically. The close links between the TUC and the 
Foreign Office were therefore strengthened as the TUC acted not only in their 
own interest, but, as far as they were concerned, in the wider national interest to 
combat communism at home and abroad, thus raising the profile of the TUC. 
This chapter has also revealed that while trade unions that were ostensibly on the 
same side could organise and reach agreement, they were still jockeying for 
power and position amongst themselves as the apparatus for a new, anti- 
log Keesings Contemporary Archtves, Vol, VIII, 1950-52, p. 1123 1. 
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communist International was put into place. This, and the intervening 
organisation, the European Recovery Programme Trade Union Advisory 
Committee, which played a significant role in international trade union politics, 
will form the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
The European Recovery Programme Trade Union 
Advisory Committee 
Introduction 
Chapters 4 and 5 have mapped out how the centre-right leadership of the labour 
movement was able to use the Marshall Plan to effect the short-term 
marginalisation of the far left through control of the agenda on trade union issues 
and institutions. Chapters 6 and 7 turn to the issues and new institutional 
structures that were developed after 1948. While Chapter 7 examines the Anglo- 
American Council on Productivity, Chapter 6 assesses the role of the European 
Recovery Programme Trade Union Advisory Committee (ERPTUAC, often 
referred to as TUAC). 
The ERPTUAC is an under-researched organisation. The fairly general accounts 
of international trade unionism by Busch, Lorwin and Windmuller offer the most 
extensive coverage available, but these do not include a great deal of information 
on its activities! Both Hogan and Wexler refer to it briefly in their 
comprehensive accounts of the Marshall Plan. 2 Wexler highlights that the 
Gary K. Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trades Unions, London: Macmillan, 1983, 
see Ch. 4; Lewis Lonvin, The International Labour Movement, New York: Harper, 1953; John 
Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement 1940-1953, Ithaca, NY: 
Comell University Press, 1954. 
1 Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the reconstruction of Western 
Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; Imanuel Wexler, The 
Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective, London: 
Greenwood, 1983. 
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establishment of the ERPTUAC 'amounted to the creation of a permanent 
machinery, through which labor could continuously assert its self-conceived role 
in the implementation of the Marshall Plan. 3 However, the ERPTUAC is largely 
ignored in much of the literature on labour and the Marshall Plan. While both 
Carew and Weiler refer to the ERPTUAC, it is in reference to the activities of 
other organisations, such as the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA)II 4 
or in reference to the split that arose in the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU). 5 According to Weiler, 
Although ostensibly formed to defend working-class interests in the European 
Recovery Program, in reality the ERPTUAC's basic goals were political: to 
rally labour's support for the Marshall Plan and to encourage opposition to 
communiSM. 6 
However, he does not explain how this was done, or provide an in-depth analysis 
of the ERPTUAC. 
This chapter argues that the ERPTUAC played an important role in the Marshall 
Plan machinery. It provided a transitory organisation that could be used as a 
framework for an anti-communist alternative to the WFTU, and as the basis for 
the establishment of a new trade union International. It also helped to legitimise, 
the Marshall Plan in the eyes of British and European labour by initiating a large- 
scale propaganda drive on behalf of the ERP, thus shaping the response of trade 
' Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, p. 39. 
4 Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1987, pp. 83,134,234; Peter Weiler, 'The United States, International Labor, and the Cold War: 
The Breakup of the World Federation of Trade Unions', Diplomatic History, Vol. 5, No. 1,198 1, 
P. 18. 
Anthony Carew, 'The Schism within the World Federation of Trade Unions: Government and 
Trade-Union Diplomacy', International Review ofSocial History, Vol. 29, No. 3,1983, pp. 297- 
335; Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1988, pp. 118-9. 
179 
unionists to the European Recovery Programme. In some respects it also acted to 
diffuse the anti-Marshall Plan campaign of the communist unions. The 
communists were mainly concerned with presenting the creation of the 
ERPTUAC as an act of treachery that demonstrated that the British and US 
unions had been planning to break up the VVTTU before they actually left it, and 
that their support for the break-away non-communist unions in France and Italy 
6was a grave infraction of the duties of international solidarity'. 7 This reinforced 
the growing differences between the unions of the East and West, and focused 
debate on the issue of the communist/anti-communist split rather than on the 
actual conditions attached to the Marshall Plan. Thus, the ERPTUAC was 
important in terms of the issues and ideas it was propounding, in terms of the 
attitude that communist unionists took towards it, and because it provided an 
organisational structure with which to counter the communist trade unions. The 
crucial role that the TUC leadership played within this organisation provided it 
with another organ through which it could get its views across and shape those of 
its own membership base along the appropriate anti-communist lines. This 
chapter focuses on the functions and activities of the ERPTUAC, and the role 
that the TUC played within it. 
6.1 The Establishment of the ERPTUAC 
As discussed in the previous chapter, on 9-10 March, 1948, the TUC, in 
conjunction with the Benelux trade union centres, convened the International 
Trade Union Conference on the European Recovery Programme (ERP), a 
Ibid., p. 118. 
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conference of trade union national centres to discuss the Marshall Plan. The first 
action of the Conference was to unanimously approve a declaration of its aims and 
principles, which included three politically important points. Firstly, the conference 
expressed its 'earnest desire to see other countries brought within the scope of the 
European Recovery Programme. We repudiate fmnly and emphatically any policy 
of aligning East against West. A Politically, this point could be used to counter 
criticism from the left in Britain and elsewhere that the conference was designed to 
split the trade union movement, even though by this time it was obvious that the 
Soviet Union would not allow any of its satellites to support the Marshall Plan. 
Secondly, the Conference declared its support for the ERP and emphasised the role 
that trade unions had to play in the success of Marshall Aid. Trade unions, 
must contribute to the establishment of the social, economic and political 
conditions which are essential to safeguard the principles of free citizenship and 
democratic institutions, and which alone can assure a progressive improvement 
in the life and labour of the people. 
Trade unions were 'to give their wholehearted support to the necessary measures 
that each country must take to fulfil the requirements of each national production 
programme of economic renovation and modernisation'. Thirdly, the Conference 
reassured trade unionists that there were no unacceptable strings attached to 
Marshall Aid. 
The Conference has satisfied itself by an examination of the principles 
underlying the present American proposals that no unacceptable conditions are 
attached to the offer of American aid, and that in particular there shall be no 
interference in the internal affairs of any participating country. 9 
7 WFTU, Free Trade Unions Remain in the WFTU, Paris: WFTU, 1949, pA 8 TUC files, Modem Records Centre (MRC) at the University of Warwick, MSS 292/564.11/1 
Declaration of the ERP Trade Union Conference, 10 March 1948. 
9 Ibid. 
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This message was repeated at future international conferences, despite the fact that 
there were internal misgivings over certain conditions of the ERP as laid out in 
the Foreign Assistance Act, which will be examined later in the chapter. 
Apart from the mapping out the response of the anti-communist unions to the 
Marshall Plan, the second action of the Conference was the decision to establish a 
continuation committee, the European Recovery Programme Trade Union 
Advisory Committee (ERPTUAC), to provide the necessary institutional structure. 
This was to be a 'joint representative organisation to maintain continuous 
association with the Administrative machinery established by the governments of 
the participating nations'. 10 This was to be 'open to all bona fide trade union 
organisations', usually taken to mean non-communist, 'that may later decide to 
participate in the co-ordinated and co-operative activities which we have taken in 
hand. ' The functions of the Committee 'which shall be consultative and advisory in 
character' were to collect and circulate infonnation; to conduct the work of the 
Conference between meetings, with the full International Trade Union Conference 
on the ERP being reconvened periodically; to convene future conferences and to 
determine the basis of representation; to 'secure the greatest measure of unified 
action between constituent organisations'; and to seek contact with the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to 'determine the 
form in which the greatest measure of representation or co-operation can take 
place'. ' 
10 Ibid. 
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As this chapter will demonstrate, some of these functions were met more readily 
than others. While the Committee proved to be a valuable information and 
propaganda machine, it could not always agree on the work that was to be 
conducted between conferences, or when to convene meetings. 12 Unified action 
was achieved, but, as Hogan points out, 'Its work was slowed by internecine 
rivalries and personal jealousies, particularly by the AFL's resentment over TUC 
control of key posts in the TUAC and by its reluctance to concede the CIO an equal 
status in the new international. ' 13 Lastly, while contact with the OEEC was 
established, it did not achieve the desired results as the TUAC was not accepted as 
an advisory body, and it was felt by the OEEC that 'the form and scope and timing 
of European labor participation in OEEC work are essentially political and public 
relations questions. ' 14 
The Conference also recommended that the national centres 'be urged each to 
approach their governments with the object of being associated with the machinery 
concerned with the administration of the European Recovery Programme'. 
15 This 
was seen as a key component to the success of the Marshall Plan, which, trade 
union leaders felt, could not achieve its desired goals without their support and 
involvement. While this reflected the trade unions enhanced status in the postwar 
world, it also reflected their desire to cement formal relations with their 
11 Ibid. 
" See correspondence between Tewson and Walter Schevenels (Secretary of the TUAC Liaison 
office) during 1949, TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.151/4. 
13 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, p. 202. 
14 'Labor participation in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation', Department of 
State, RG 59,840.5043/5-1448, cited in Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 1 19. 
15 Ibid. 
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governments in order to build up their domestic profile and importance. It was 
ageed, 
That each national centre should seek every opportunity of participating in the 
machinery established in their respective countries to deal with their national 
production programme and with the allocation of goods and services available 
to each country in its effort to fulfil its part of the Recovery Programrne. 16 
Consequently the TUC set up a special committee to consult with the British inter- 
departmental committee that had been established by the government to administer 
the ERP in Britain. 17 
Eleven members were elected to form the ERPTUAC, two each from Britain, the 
USA and France, one each from Italy, Scandinavia, Benelux and Germany, and one 
to represent both Austria and Switzerland. The British representatives were Vincent 
Tewson, the General Secretary of the British TUC, and George Chester. 18 The 
American members were Frank Fenton from the American Federation of Labor, 
and James Carey from the rival the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The 
appointment of Frank Fenton, who was not one of the AFL's most high-ranking 
individuals, reflected their annoyance at the TUC having convened the conference 
without the AFL's involvement, 
19 and he was soon replaced by Irving Brown, the 
AFL's ubiquitous roving representative in Europe. Tewson was unanimously 
elected the Secretary of the Committee, with Evert Kupers from the Netherlands 
16 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/1 Resolution on Continuing Machinery, International Trade 
Union Conference on the ERP, 9-10 March 1948. 
17 Reported in the TUC publication, Labour, June 1948. 
'a George Chester, of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, had been on the TUC 
General Council for a number of years. Although he was at this stage a member of the TUC's 
International Committee, his appointment as a member of the ERPTUAC was surprising in that he 
did not have a particular record of involvement in international union affairs. He was knighted in 
1948, but died a few months later. A short obituary is in TUCR 1948, p. 87. 
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trade union national centre as its Chairman (later to be called President). Tewson's 
was the most important post in the organisation, and its headquarters were 
subsequently established at Transport House in London. This ensured strong British 
influence over the course of the TUAC, and placed British trade unionism at the 
centre of the fight against the communist unions and for the Marshall Plan. 
One immediate effect of the International Conference and the creation of the ERP 
Trade Union Advisory Committee was to enhance the status and establish the 
international credentials of the non-communist break-away unions in France (Force 
Ouvri&e) and Italy (the CGIL-Minority Group). The much larger communist 
dominated national centres had not been invited as they were against the Marshall 
Plan and were still operating within the VIM. By becoming the official trade 
union representatives of their countries for the ERP in the international trade union 
movement these two organisations gained in prestige and power. The ERPTUAC 
was also the first occasion where there had been 'a joint US coalition of the AFL 
Clo,. 
)20 and the settmg a precedent which was to ease the path towards their 
integration in 1955. 
6.2 The Role and Activities of the ERPTUAC 
The activities of the ERPTUAC are important to this study as this organisation 
shaped the response of the non-communist unions to the Marshall Plan and created 
the institutional structure through which a new, anti-communist International could 
19 See TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.18/1 report of phone call from Oldenbroek of the ITF to the 
TUC, 19 Febraury 1948. 
20 Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trades Unions, p. 64. 
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be established without creating widespread criticism from the rank-and-file of the 
trade unions, some of whom retained a commitment to the WFrU. As American 
trade unionists pointed out to Averell Harriman, the ECA's special representative 
in Europe, the ERPTUAC would provide an organisation that would 'work 
parallel with Marshall Plan activity in the various Marshall Plan countries to 
combat Communism within the trade unions. 21 
The ERPTUAC established two main component organisations, apart from its 
Executive of eleven members. The first of these, the ERTPUAC Emergency 
Committee, was a small body consisting of Vincent Tewson from the TUC, Leon 
Jouhaux of the French trade union centre Force Ouvri&e, and Evert Kupers of the 
Netherlands National Centre (NVV). Their remit was to keep the work of the 
ERPTUAC going between the meetings of the whole organisation; to maintain 
contacts between the unions; to conduct the negotiations between the ERPTUAC 
and the OEEC on its attempt to acquire advisory status to the OEEC on labour 
questions, and to attain the official status of the Trade Union Advisory Committee 
to the OEEC. 22 The second body to be created, at the urging of the American trade 
union representatives, was the ERPTUAC Liaison Bureau. This was to be based in 
Paris, and was designed to act as an information centre; to provide material for 
propaganda; to increase the unity of action between the trade union organisations, 
involved in the TUAC; and to provide closer contact between the trade union 
21 Thomas Finletter to Averell Harriman, August 2,1948, Papers of the Mutual security Agency, 
RG 286/53A405/Box I /File: Special Representative's Office, 1948, cited in Weiler, British 
Labour and the Cold War, p. 119. 
22 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/1 report of Yd ERPTUAC meeting, 29 June 1948. 
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national centres, the ERPTUAC, the OEEC and the ECA. Tewson was keen to 
stress that, 
the Bureau while itself an information centre would subsequently be able to 
provide material for propaganda, and that its establishment would in no way 
lessen the need for adequate activity on the part of the several trade union 
national centres. 23 
It was expected that the Bureau would act as a way of increasing the unity of action 
between the trade union organisations involved in the TUAC. 
While the ERPTUAC never fully achieved its aim of gaining official status as the 
Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OEEC, it did receive extensive support 
from the Marshall Plan administrators which helped to cement its position as the 
representative body of the non-communist unions. At the ERPTUAC meeting of 
29 June, 1948, Averell Harriman made an address to the meeting at which he 
6stressed the important role national trade union movements have to play in the 
successful implementation of the European Recovery Programme'. Furthermore, 
'He himself and his staff would at all times be accessible to the E. R. P. Trade 
Union Advisory Committee for advice and consultation', as would Paul 
24 
Hoffman, the head of the ECA. Harriman made another speech to the 
ERPTUAC at its second international trade union conf 25 erence in July 1948, 
where the AFL unsuccessfully lobbied for the TUAC to move its headquarters 
from London to Paris so that it could maintain closer contacts with Harriman and 
the ECA staff. The ECA's labour advisor in Harriman's Paris ECA mission, 
23 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.151/3 minutes of 4th ERPTUAC meeting, 22 September 1948, and 
292/564.11/1 report of the 4h ERPTUAC meeting. 
24 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/1 minutes of ERPTUAC meeting 29 June, 1948. 
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Boris Shishkin, attended, as did Bert Jewel (from the AFL), and Clinton Golden 
(from the CIO), who were Paul Hoffman's trade union advisors in Paris. 26 On 
October 8,1948, these and other key labour officials from the ERP countries met 
in Paris to discus labour's part in the recovery programme and to hear an address 
by Secretary of State Marshall himself. 27 
Despite the common interests of the unionists involved in the ERPTUAC, such as 
anti-communism and support for the Marshall Plan, there was difficulty in gaining 
agreement between the trade union centres from different nations. This was 
highlighted by the controversy surrounding the Emergency Committee's 
appointment of Walter Schevenels to the post of Secretary of the Liaison Bureau. 
Schevenels had a long record of international trade union activity, having been the 
last Secretary General of the now disbanded International Federation of Labour. At 
this point he was attempting to remove himself from his post as a Vice-President of 
the WFTU. As far as the AFL were concerned, Schevenels' involvement in the 
VvTTU meant that he had sold out to the communists. The AFL put out a press 
statement saying that, 
The A. F. of L. is unalterably opposed to Mr. Schevenels because he is unfit to 
hold so high an office in the ranks of democratic world labor. 
The record of Mr. Schevenels in the former International Federation of Trade 
Unions shows that, though he may be an indefatigable factionalist, he is 
incapable of serving as a responsible and constructive general organisation 
spokesman. 28 
25 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/1 'Report of the Second International Trade Union Confi rence e 
on the European Recovery Programme', July 1948. 
26 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1 /1 see comments by Harriman at ERPTUAC meeting of 29 June, 
1948, and press release by ECA, July 5,1948. 
27 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/1 calendar of meetings for 1948. 
28 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.151/3 press statement by AFL, 1A. F. of L. Opposes Schevenels in 
TUAC Post', 2 February 1949. 
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This damning indictment of Schevenels also suggested that he was guilty of 
financial irregularities, a claim which was strongly denied by the TUC and of 
which there was no evidence, and that, 
As a secretary of the W. F. T. U., he worked hand in glove with the Communists 
in all their undertakings and especially in their drive to wipe out the 
effectiveness and independence of the international trade secretariats which 
are the bloodstream of healthy international free trade unionism. 29 
Of course, if having held office in the WFTU disqualified trade unionists from 
holding office in the ERPTUAC, then practically all but the AFL representatives 
would have had to resign. However, it seems that the main reason that the AFL 
refused to accept Schevenels' appointment was that, 
AFL officials here interpreted the action of a majority of the European non- 
Communist trade unionists in Berne in naming M. Schevenels to a new post as 
an arrangement made by the British unionists and the CIO to prepare the way for 
the Belgian trade unionist to head a new world labor body. Such an organization 
is expected to be formed within the next six months as a rival of the Russian- 30 dominated WFTU, but it will be limited to 'free, democratic trade unions'. 
This disagreement arose for two reasons. Firstly, the AFL wanted to prevent the 
TUC or CIO from having too much power through the promotion of someone with 
whom they had good relations, and presumably the AFL wanted to promote 
someone of their choice to any posts that might lead to the leadership of a new 
International. Secondly, as with the timing of the establishment of the ERPTUAC, 
while the TUC was advocating a fairly cautious approach, the AFL wanted to push 
a more aggressive agenda and to 'propagandize European workers in order to enlist 
29 Ibid. 
30 Article by Lois Starch in the New York Times, 28 January 1949, see TUC file MRC, MSS 
292/564.151/3. 
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their support of [the] ECA and counteract Communist propaganda and sabotage. 31 
In the end, the situation was difrused by Tewson and Jouhaux of Force Ouvri6re 
lobbying the AFL to accept Schevenels, whose appointment had already been 
reported to the press. 32 To have removed Schevenels at this point would have 
provided embarrassing negative publicity for the ERPTUAC. It seemed that despite 
the common interest of promoting the Marshall Plan and fighting the communist 
unions, the union national centres were still subject to internal politicking, with the 
AFL wanting to be in control while the TUC, CIO and Benelux unions were 
33 
anxious to prevent this. 
Despite this problem, the ERTPUAC did achieve remarkable results in terms of 
its propaganda drive on behalf of the Marshall Plan, and against the communist 
unions. It co-operated with the ECA in its vast propaganda campaign, which, 
according to one insider, 
tended more and more to become a working alliance with various European 
groups, including labor unions, groups working for European unification and 
various anti-Communist elements. More and more its propaganda technique 
was indirect, and more and more its objectives were to change basic political, 
social, and economic attitudes in European rather than merely to advertise or 
explain American policy. 34 
As Carew points out, 'In this context the information and propaganda aimed at 
European trade unionists was always regarded as a crucial aspect of the whole 
31 Sam Berger, 'Second Internaitonal ERP-Trade Union Conferece', August 13,1948,850.4 
Trade Unions, Box 807, DS, RG 84, cited in Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 120. 
See also TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/1 'Report of the Second International Trade Union 
Conference on the European Recovery Programme, July 1948. 
12 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.151/3 letter from Tewson to Green of AFL, 28 January 1949, and 
Jouhaux to Green, 2 March 1949. 
33 See Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, pp. 84-85 on the rivalry between the AFL and the 
CIO within the ECA apparatus. 
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programme. 35 However, while Carew stresses and describes the propaganda 
campaign carried out by the ECA, he says very little about that carried out by the 
ERPTUAC itself. This study concludes, however, that the propaganda role 
carried out by this organisation was crucial to the success of the division of the 
communist from the non-communist trade unions, and of course united them in 
their battle to provide support for and be involved in the Marshall Plan apparatus. 
The ERPTUAC played a crucial role in providing the channel through which 
American and European trade union centres could co-ordinate their policy on the 
Marshall Plan, and in providing positive propaganda for Marshall Aid. Through 
its educational campaign, it helped to shape the appropriate attitude towards the 
Marshall Plan of trade unionists across Europe. 
The Educational Campaign in Favour of the Marshall Plan 
The ERPTUAC had decided from the outset that one of its roles was to provide 
publicity aimed at European labour in support of the Marshall Plan. This was put 
into action following discussions between Schevenels of the Liaison Bureau and 
the ECA, and a meeting that had been convened with representatives from the 
ECA, the OEEC, the TUC Publicity Department, and the editor of the paper Force 
Ouvriýre. At the TUAC meeting of 26-27 May 1949, Schevenels reported on these, 
explaining they aimed at conducting an educational campaign in favour of the 
Marshall Plan. This was to include the setting up of exhibits at the annual 
conventions of the national trade union centres, and the sending of delegates to the 
34 Harry Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955, 
247, citing letter from Nielson to H. B. Price, 16 September 1954. 
Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, p. 83. 
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US to study production methods. 'The E. C. A. agreed also in principle with the 
proposal that they would print the posters and lend the clich6s [sic] to the T. U. A. C. 
for distribution to Trade Union papers of the E. R. P. National Centres and to labour 
dailies. 36 
The TUAC Liaison Bureau held frequent meetings with officials from the OEEC, 
the OEEC Technical Committees, and the ECA to gather information, reports and 
documents that would be of interest to trade union organisations which it then 
passed on to the national centres. It drafted a number of reports on industries such 
as coal, electric power, oil products and iron and steel for the national centres and 
for the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs), with whom they quickly developed a 
good working relationship. It also published a large number of bulletins. From 15 
April 1949 the Liaison Office published four occasional Information Reports in 
three languages, which focused on one particular subject per issue. These were the 
OEEC and role and structure of the TUAC; the OEEC Technical Committees; the 
TUAC educational campaign on the Marshall Plan; and how the Marshall plan had 
curbed unemployment and halted inflation. 37 Then from August 1949 the Liaison 
Office published with co-opemtion from the ECA a weekly Information Bulletin. 
(This Bulletin will not only supply the Tmde Union Organisations with infonnation 
but is particularly designed to give items suitable for publication in the Labour 
press. 38 These Bulletins contained information on the Marshall Plan and its 
progress, what funds were being used for, developments in the TUAC, and 
36 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/1 TUAC Information Bulletin, no. 3, July 1949. 37 Copies can be found in the file 292/564.11/1. 
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discussion of issues such as productivity. Considerable care went into making these 
publications accessible as well as informative, and, 'In order to make these 
publications more attractive we have edited drawings, cartoons, picture strips and 
photographs, of which mats [sic] are sent to the Trade Union and Labour journals 
receiving our Labour News Bulletin. 39 The Liaison Office also assisted the 
national trade union centres and the ITSs in supplying additional infonnation, on 
topics published in the bulletins. 
The educational campaign in favour of the Marshall Plan was given a boost 
following the 'conference of experts' on propaganda and publicity from the OEEC, 
ECA and trade union movements, held in September 1949 to discuss further how 
to popularise the Marshall Plan. This meeting noted that the Liaison Bureau, with 
close collaboration from the ECA, had been preparing material for the exhibits 
mentioned above which would consist of sets of posters, and had published a 
pamphlet to complement these exhibits. In all 9,000 sets of posters and 1,000,000 
pamppets had been published and were being circulated amongst the trade union 
organizations. The conference also decided to publish sets of speakers' notes to 
help trade union leaders and officialS. 40 There were also suggestions to prepare 
radio-scripts for national trade union centres, but these were dropped because it was 
thought that the Liaison Bureau 'could not be of much assistance in Us field. 941 
38 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.151/4. Copies of the bulletins can be found in the file 
292/564.171/1. 
39 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/2 Report of the Activities of the ERPTUAC, April 1950. 40 TUC, MRC' MSS 292/564-11/2 Report of Activities of the ERIPTUAC, April 1950. 41 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/2 Report of 7th ERPTUAC Meeting. 
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Tbrough the educational campaign in favour of the Marshall Plan, the contacts 
between the TUAC and the ECA increased. From 1950 onwards there was regular 
correspondence between Tewson at the TUC and the ECA London Mission at the 
American embassy. 42 In January 1950 it was also agreed to set up a working party 
for collaboration with the OEEC and the ECA whenever new aspects of the 
Marshall Plan campaign arose !3 However, the issue of the propaganda campaign 
did prove controversial amongst the members of the TUAC. At its meeting of 
January 1950, Schevenels pointed out that there were countries where the need for 
an educational campaign was greater than in others, but not all the members of the 
TUAC were happy about the emphasis being put on the propaganda campaign. 
Pastore of the Italian trade union centre said that 'in Italy the present propaganda 
was sufficient', and argued that more could only work 'A rebours', that is, contrary 
to the way intended. Furthermore, 
some Italian workers started to doubt whether American Aid did not help in the 
first place the upper classes. The problems of manpayer and unemployment 
were of great urgency. In Italy future propaganda on thýMarshall Plan had to be 
made by achievements and facts. If the trade union movement did not take 
within the scope of the Marshall Plan a lively interqt in the problem of 
manpower and migration, the Italian workers would not have any more 
confidence in E. R. P. 
Pastore was not the only trade union leader concerned at the amount and tone of 
the Marshall Plan propaganda. Another representative, Bahaud, 
I 
advised the E. C. A. to be very cautious in its Marshall Plan campaign in the 
various countries. He referred to labels with the inscription 'Gift from the 
Marshall Plan' sticked L-sic] on freight cars and to commemorative tablets on 
hospitals and other public buildings 'thanks to American Aid'. From the 
psychological point of view these propaganda means often produce an adverse 
effect. 44 
42 Some of this can be found in file 292/564.1/3. 
43 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/2 Report of 7th ERPTUAC Meeting, 20 January 1950. 
44 Ibid. 
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While Jouhaux of Force Ouvri&e also warned that the Marshall Plan campaign 
should not be overdone, Evert Kupers of the Dutch national trade union centre 
argued that close collaboration with the ECA in the propaganda campaign was 
45 6most desirable'. Thus, while the educational campaign in favour of the Marshall 
Plan was the one area where the TUAC did excel, it also obviously caused 
resentment amongst some trade unionists who felt there should be limits to the pro- 
American propaganda. 
One aspect of the Marshall Plan that the ERPTUAC was careful to keep off the 
agenda of its educational campaign was the conditions attached to it that its own 
members felt to be unsatisfactory. Despite having proclaimed at its founding 
conference in March 1948 that 'no unacceptable conditions are attached to the 
offer of American aid, and that in particular there shall be no interference in the 
internal affairs of any participating country', 46 there were three aspects of the 
Foreign Assistance Act which the ERPTUAC flagged up as problematic. These 
were firstly, the shipping provisions (Section I 11, clause a, part 2), which stated 
that at least 50% of goods bought in the US under the Foreign Assistance Act had 
to be transported on American ships. Secondly, the use of the counterpart funds 
(Section 115, clause b, part 6), which was to be jointly authorised by the 
governments of the recipient state and the US. Thirdly the necessity of making 
European raw materials available for stockpiling in the US, and the right of the 
US to refuse an export licence of goods from Europe to non-participating 
45 Ibid. 
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47 
countries (section 117, clause d). At the TUAC meeting of April 1948, Tcwson 
drew attention to these aspects of the Foreign Assistance Act as these were 
'points which might become the focus for opponents of the ERP for propaganda 
purposes. 48 However, the TUAC was careful not to draw public attention to 
these points, to the extent that the concern expressed over them did not even 
appear in the report of this meeting that was sent out to the national trade union 
centres participating in the TUAC . 
49 The education campaign in favour of the 
Marshall Plan was not to include anything that could detract from the 
ERPTUAC's claim that 'no unacceptable conditions are attached to the offer of 
American aid', and so provide ammunition for the communist trade unionists. 
The above provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act were seen by one trade union 
centre participating in the ERPTUAC in particular, as clear evidence of 
unacceptable conditions. On 19 May 1948, Konrad Nordahl, the President of the 
Norwegian Trade Union Centre and the Scandinavian representative on the 
ERPTUAC, wrote to Tewson about two of the three above provisions. With respect 
to the 50% shipping clause, he stated that not only would it hinder Norway's 
recovery, but that it would place barriers in the way of free trade, which was 
inconsistent with the free trade policy set out in the Foreign Assistance Act: 
46 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11 /1 'Declaration of the ERP Trade Union Conference', 10 March 
1948. 
47 These clauses of the Foreign Assistance Act can be found in full in the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Documents on European Recovery and Defence, March 1947-April 1949, 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949, pp. 40,50-5 1& 54. 
48 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/1 draft report of second meeting of the ERPTUAC, London, 23 
April 1948. 
49 Compare the above with the 'Report of the Second Meeting of the ERPTUAC, London, 23 
April 1948'. 
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From the point of view that Norway is a comparatively great shipping nation, 
our organisation finds this provision may lead to unfortunate consequences. The 
provision will enhance the prices of the goods Norway gets according to the 
E. R. P., as we ourselves are in possession of tonnage enough to transport the 
goods, which are to be sent to Norway, and besides the provision will hinder the 
transport by our ships to other European countries. 
Nordahl continued, 
it seems right to us to raise objections in principle against this provision, which 
in our opinion is inconsistent with the free trade policy of the U. S. A., inter alia 
expressed in section 115 (c, 3), concerning the obligation of each participating 
country to facilitate and stimulate increased exchange of goods and services 
among themselves and other countries by reducing trade barriers. 50 
The other provision that Norway objected to was the use of counterpart funds, since 
'there may be the possibility that the United States will state as a condition that 
these deposits are used to ftu-ther American trade policy by investments [it 
authorises] in the participating country. ' The participating countries would 
naturally advocate that they 'themselves are to decide in what way and in what 
form they wish to receive American investments in their own country. ' Nordahl 
concluded by drawing attention to article 12 of the United Nations conference on 
trade and employment held in Cuba on 21 November 1947, which recognised the 
right of member states 'to determine whether and to what extent and upon what 
terms it will allow future foreign investments! " 
The issues of counterpart -funds and 
the stockpiling of raw materials were not 
taken up by the TUAC, but the shipping provisions were, especially when in 
1949 Judge Bland attempted to get the US administration to pass a bill that would 
have significantly tightened up the shipping provision. His bill proposed that at 
50 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.18/2 Nordahl to Tewson, 19 May 1948. The section referred to in 
the quote should actually be section 115, clause b (not c), part 3. 
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least 50% of all commodities procured by US loans, grants of funds, would have to 
be transported on US flag vessels at market rates, computed by countries, and 
separately for dry bulk cargo, liner and tanker services. 52 Up until this point, the 
50% shipping provision had been aimed at the overall level of goods transported to 
Europe, which meant that shipping nations had been using their own vessels to 
carry more than 50% of goods, while those states without a shipping industry had 
been carrying less. This issue was discussed at length by the ERPTUAC, 
particularly at its January 1949 meeting, and generated a flurry of correspondence 
between Tewson and other members of the TUAC. Evert Kupers, the leader of the 
Dutch National Centre, and member of the ERPTUAC Emergency Committee, in 
particular felt that, regarding the Bland Bill, 'It seems to me that is desirable that 
we on our side take steps in this affair. -j 53 Tewson favoured a more cautious 
approach, but did, through the Board of Trade, request the government to 
encourage the ECA to oppose the Bill. The response he received from the Board of 
Tmde was that, 
Arrangements have been made to ensure that E. C. A. are in possession of all the 
arguments that can be used against the Bill. But in order not to embarrass E. C. A. 
in their relations with American shipping interests, it has, of course, been 
essential to avoid giving any publicity to these arrangements. 54 
Avoiding negative publicitY for the Marshall Plan was a preoccupation of the 
ERPTUAC as well as the ECA. The British and most other European trade union 
leaders did not want to give any anti-Marshall Plan ammunition to the communists 
to use. 
5' Ibid. 
52 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/2 text of Bland Bill. 
53 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/2 Kupers to Tewson, 22 February 1949. 
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Despite the ERPTUAC's rather low key lobbying approach on the question of 
shipping, the Emergency Committee did agree 'to make immediate representations 
to the O. E. E. C. concerning the Bland Bill', and concerning the use of ships using 
flags of convenience, and 'to make similar immediate representations to the C. I. O. 
and the A. F. L. requesting their intercession with the American Congress. '55 By 
linking the issue of the shipping provisions with the long-running issue of flags of 
convenience, the ERPTUAC could direct attention away from the former and 
towards the latter, which had nothing directly to do with the European Recovery 
Programme. Again, the ERPTUAC did not make public statements on this, though 
the TUC did go so far as to comment in its report to the 1949 TUC annual congress 
that there had been 'intervention with O. E. E. C. and the E. C. A. on the shipping 
56 
clauses of the U. S. Economic Co-operation Act'. Surprisingly, British communist 
trade unionists at the congress did not pick up on this reference to the shipping 
provisions, thus missing the opportunity to show negative aspects of the Marshall 
Plan. 
While the ERPTUAC was conducting its educational cwnpaign in favour of the 
Marshall Plan, the WFTU conducted its campaign against the Marshall Plan and 
the unions leaders of Western Europe. Saillant, the French communist General 
Secretary of the WFTU who retained control of its propaganda and publicity 
54 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/2 Smith of the Board of Trade to Bowers of the TUC, no date, but 
presumable March 1949. 
5 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/1 Report of Joint Meeting of ERPTUAC Emergency Committee 
and International Trade Secretariats, 12 March 1949 
56 TUCR, 1948, p. 18 1. 
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organs, from the end of 1947 'began publishing article after article condemning 
57 the ERP'. These articles included attacks on the ERP made by the communist 
unions of France, the Soviet Union and China, and personal attacks on Western 
unionists such as Irving Brown and Arthur Deakin. 58 This could only act to 
further isolate those in Britain and elsewhere who continued to call for trade 
union co-operation between the communist and non-communist unions. In 
particular, personal attacks on their leaders would be likely to alienate those 
unionists who were not already on the far left, since British trade unionists did 
not like to feel that foreign unions were trying to tell them what to do or what to 
think . 
59 The WFTU also condemned the ERPTUAC, and stated that the TUC and 
CIO had, 
cut themselves off from the main body and current of world trade unionism and 
have joined with a minority goup which more and more in the future can only 
take one path - that of opposition to the aims of the international working class 
and support of its worst enemies. 60 
One of the main effects of the very existence of the ERPTUAC, and of its 
substantial propaganda campaign in favour of the Marshall Plan was that it further 
isolated the communists and those close to them. The communist parties of Europe 
'rejected the ERP as "an imperialist venture of capitalistic interests" and 
condemned the trades union[s] organised in the ERP-TUAC as collaborators with 
the forces of Wall Street and monopoly capitalism. 61 But, in this, the communists 
were making a tactical error, in so far as the criticisms of the Marshall Plan were 
57 Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trades Unions, p. 67. 
58 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/901/8 International Committee document 5/3,20 April 1948, 'World 
Federation of Trade Unions: Part 111, Press Statements', pp. 11-14. 
" Vic Allen, Trade Union Leadership, London: Longmans, 1957, p. 307. 
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couched in political, polemical language, and based on a general level, which could 
easily be rebutted as communist propaganda. Rather than raising issues such as the 
shipping provisions, which could have been presented as directly damaging the 
interests of European trade unionists, they argued that the Marshall Plan was an 
American plot. This type of propaganda could reinforce the opinions of those 
already on the hard left, but it could not be used to persuade others to the 
communist point of view. For instance, in the V; M's pamphlet, Free Trade 
Unions Remain in the WFTQ, the communist national trade union centres asserted 
that it was, 
difficult to imagine how the [Marshall] Plan could be free of conditions (and 
only a very foolhardy person would now care to assert this, with the terms of the 
Marshall Plan known throughout the world) when as early as 19 th December 
1947, President Truman stated: 'It is essential to realise that this programme is 
.. a major segment of our 
foreign PoliCy., 62 
But, the lack of debate over the shipping provisions and the counterpart funds 
suggests that the 'terms of the Marshall Plan' were not known throughout the 
world. Instead of focusing on concrete issues, the Moscow line focused on the 
notion of 'foreign policy', which could be interpreted according to people's 
existing political allegiances. 
One instance when important questions about the conditions of the Marshall Plan 
were raised was at the 1948 annual TUC congress in Britain. A member of the 
Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers expressed his desire, 'to draw 
60 WFTU, Free Trade Unions Remain in the WFTU, p. 14, italics as in the orginal. 
61 Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trades Unions, p. 64. 
61 WFTU, Free Trade Unions Remain in the WFTQ, p. 39. 
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attention of delegates to certain aspects of the Marshall Plan which are bound to 
retard the economic recovery of this country. ' He stated that, 
Despite declarations by Ministers and others to the effect that there are no 
strings attached to this Aid and no political motive, it is a fact that, as 
President Truman stated in December, 1947: 'It is essential to realise that this 
programme is a major segment of our foreign PoliCy., 63 
This was the same evidence given in the WFTU pamphlet above. However, on 
this occasion specific examples of the 'strings' attached to the ERP were 
explained, namely that the goods received were not the goods Britain requested, 
but the goods that 'America wants to get rid of. ' 
For instance, we did not ask for fish, yet the Plan includes 42 million dollars 
worth of fish this year. We did not ask for vehicles, but we are allocated four 
times the amount received last year. On the other hand, no steel or scrap iron, 
which we so seriously need, is allocated, and less coal mining machinery than 
was asked for... The cut in the allocation of steel to the shipbuilding industry 
is already having its effect, resulting in reduced shipbuilding, despite the fact 
that the British mercantile marine is still below pre-war strength. 64 
This trade unionist also pointed out that 'we are required to transfer reasonable 
quantities of materials which we may need to America in order to make up 
deficiencies in their own resources. ' 65 Unfortunately for him, a colleague from 
the same union made clear that these were not the views of the Distributive 
Workers' Union, and, having run out of time, the issues raised were not 
66 discussed . 
The above incident was unusual, in that someone on the communist left had 
raised specific issues which could have proved damaging to the ERPTUAC and 
63 7VCR, 1948, p. 45 1. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., pp. 451-2. 
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its'educational campaign in favour of the Marshall Plan. In general though, 
criticism was based in abstract and general terms, which was harder for rank-and- 
file trade unionists, concerned more with day-by-day issues at the local level, to 
mobilise around. In Britain, the Communist Party followed the critical line set by 
the Cominform regarding the Marshall Plan, at the same time as it was becoming 
increasingly critical of the Labour government, calling at the Party's 20th Congress 
in Febnmry 1948 for the 'dismissal of the government's right-wing leaders and the 
fonnation of a "Labour Government of the lefV'. ' Again, this could only alienate 
those on the left who were not communists but who may have had concerns over 
the Marshall Plan, since in Britain the only likely alternative to the existing Labour 
government was a Conservative one. This was symptomatic of a situationwhere it 
was difficult for the Communist Party to mobilise trade unionists to take a stand 
against a Labour government when the criticisms being made were not directly 
related to British trade union concerns. Callaghan points out that since those on the 
'soft left' perceived the Marshall Plan as 'a road to full employment rather than the 
economic slump and poverty predicted by the Communists', it meant that 'the 
scene was set for the Party's isolation on Us issue. 67 This situation continued until 
1950 when the ICFTLJ was established, effectively forming a long-term anti- 
communist International which took over the work of the ERPTUAC. 
67 John Callaghan, 'Towards Isolation: the Coffununist Party and the Labour Government', in Jim 
Fyrth (ed. ), Labour's Promised Land? Culture and Society in Labour Britain 1945-51, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1995, p. 96. 
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6.3 The ICFTU Takes Over the ERPTUAC 
Discussions had taken place concerning the need for a new international trade 
union body since the end of 1948, with the AFL publicly calling for a new 
68 
organisation to counteract the communist dominated WFTU in April 1949. In 
May the TUC sent out letters to non-communist trade union centres inviting them 
to a preliminary conference in Geneva in June to discuss the establishment of the 
new International . 
69 The 'Free World Labour Conference' of non-communist 
unions was then held in London 28 November to 9 December 1949, at which the 
new organisation, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
was set up. Oldenbroek, the leader of the International Transport Workers who had 
strong links with the AFL, was unanimously elected General Secretary after the two 
other nominated candidates dropped out in favour of him, 
70 presumably to prevent 
a repetition of the in-fighting that had occurred over the appointment of Schevenels 
to the ERPTUAC Liaison Bureau. 
At this point the ERPTUAC co-existed with the ICFrU. At the ERPTUAC 
meeting of January 1950, the Chairman, Evert Kupers of the Dutch national trade 
union centre, expressed his hope for close collabomtion between the TUAC and the 
lCFTU . 
71 This was more t1m likely since the Executive of the lCFrU consisted 
mostly of TUAC Executive members. Indeed, it seemed that extremely close 
collaboration was expected, for Irvine Brown, the AFL representative, requested 
's For details see file MRC, 292/919/4 
69 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/919/4 letter from Tewson to non-communist trade union centres, 12 May 
1949. 
70 TUC' MRC, MSS 292/919/1. 
71 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/2 Report of 7h ERPTUAC Meeting, 19-20 January 1950, Paris. 
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that on the agenda of the next ERPTUAC meeting should be the question of the 
future of the ERPTUAC, for 'The American point of view was that the T. U. A. C. 
should be integrated into the new International. 972 Tewson and some of the other 
European trade union leaders were strongly in favour of keeping the TUAC going, 
'For a number of obvious reasons, particularly the fact that the OEEC has officially 
recognised the TUAC as an independent body, ' and proposed 'that the TUAC 
would be maintained as the representative body of the ERP Trade Union 
73 Organisations' . However, the AFL managed to maintain the momentum 
for 
integation, and by May 1950, it had been ageed that the functions of the 
ERPTUAC would be taken over by the ICFTU's European Regional Organisation, 
which was to consist of the European and US trade union representatives. This was 
to concern itself, 'with the need for closer European unity; the work of the E. R. P. 
Trade Union Advisory Committee, and the question of the relationships between 
the I. C. F. T. U. and the various governmental and non-governmental organisations 
and their European agencies. ' The existing staff of the ICFTU were to act as its 
Secretariat. 74 This regional organisation was established in November 1949 . 
75 The 
meeting of the outgoing ERPTUAC was held on 30 January 195 1, at which it was 
decided to hand over all the assets of the TUAC to the ICFTU European Regional 
organisation. Kupers resigned as President of the TUAC, as he had now retired 
from his post in the Dutch national trade union centre, and was replaced by the 
72 lbid 
73 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/2 letter from Schevenels to the national centres, 27 April 1950. 
74 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/910/9 Minutes of ICFTU Executive Board, 25-27 May 1950. 
75 MRC, 292/919.64/1 Document I. C. 2/4, TUC Report of the ICFTU European Regional 
Conference, 1-3 November 1950. 
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unanimously elected H. Oosterhuis, also of the Netherlands. The composition of 
the TUAC otherwise remained unchanged. 76 
At the last meeting of the TUAC, a new resolution was passed on the Marshall 
Plan. 
'Me Marshall Plan aims at providing the free peoples of Europe, by means of 
American aid and the co-ordination of their own efforts, with the widest 
possible economic independence, and at increasing the productivity of their 
national economies, encouraging and strengthening social progress in the 
European countries and achieving the largest possible degree of ftill 
employment. 77 
The language used reflected a more overt anti-communist agenda, no doubt caused 
by the increasing influence of the AFL on the organisation, and by the tensions 
arising over Korea: 
The democratic nations of America and Western Europe are still as determined 
as ever to serve peace with all their might; however, in order to protect 
themselves from any threat of war originating from dictators behind the Iron 
Curtain, they are forced to divert a large portion of their strength and material 
resources towards building the defences of democracy. 
Furthermore, the ERPTUAC 'urges ... that all Western European governments 
take effective measures to put a stop to waste or leakages of vital raw materials to 
countries behind the Iron Curtain', and the ERPTUAC calls for greater economic 
controls, the continuation of Marshall Aid, and the fintherance of economic and 
social progress through full employment to raise the standard of living, particularly 
for the workffig class. 78 
76 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.11/2 Document I. C. 5/4,23 April 195 1. 
77 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/564.1/3 Resolution on the Marshall Plan, adopted by the ERPTUAC, 31 
January 1951. 
79 Ibid. 
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Just as there were rivalries in the organisational structure of the ERPTUAC, and in 
terms of its overt ideological outlook, so there were with the ICFTU. While George 
Meany of the AFL, 
argued passionately for an official ICFTU anti-communist crusade against a 
'Worldwide totalitarian conspiracy [which] aims to foist on the workers of all 
free countries a system of economic exploitation and oppression', other trade 
union leaders favoured a less strident line. 79 
But, by this point, the Marshall Plan was nearing its end, and the communists 
within the British and other European trade unions had been effectively isolated 
from their main forni of institutional support and from the non-communist 
colleagues domestically. 
Conclusion 
The ERPTUAC proved an important institutional structure. Its creation 
formalised the split with the VYTTU, and provided an anti-communist fulcrum 
round which the non-communist unions could organise. It managed to establish 
strong links between the national trade union centres (despite the tensions 
between them), and between them and the Economic Co-operation 
Administration. It provided a structure with which to counter the WFTU's anti- 
Marshall Plan stance, and from which the pro-Marshall Plan union leaderships 
could launch their own propaganda campaign in favour of the Marshall Plan. 
This acted to legitimising the ERP, and to isolate those on the 'hard' left of the 
unions who continued to criticise Marshall Aid, both from their colleagues on the 
79 Busch, The Political Role ofInternational Trade Unions, p. 70. 
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&soft' left and from their international allies, while paving the way for the 
restructuring of the international trade union movement. 
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Chapter 7 
The Anglo -American Council on Productivity 
Introduction 
This chapter assesses the work of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity 
(AACP), the other main organisation associated with the Marshall Plan with which 
the British trade unions were involved. The motivations for the establishment of the 
ACCP, its activities and its achievements are examined. The chapter argues that the 
AACP was an important organisation for a number of reasons. Firstly, it provided a 
framework for the production and circulation of'valuable propaganda for the 
Marshall Plan. Secondly, the AACP was the single most important institution 
through which the 'politics of productivity' could be transferred to Britain. Thirdly, 
it provided a mechanism for the British trade union leadership to control and shape 
the policy agenda of the trade union movement, by involving them in a corporate 
body that represented 'responsible' trade unionism. Finally, this chapter argues that 
theses achievements were done in a way that supported and strengthened the Labour 
government and trade union leadership. Thus, rather than the US imposing the 
agenda of the AACP and the 'politics of productivity' onto Britain, the labour 
leadership welcomed and shaped the new discourse of productivity according to their 
own vision of a modemised British economy. Whereas other accounts have failed to 
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fully explain why the labour leadership was so supportive of the AACP, ' this study 
argues that the AACP and the productivity agenda can be seen, as a type of 
modernisation programme that was compatible with the Attlee government's vision 
of British socialism. 
7.1 The Establishment of the AACP 
The idea of setting up a Joint Anglo-American Council on Productivity arose out of a 
discussion between Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Paul 
Hoffman, the head of the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) in the 
summer of 1948. According to Hoffinan, Cripps first raised the issue when they were 
discussing economic problems, arguing, 
If we are to raise the standard of living in Great Britain, we must have greater 
productivity ... Great Britain has much to learn about that from the United States 
and I think we have a few manufacturing secrets we've been concealing for a 
generation or so that you might like to learn. 2 
Hoffman 'jumped at the idea', suggesting a system of transatlantic visits. 3 These 
visits were to be realised under the Anglo-American -Council on Productivity. The 
Council was made up of a British and an American section, consisting of employers' 
and trade union representatives. The British section was to be independent of the 
British government, while the US section was run by the Economic Co-operation 
Administration. 
For example, Jim Tomlinson, 'The Failure of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity% 
Business History, Vol. 33, No. 1, January 199 1, pp. 82-92. 
I Paul Hoffinan, Peace Can Be Won, London: Michael Joseph, 195 1, p. 89. 
3 Ibid. 
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At the Council's first meeting it was established that, 
The purpose of the Council is to exchange views on the question whether there are 
ways, through E. R. P. and otherwise, in which U. S. industry could co-operate in 
assisting the efforts of British industry to promote greater productivity and to 
facilitate any necessary arrangements to that end. 4 
However, the decision to set up the AACP served a wider purpose than this. As far as 
the British government was concerned, the most public purpose was that of trying to 
increase production and productivity in order to produce more goods for export and so 
ease Britain's balance of payments problem. Part of the rationale for setting up the 
AACP was due to the economic situation after the War. The severe winter of 1947 
had resulted in coal shortages, and it was feared that the economic recovery was not 
proceeding fast enough. The Labour government was aiming for an export-led 
recovery at a time of a shortage of raw materials and full employment. Home 
consumption was kept low in order to divert goods for export and allow high levels 
of investment. Increased exports were needed to help with the balance of payments 
deficit and in particular with the more intractable problem of the dollar deficit. 
5 
Thus, increasing production and productivity were particular concerns of the 
government. It launched a production campaign in 1946,6 and a productivity drive in 
1948. The latter will be examined later in the chapter. 
' Modem Records Centre (hereafter MRC), University of Warwick, TUC files, MSS 292/552.31/1 
Minutes of I st Meeting of AACP, 25 August 1948. 
5 For information on the economic situation, see Alec Caimcross, Years ofRecovery, London: 
Methuen, 1985, and Worswick and Ady (eds. ), The British Economy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952. 
6 For information on the production campaign, see Paul Addison, Now the War is Over, London: BBC 
& Jonathan Cape, 1985, pp. 1 85-189. 
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A more private purpose for the establishment of the AACP was that of securing 
Marshall Aid, since Sir Stafford Cripps was also concerned that Britain might not 
receive any Marshall Plan aid if it were not seen to be taking a pro-active approach to 
its economic problems. 7 In the Treasury, it was felt that 'there will undoubtedly be 
trouble if the Americans think that we are not sufficiently interested in productivity or 
that we are not making use of the assistance which they can give us. '8 The AACP was 
a way of showing the Americans that Britain was taking the issue of productivity 
seriously. This would appease public opinion in the US and in Congress without 
looking like special pleading. The US administration had on a number of occasions 
reiterated the view 'we can help only those who help themselves', and according to 
Hoffman, at the ECA 'These vital words ... became our text: Only the Europeans 
themselves can save Europe. [The] E. C. A. has never departed from the idea that 
those who receive aid should accept responsibility for making it count, for making 
the most of it. '9 
Cripps was correct in his assessment that Britain needed to be seen to be taking 
action to help its own economic recovery. Regardless of whether the AACP was 
actually successful or not in terms of raising productivity, Britain had to be seen to 
be making an effort. This is highlighted by the manncr in which the British scction 
of the AACP was requested to provide evidence of the ways British industries had 
7 Anthony Carew, 'The Anglo-American Council on Productivity (1948-52): the Ideological Roots of 
the Postwar Debate on Productivity% Journal ofContemporary History, Vol. 26, No. 1,199 1, p. 53. ' Peter Burnham, The Political Economy ofPostwar Reconstruction, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 99, 
citing Public Record Office (PRO), Treasury files (T), 232/101 'American Assistance', 22 July 1948. 
1 Hofftnan, Peace Can Be Won, p. 79. 
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benefited from the productivity team trips, since this would be needed when 'the 
question of making Marshall Aid appropriations for next year would come up for 
consideration by Congress'. 10 The British section of the AACP found that, 
We are under considerable pressure from the E. C. A. representative in London ... 
to expand our organisation so as to collect a larger volume of data and 
photographs for the Press and Congress respecting the actual results of 
Productivity Team visits to the U. S. 
We are told that this is in accordance with the express views of Mr. Paul 
Hoffman, and is required not only as part of the productivity drive in Europe, 
including the U. K., but also to create a favourable attitude in the U. S. towards 
E. C. A. and E. C. A. technical assistance. " 
From the American point of view, the establishment of the AACP served one main, 
but somewhat complex, purpose. Primarily, it was part of the economic fight against 
communism. Raising productivity in Britain would help stabilise its economic 
situation, especially vis-A-vis the dollar deficit, and politically would pull Britain more 
firmly into a liberal world order based on mass production, consumption and free 
trade. Thus, the Council was seen as a way of not just raising productivity but of 
selling the 'American Way' to Britain. The underlying message was that it was 
possible to use gains in productivity in the capitalist system to improve the standard of 
living for the poorer sections of society, rather than welfare and redistribution. This 
was seen as a useful panacea against 'belly-Communism'. 12 Ray Gifford, Chairman of 
the Board of the Borg-Warner International Corporation and 'one of the country's 
10 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.372/1 AACP (UK Section), Report of the Council, T. J. Hutton, 14 
December 1949. 
11 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.372/1 'Productivity - Policy respecting Publicity', T. J. Hutton, 13 
December 1949. 
" The term is used by Stirk, 'Americanism and Anti-Americanism in British and German Responses 
to the Marshall Plan, ' p. 27. 
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leading foreign trade authorities' had for some time been pushing the idea of making 
available the services of American industry to the beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan. 13 
He proposed the establishment of an American Council for Aid to European Industry. 
The purpose would be, 
To seek to improve these nations' manufacturing methods and processes wherever 
the need for and possibility of improvement may be indicated, thereby increasing 
productivity abroad, raising the standard of living, and helping to make Western 
Europe self-sustainirýg and economically strong enough - under a system of 
individual business enterprise - to resist the lure of communism. 14 
The link between capitalism, improving the standard of living of workers and the 
prevention of communism was made explicit: 
The spread of Marxian doctrines may be stopped by bettering the world's standard 
of living through the direct application of many of the same methods that have been 
so conspicuouslysuccessful in the world's most productive free society - the United 
States! 
It is probable that Gifford's remarks did have some impact in the US, as he appeared, 
with his pamphlet, How the Marshall Plan can be Made to Work Effectively, before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 26,1948, to present his plan for 
consideration. 16 Paul Hoffinan, the American instigator of the Council, later reiterated 
similar views to Gifford. He felt that 'In one very real sense, today's contest between 
freedom and despotism is a contest between the American assembly line and the 
Communist party line. ' 17 As far as Hoffman was concerned, the AACP and other 
13 FBI files, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3/5/41 'An Outline of R. W. Gifford's Plan for Aid to European 
Industry', p. 1. 
14 Ibid., p. 2. 
13 Ibid., p. 4. 
16 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3/5/41 Ray Gifford correspondence. 
" Hoffinan, Peace Can Be Won, p. 76. 
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technical assistance progarnmes were part of an economic offensive intended to sell 
the values of capitalist productivity, and hence anti-communism. The members of 
the productivity teams learnt not only about 'lathes' and 'ploughs': 
They learned that this [the US] is the land full of shelves and bulging shops, made 
possible by high productivity and good wages, and that its prosperity may be 
emulated elsewhere by those who will work toward it. But they found out for 
themselves that the "American Way" is a way marked by the primacy of the 
person in a setting of teamwork. 18 
Overall, the export of Marshall Aid and of technical assistance was seen by Hoffman 
to have been a success, giving as evidence a 'correlation between material benefits 
and election results in Europe', with the communists losing support in many 
European countries. 
Lastly, another rationale for the AACP, that may or may not have been realised at the 
time of its establishment, was that the productivity drive and subsequent contacts with 
American industry would act as useful propaganda material for the Marshall Plan 
itself. As Carew points out, the AACP was the Marshall Plan's most visible activity in 
Britain. 19 The increased links with US unions may have helped the Marshall Plan gain 
credibility in the UK. These aspects of the AACP will be examined in greater detail 
later in the chapter, but in order to appreciate them it is necessary to have a greater 
understanding of the structure, functions and activities of the Council. 
18 Ibid., p. 91. 
" Carew, The Anglo-American Council on Productivity% p. 52. 
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The Structure and Role of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity 
The AACP was made up of a British and an American section. The British section 
consisted of representatives from the Federation of British Industries (FBI), the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC), and, after the first meeting of the AACP, from the British 
Employers Confederation (BEC) . 
20 Two Joint Secretaries, Sir Norman Kipping of the 
FBI and Vincent Tewson of the TUC led the British section, which also appointed two 
Chairmen, Sir Frederick Bain of the FBI and Lincoln Evans of the TUC. The British 
section was supposed to be independent in its operations and personnel from the 
British government, but it received most of its funding from the government. 
Approximately E250,000 came from the govemment compared to E10,000 each from 
the TUC, FBI, and BEC between 1948 and 1951.21 The UK section became a limited 
company from February 1949, with Sir Norman Kipping (FBI) and Vincent Tewson 
(TUC) as Joint Managing DirectoTs. 22 Sir Thomas Hutton, who had been working at 
the Ministry of Health, was appointed General Manager of the AACP, which of 
course strengthened contacts with the government. For the TUC, other members 
included Arthur Deakin, Lincoln Evans, Will Lawther, Andrew Naesmith, Jack 
Tanner and Tom Williamson, that is, authoritative trade unionists from the centre 
and centre-right of the labour movement. 
" The Federation of British Industries was the predecessor to the current Confederation of British 
Industries, and as such was a respected pressure group in British politics as the largest employers, 
organisation. The British Employers Confederation was a smaller and less high-profile organisation. 
21 Figures collated from TUC files, MRC MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Mins of 4th Meeting of AACP (UK 
Section), 13 January 1949. 
22 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Mins of 3rd. Meeting of AACP (UK Section), 14 December 1948. 
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The US section of the Council was run by the ECA, and did not downplay its links 
with the American government. As we have already seen, Paul Hoffman, the head of 
the ECA, took a keen interest in the Council. The Chairman of the US section was 
Philip Reed (Chainnan of the Board of General Electric) and the Secretary was 
Stanley Holme (also of General Electric). Other members included Victor Reuther 
(Director of the United Automobile Worker's International Affairs Department and 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations' European representative), who was later 
made a joint Chairman with Reed. 
The first full session of the AACP, which included members of the US Section, was 
held in London, October 1948. The aim of the Council was stated in the Report of the 
Session: 
The Council was formed for the purpose of furthering the programme for increasing 
productivity which has been so strongly advocated and pursued by management and 
labour in the United Kingdom. The object of the Council is to exchange views on 
the question as to whether there are ways in which United States industry could co- 
operate in assisting these efforts and to take such steps as are consistent with this 
programme and with the similar objectives of the Economic Co-operation 
Administration. 23 
Thus the Anglo-American Council on Productivity, through both its activities and its 
personnel, had strong links to the European Recovery Programme. Without the 
patronage of the ECA, the Council would have found it very much harder to manage 
its transatlantic trips and activities. As Wombwell puts it, 'Though the leadership of 
the ECA, Ahe "politics of productivity" became the "diplomacy of productivity" for 
23 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Report ofthe Ist Session ofthe AACP, held October 25-29, published 
pamphlet, London: AACP, November 1948, p. 3. 
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productivity programs became a key component of the aid the United States provided 
to the countries participating in the European Productivity Program (ERP). 924 
The Activities of the AACP 
At the first full meeting the AACP decided to establish five committees through 
which to focus its activities. The first, and most high profile, was Committee A. This 
was to work on plant visits and exchange of production techniques, and was 
responsible for organising productivity trips from many British industries to the 
United States. It had a strong trade union presence, involving Arthur Deakin and 
Will Lawther on the British side and Victor Reuther on the American side., It was 
'the view of the Council that the problem of productivity is to a great extent a problem 
of spreading "know-hoV' and technique. ' The aim of this committee was to make 
knowledge of the best practice in UK industry more generally available, and to 
supplement it with that of the best practice in the US, and to organise productivity team 
visits from UK industries to the US, 25 which then produced productivity team trip 
reports of their findings to be distributed in Britain. However, while over sixty British 
teams visited the US, only three American teams visited the UK. 26 There was no 
systematic effort to disseminate information about best practice in Britain, and it 
tended to be assumed that Britain could not match anything the Americans did. 
24 James Wombwell, 'Post-War Business-Labor Relations: The "Politics of Productivity" and the 
Anglo-American Council on Productivity% paper presented at the Economic and Business History 
Society conference, Savannah, GA, 25 April 1996, p. 2. 
25 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Report ofthe Ist Session ofthe AACP, p. 5. 
26 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Final Report ofthe AACP, published pamphlet, AACP, 195 1. 
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The other four committees established by the AACP did not fulfil their remit. 
Committee B was set-up to work on the 'Maintenance of Productive Plant and 
Power', to examine the level of capital equipment and power available for 
production in Britain. 27 At the first meeting of Committee B it was stated that 'One of 
the Committee's objects was to expose sectors of industry where a little help (e. g. via 
ERP) [sic] in providing capital equipment would do a disproportionate amount of 
good. 928 The first task was to collect statistical inforination, but, 'Like the U. S. section, 
the U. K. section has found the immediate problem most intractable. 29 Apart from 
reporting that in the US there was two or three times the amount of electric power per 
industrial worker than in the UK, and that 'While there are other factors which affect 
productivity, there is no single limitation so restricting as a shortage of power and 
capital equipment, ' this committee did not achieve many objectives. 
30 
The third committee, Committee C, was to work on 'Productivity Measurements'. This 
Committee was charged with gathering information on the relative levels of 
productivity in the US and UK, comparing plants and products in the two countries, 
and ex=tmng the factors influencing their relative productivity. 31 To do this they 
selected parallel factories making broadly similar products in the US and UK, and 
invited the management to make comparisons on productivity and supply the Council 
27 TUC, MRC, MSS292/552.31/1 Report ofthe Ist Session oftheAACPp. 5. 
28 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3/7/23 Meeting of Committee B, 3 February 1949. 
29 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3n/23 Report of Committee B, 22 March 1949. 
31 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.31/1 Report ofthe 2ndSession oftheAACP, held March 29 - April 7,1949 
published pamphlet April 1949, p. 7. 
I TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.31/1 Report ofthe IstSession oftheAACP, p. 6. 
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with the results. 32 Thirty-two firms in the UK were approached for information, but 
only seven completed the investigation. In nearly all cases, the firms found that the 
man-hours taken in the UK to perform a given task was higher than that of the US. The 
reasons given for the differences varied, but included the use in the US of techniques 
that Britain knew about but which were not practical due to cost and greater fuel 
requirements; British firms having to produce small orders for varied types of product; 
higher wage rates in the US; and lower prices of wholesale goods in Britain. 33 
However, it was decided that the findings of this research were not to be publicised, 
because 'The firms participating in the investigation constitute a small part of the total 
manufacturing industry in Great Britain and can in no way be considered 
representative. ' Also, 'In the majority of cases the reasons given for the differences' 
in productivity between the US and Britain, 'are not well established. ' 
They are, for the most part, little better than expressions of (perhaps informed) 
opinion ... The 
information included in the Productivity Team reports is so much 
more cogent and comprehensive, that the good effect of those reports would, if 
anything, be weakened by the publication of a dubious report of Anglo-American 
Comparisons. 34 
That the productivity team reports were themselves based on opinion, and probably 
had less accurate evidence to go on than the investigation criticised above, was 
apparently not perceived. Attempting to measure and compare productivity in the US 
and UK was quietly given up. Instead, the AACP relied on individual firms to send 
32 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3/7/23 Report of Committee C, 18 March 1949. 
33 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3n/23 Summary of Information Received by Firms, doc. C3/1, October 
1950. 
34 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3/7/23 Summary of Information Received by Firms, doc. C3/1, October 
1950. 
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in figures themselves showing how much their productivity had increased since 
introducing practices and techniques learnt from a productivity trip. 
The fourth committee established by the AACP, Committee D, was to look at 
'Specialisation in Industrial Production'. It was to examine and report on the 
development in the US of the standardization, simplification and specialization of 
production, and to investigate the extent of the applicability of this type of 
specialisation in the UK. 35 While it recognised that the dependence of many branches 
of British industry upon export markets limited the amount of standardization possible 
without risking loss of markets, the Council was 'anxious, however, to restate with the 
greatest possible emphasis the particular benefits that can be gained from 
standardization, specialization and simplification, and in no other way. 36 It was 
decided that the productivity teams would study these methods for different industries. 
The fifth committee, Committee E, was to specialise on 'Economic Information, as it 
was felt that 'Greater understanding on the part of the people of both our countries of 
the reasons for and beneficial results of increased productivity will contribute 
significantly towards achieving it., 
37 Ile only achievement of this Committee, which 
had petered out by the summer of 1949, was to raise some interesting issues that were 
not then pursued. For instance, at the Second Session of the full AACP, Committee E 
raised 'the problem of cushioning the short term unemployment resulting from major 
35 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Report ofthe Ist Session ofthe AACP, p. 6. 
36 TUC, MRC' MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Report ofthe 2ndSession ofthe AACP, p. 9. 
37 TUC, MRC' MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Report ofthe Ist Session ofthe AACP, p. 6. 
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technological change. 38 Some members of the Committee noted that this was outside 
its remit, and 'It was agreed to refer the matter to the Council for decision as to 
whether or not a separate Committee might usefully be formed to give the matter 
further study. 09 This was the first, and apparently only, time that the issue of 
unemployment created by productivity increases and technological change was 
discussed by the AACP, even though it was an issue that would be of concern to the 
average worker. No committee was formed to investigate this matter. 
Of these five Committees, only Committee A fulfilled its objectives, with the others 
finding, for instance, that the issues involved in measuring and comparing 
productivity between the US and the UK were extremely problematic. Also, some of 
the techniques used by large-scale American plants were not applicable to Britain, 
and capital investment would have been required to up-date machinery and to make 
more fuel available. Because of these problems, the AACP chose to focus its 
activities on the productivity team trips to the US, and its exhortations in the area of 
labour productivity and flexibility. 
7.2 The AACP and the Productivity Debate 
one of the key aspects of the AACP was the way that it portmyed and simplified the 
productivity question for British assimilation. Up until the late 1940s, production, 
rather than productivity, was seen as the measure of economic success in Britain, partly 
38 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3/7/25 Report of Meeting of Committee E at Second AACP Session, 28 
March 1949. 
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because of the problems of trying to measure or define productivity. One eminent 
economist who had attempted to make transatlantic comparisons before the work of 
the AACP started made a point of saying that as far as his work was concerned the 
results were not to be regarded as final. 
On the contrary I feel that we are still at the beginning of enquiry into the 
fascinating subject of relative productivity, and I hope that this study will 
stimulate ftuther research. It shows the limitations on how far we can get on the 
basis of available data and information towards knowing what our relative 
productivity is vis-a-vis other countries; and it shows as well the limitations on 
our attempts to account for the differences. 40 
However, the AACP was not so careful about applying such qualifications to the 
Productivity Team Reports published under its auspices. Initially the UK section of 
the AACP had stated that 'The Council recognises that industrial productivity is based 
941 
upon a diversity of elements, each of which must make its full contribution. 
Specifically, it noted the better availability of productive power and plant in the US, 
'and the consequent increase in the productive capacity of the individual worker 
fluough greater mechanisation. ' Furthennore, the AACP recognised that the greater 
availability of energy available per employee in the US (roughly twice that in the UK), 
in our opinion, accounts in large measure for the greater output per man hour in many 
industries in the United States ý2 However, while the statements and publications, such 
as the AACP Session Reports, issued by the Council itself in the form of pamphlets 
tended to reflect the above view, the reports written by the productivity teams, for 
39 Ibid. 
40 L. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British andAmerican industry, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1948, preface pAx. 
41 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Report of Ist Session ofAACP, p. 3. 
42 Ibid. 
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which the AACP did not accept responsibility, and much of the American publicity, 
did not. 
The productivity team reports were the main form of publicity produced by the AACP. 
Concern over the difficulties of making international comparisons or of simply 
measuring and defining productivitY were replaced with a more simplistic, popularised 
view of productivity as an issue of labour productivity, narrowly defined as a problem 
concerning workers. However, 'The lesson ... which the [productivity] tearns largely 
decided to ignore, is that the constant wage demands of American unions keeps 
management on the alert to improve efficiency by all means'. 43 Because other factors, 
such as capital investment, tended to be overlooked by the publicity, the issue of 
productivity became increasingly equated with that of the efficiency of labour. 
Tomlinson refers to this as the growing influence of the 'human relations' approach to 
industry, and points out its positive aspect: 
The term "human relations" embraced a number of different perspectives and was 
in some ways nebulous, but its central thrust hinged upon an admonition that the 
workers needed to be treated as more than just a factor of production, especially if 
real gains in efficiency were to be made. 44 
However, in the development of the debate on productivity, labour was repeatedly 
treated as the most problematical and troublesome factor of production. Carew points 
out that, 
organized labour found itself more and more cast in the role of scapegoat - its 
restrictive practices the cause of low productivity - as a particular managerialist 
43 W. Campbell Balfour, 'Productivity and the Worker', British Journal ofSoclology, Vol. 4, No. 3,1953, 
L. 262. 
Jim Tomlinson, 'Human Relations and Productivity, 1947-5 1', in Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinsong 
Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 90. 
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view of productivity and its dynamic came to dominate political debate on the 
subjecOs 
I 
This was largely because of the way the productivity trips were conceived, organised, 
and the reports drawn up and publicised. 
The Productivity Team Trips and Reports 
Sixty-six productivity teams visited the US, forty-seven industry and nineteen 
specialist ones, while only three American teams visited the UK. 46 There was no 
systematic effort to disseminate information about best practice in Britain, and the 
AACP tended to work on the assumption that Britain could not match anything the 
Americans did. This assumption was indicative of the way the problem of 
productivity was perceived by the members of the Council, and was reflected in the 
productivity team reports. This sometimes created trouble, for instance over the Drop 
Forgers productivity team. Even though it was accepted by those in the industry in 
both Britain and the US that Garringtons, a British firm in Brornsgrove, was the most 
modernised and efficient manufacturer on both sides of the Atlantic, the AACP 
failed to visit them or to consult with them for advice on raising productivity. 47 This 
resulted in some unfortunate publicity, as Garringtons complained to the press that 
, The widely publicised adverse comparison between American and British forging 
efficiency is typical of the prevalent slavish assumption that we British are 
45 Carew, 'The Anglo-American Council on Productivity (1948-52)', p. 52, emphasis in the original. 
0 TUC, MRC MSS292/552.31/1 Final Report oftheAACP. 
47 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3n/62 Drop Forging Team, correspondence over Garringtons, May and 
September 1950. 
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industrially backward. A8 It was felt by other employers that this was 'likely to do the 
whole of the Marshall Aid Productivity Scheme great harm . 
49 This does suggest that, 
at times, the team trips were little more than a publicity and propaganda stunt, and 
that the AACP was most concerned with getting their message across, even when 
their message was incorrect. 
The British side of the AACP chose which industries should send productivity teams 
to the US, though the ECA had some influence over the types of teams that were 
selected through the US section of the Council. From late 1948 to late 1951, a very 
wide variety of teams visited the US, from hop growing to management accounting in 
industry to metal finishing, 50 though towards the end of this period the British section 
decided that the team programme would continue 'with rather more emphasis on 
defence and economic needs. '51 The productivity teams were made up of twelve 
members, covering a selection of employers and employees. Once an industry had been 
chosen for a productivity trip, firms would be asked to forward nominations for team 
members in consultation with a workers' representative. A Selection Committee, 
composed of employers and trade union representatives for the particular industry, 
would then take its decision in the light of the geographical situation of the works and 
the size of the firm 'and would be able to do so without giving any explanations. 52 
48 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3n/62 cutting from the Financial Times, II May 1950. 
49 FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3/7/62 letter from Stuart Todd of the National Association of Drop 
Forgers and Stampers to the FBI, 10 May 1950. 
50 TUC, MRC, MSS 292.552.31/1 Report ofthe ThirdSession of theAACP, October 1950, published 
pamphlet by the AACP, appendix. 
51 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.31/1 Meeting of Joint Secretaries of UK Section, 20 December 1951. 
52 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.3 1/1 Mins of 5th Meeting of AACP UK side, I February 1949. 
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However, the choice of worker members was strongly influenced by the security 
procedures in place for vetting members of teams. The US would not admit 
communists to the teams, and had the right to approve aH nominations on security 
grounds. 53 This meant that only non-communist trade union members would be 
nominated to take part in the team trips. Checks were then made on all people being 
selected to go to the US as part of the AACP initiative, with a list of the names and 
details of individuals being sent to Special Branch at Scotland Yard to run a security 
check on them for the US ConSUI. 54 Ilus, to a certain extent, the teams were self- 
selecting, as those with strong views on the left were not likely to be acceptable to the 
selection committee. Another constraint on members of the teams was that workers 
had to be paid for by their employers, and had to be nominated by them. Thus, those 
seen as trouble-makers were not likely to be put forward for such an honour, and trade 
unionists complained that management 'fixed' teams, as they decided who was 
allowed to go. 
55 
The organisation of the teaxns also led to a certain bias. A team leader would be 
nominated to speak on behalf of the whole team and a secretary to be responsible for 
keeping notes and writing up the subsequent productivity report. Almost all the team 
leaders and secretaries were from the management rather than labour side of industly. 
'3 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.311 Mins of I st meeting of TUC General Council members of AACP, 13 
December 1948. 
54 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.3/1 confidential memo from Sir Norman Kipping to Tewson and 
Burton, 31 Jan 1949. 
55 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.37/2a letter from E. Harries, Organisation Dept. of the TUC, to Sir 
Thomas Hutton of the AACP. He notes that when the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers 
complained about the selection of workers for the Ironfoundry productivity team being imposed on 
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This meant that labour had less input into the activities and findings of the teams than 
management. As Carew points out, 'Although the visits programme was ostensibly a 
joint union-management venture, it is quite apparent that management personnel 
dominated the teams. '56 
Each productivity trip took about fourteen weeks to complete: four spent in the UK 
before departure studying British industry, six in the US visiting factories, and four 
weeks back in the UK reporting on the infonnation gathered. The factories in the US 
that were visited tended to be in the more advanced industrial areas. The Teams did not 
see areas that were not unionised, 57 and only saw the best of US industry. Finns had to 
volunteer to receive a tearn. Again, self-selection worked to produce a bias, as factories 
where working conditions were poor or where there were production problems were 
unlikely to volunteer to be scrutinised by a team from the UK. The teams spent usually 
only one day in each factory, and so could not gain any in-depth information. As 
Wombwell puts it, 'From the American point of view, the objective was to present 
American industry in the best light possible. '58 Despite this, problems did sometimes 
arise with the trips themselves, especially amongst the first visits. The TUC pointed 
out that 'The tour of the first team (steel foundries) was partly improvised, and if 
very hasty action had not been taken they would have had in one case to have 
them, the trade association representing the employers replied, 'We are*** well paying, sowe are 
*** well saying. ' 
56 Carew, 'The Anglo-American Council on Productivity: (1948-52)', p. 56.. For more information on 
seletion of teams, see TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.37/2a. 
" Carew, 'The Anglo-American Council on Productivity (1948-52)1, p-55. See also Balfour 
, Productivity and the Worker' on this. 
Is Wombwell, 'Post-War Business-Labor Relations', P. 10. 
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crossed a picket line. '59 There was also concern that 'we found that the American 
trade union members of the Council had not been actively associated with the 
preliminazy work and had not been consulted. -)60 
While the AACP took the credit for the organising the temn trips, and subsequently 
published their productivity reports, they were anxious to distance themselves from 
the findings. The AACP repeatedly pointed Out that the reports were the product of 
the teams and not the Council, and the reports contained a disclaimer saying that 
each tearn was solely responsible for its report. The productivity team reports also 
nearly always stressed that the team had reached unanimous agreement. Most had a 
preface such as, 
The Report is the work of the whole Team, its Findings and Conclusions are the 
result of careful observation and study, and everything embodied in the Report 
has been unanimously approved. 61 
That the reports were unanimous was due to the way that the teams were selected, 
due to the fact that any disagreements were ironed out in the lengthy procedure 
before publication (which took several months), and possibly because disagreements 
were not allowed to arise in the first place. One worker member of the Metalworking 
Machine Tools team wrote to Jack Tanner (President of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union and TUC General Council member), that after returning to 
Britain, only one meeting of the team took place. After this he heard nothing for six 
" TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.31/1 National Production Advisory Council on Industry, (TUC General 
Council Side), 6n, 9 May 1949. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Grey Ironfounding Productivity Team Report, London: AACP, 1950, preface p. xii. Although this is 
taken from one particular Report, they nearly all contain a similar statement. 
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months and was then sent a copy of the proposed report for his comments. 62 He 
complained that, 
The task of collating the published report from the reports handed in and 
information received was undertaken by the team leader, team secretary, and the 
four other report writers with the team, which must, and in fact did result in many 
interim meetings. During the whole time however, neither myself nor any other 
members of the workshop group of five men were called upon, and it is with the 
object of protesting against this that I have written to you ... 
63 
Given that the team leaders and secretaries were always employers, it is highly 
probable that their views were given more prominence than those of the workers 
were. Goldstone, who carried out an analysis of thirty of the productivity team 
reports in the early 1950s, found that, 
[T]he understandable desire of the Council to present unanimous Reports does 
not alter the fact that there is, in the compiling of these Reports, a political 
atmosphere which is not conducive to impartial reporting. 64 
Each productivity team report consisted of two sections, one on technological 
differences between the UK and the US, and one on more 'psychological' and 
intangible factors, such as climate of opinion, spirit of competition, and productivity 
consciousness of workers. It was repeatedly stressed that these cultural factors were 
conducive to higher levels of productivity. This viewpoint largely reflected the 
stance taken at an early stage by the Council, particularly the US section. The attitude 
of Philip Reed, the Chairman of the US Section, is symptomatic of the American way 
of thinking about Britain at this time. At the end of the first session 'He felt that 
62 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.372/1 Letter from Nickolson to Jack Tanner, 2 February 1953. 
63 Ibid. 
" Joseph Goldstone, unpublished MA thesis p. 7, held in the TUC Library, Congress House, Box 
HD21. 
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Britons could solve their own problems if they recognised first, that they have a 
problem to be solved, secondly that it could be solved. In this connection he felt the 
problem was partly psychological. 965 Of course, no psychologists were employed by 
the AACP. 
While the technological section of the productivity team reports was generally held 
to be factual, and actually useful to UK industry, the psychological and cultural 
section proved more problematic. It was usually the case that no clear differentiation 
was given between fact and interpretation. According to Goldstone, the reports did 
not distinguish between actual factual information and interpretations, and that 
'findings and interpretation are often combined and evidence is sometimes presented 
so as to make inevitable a certain conclusion. 66 For instance, in the Grey 
Ironfounding Productivity Report, in the section on 'Opinions and Findings', a 
heading was given for 'Reasons for Greater Productivity in the U. S. A'. This said that 
'The observations which follow are based upon facts which most impresses the 
Team. ' These included the I fact' that 'The citizens of the United States are definitely 
production minded' and notes the extra nervous energy they have, which they feel is 
possibly due to diet or breeding. 67 This lack of objectivity actually removed much of 
the value that could have been gained from the whole productivity trip exercise, and 
gave the actors involved greater reason to be suspicious of each other. 
65 TUC, MRC, MSS292/552.31/1 Notes on discussion 29 October 1948, Ist Session of AACP. 
66 Ibid., p. 8. 
61 Grey Ironfounding Productivity Team Report, London: AACP, 1950, p. 4, TUC Library Box HD2 1. 
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The Grey Ironfounding Productivity Report did actually cause considerable offence 
to the union directly concerned, the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers 
(AUFW), to the extent that they published their own counter-report, Observations on 
the Grey Ironfounding Productivity Team Report, refuting the claims of the official 
version. This stated that: 
We are told the American worker lives in a more "stimulating environmenf' 
where "food is not so highly subsidised, rent is not controlled, national insurance 
provides only limited security against unemployment and sickness" and where "it 
is necessary to save for a rainy day. " All very stimulating to those who want to 
indulge in some propaganda against Britain's social services and what is left of 
price controlS. 68 
The AUFW also took exception to be being told that 'productivity must override 
welfare tradition and ideologies', seeing this as a call for the ending of social welfare 
and 'a return to the jungle law of the survival of the fittest. 69 The AUFW stated that 
it was happy to begin discussions on productivity in terms of 'the provision of better 
tools, improved conditions and a higher reward to the foundry worker, ' but that parts 
of the team report were objectionable to the foundry workers, 
many of whom will view the political interpolations as designed to discredit the 
domestic achievements of the Labour Government in the sphere of State 
enterprise and of the social services. If this is the measure of the help to be 
obtained from such visits to America the sooner the whole question of Trade 
Union participation in Productivity Teams is reviewed by the T. U. C. the better it 
will be for our movement. 70 
The AUFW was a left wing union with a pro-communist leadership, and its General 
Secretary, Jim Gardner, was a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain's 
68 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.372/2b Observations on the Grey Ironfounding Productivity Team 
Report, Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, Manchester, circa 1950, p. 3. Italics in the original. 
69 Ibid. 
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executive committee. 71 However, even the TUC agreed 'that there were grounds for 
criticism of the Grey Ironfounding Report. 72 However, it refused to issue a 
repudiation of the contents of the official report, but merely stated that, 
it was most important that these reports should contain the opinions of the team 
and should not be subject to censorship. The report in question was a unanimous 
report. Nevertheless, teams should not extend their observations beyond their 
terms of reference. 73 
It was suggested that the remedy might lie in more attention being paid to the 
selection of trade union participants, possibly by sponsoring unions. 74 Tewson told 
the AUFW that he was organising a meeting of the Engineering and Shipbuilding 
National Advisory Committee to discuss the matter, but did not want to comment 
further, 
but to indicate what you have probably already noted from the Press - that 
members of the General Council at its last meeting expressed concern at the 
inclusion in the [Grey Ironfounding] Report of a number of, to say the least, 
unfortunate sentences. 75 
Such publicity was embarrassing for the TUC and the AACP, and they attempted to 
keep it to a minimum. They particularly did not want the ECA to know about such 
problems. When criticism was made of the Hosiery Productivity Team Report by 
Groocock, the General Secretary of the National Union of Hosiery Workers who had 
also been a member of the hosiery team trip, Tewson was informed that 'this is all very 
70 Ibid., p. 8. 
71 Noreen Branson, History ofthe Communist Party of Great Britain, 1941-1951, London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1997, appendix 11. 
72 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.372/2a Production Committee 1,2 November 1950. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.372/2a Tewson to Gardner, 9 November 1950. 
233 
unfortunate' as the Economic Co-operation Administration were aware of the issue. 76 
It is clear from this and other references made about the ECA that the British AACP 
officials wanted the American Marshall Plan officials to feel that evenything within the 
productivity programme was progressing smoothly. 
Criticism of the AACP 
From the very beginning, most of the criticism of the AACP came from those on the 
left of the union movement. As far as they were concerned, 'The American 
Employers have nothing to offer British workers but increased speed-up, longer 
hours, and repressive T. U. Legislation'. 77 At the 1948 annual Trades Union 
Congress, a month after, the establishment of the AACP, Haynes of the 
Amalgamated Union of Operative Bakers, Confections and Allied Workers, who 
was also the President of the Birmingham Trades Council, stated that, 'While no one 
can deny that the Americans could teach us something, the monopoly capitalist 
system of America places its own limits on the functions of a joint Anglo-American 
Advisory Committee on productivity. 78 He continued that British trade unions 
would be glad to have advice from the US, 'and we in return should be delighted to 
advise our American Trade Union colleagues how to destroy the vicious shackles of 
the Taft-Hartley Act, those savage shackles on American free trade unionism'. 79 The 
Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers (AUFW) asserted that 'It is in the 
knowledge that production is directed for social advance that the stimulus for higher 
76 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552-372/2a Hutton to Tewson, 13 November 1950. 
77 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.3/5 Croydon Trades Council to TUC, 4 September 1948. 
78 Trades Union Congress Report, (hereafter TUCR), 1948, p. 370. 
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productivity will be found' . 
80 As for the British Communist Party, it stated that the 
AACP aimed to transfer American methods of 'capital-labour relations to break the 
resistance of progressive trade unionism. '81 Communists argued that 'It is not just a 
matter of how much is produced per man hour, but which class benefits'. Efficiency 
is 'a class question. 82 Such comments were labelled as communist subversion by the 
TUC leadership. The fact that most of the criticism came from the far left gave the 
TUC another weapon with which to isolate them within the trade unions, 
proclaiming that criticism was generated by the Communist Party, and so could be 
ignored. 
The effect of the nature of the AACP and the productivity reports was to bring the 
issue of productivity to the front of the trade union agenda, but to limit the scope of 
debate on it. Trade union criticism of the productivity programme could be labelled as 
communist agitation and so be disregarded, while at the same time being seen as 
evidence of the communists being unwilling to co-operate in postwar reconstruction. 
Issues such as the possibility of unemployment resulting from technological changes, if 
they were raised at all, were not then addressed. Factors that had a significant bearing 
on productivity, such as the superior availability of power and machinery available per 
worker in the US, tended to be ignored in the publicity, as did the fact that labour 
79 Ibid. 
so FBI, MRC, MSS 200/F/3/D3/7/47 Observations on the Grey Ironfounding Productivity Team 
Report, AUFW, 1950, p. 3. 
81 Labour Monthly, No. 30, September 1948, p. 266, cited in Peter Weiler, British Labour and the 
Cold War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987, note 162, p. 384. 
82 Comments by Margaret Hudson in World News and Views, August 14,1948, pp. 34243, cited in 
Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 255. 
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tended to be expensive in the US as compared with the UK. Instead of fully opening up 
discussion, the debate centred on how British workers could become more like the 
generalisations that were made about their American counterparts. 
The productivity debate was also shaped by the attitude that was taken towards 
management as compared with labour. Management was criticised in the reports, but 
the extent of this is difficult to assess. Carew feels that labour was made a scapegoat 
by the reports and that the TUC 'by not criticizing publicly some of the more 
unacceptable reports handed the employers a huge propaganda advantage'. 
83 On the 
other hand, Tomlinson highlights the emphasis that was put 'on the failure of 
managerial techniques in Britain' and proposes that 'The rhetoric of scientific 
management threatened [management's] traditional way of doing things as much as 
it threatened labour's traditional prerogatives'. 84 Broadberry and Crafts feel that both 
sides came in for well-deserved criticism. 
85 While undoubtedly there was criticism 
aimed at the two sides of industry, that which was aimed at management was on the 
whole more muted, and filrthermore employers were in a far better position to 
counteract this criticism than labour. For example, productivity team trip reports 
repeatedly said that American trade unions were more co-operative than their British 
counterparts, and that there was evidence of better labour-management relations. 
This information was gained from asking individual workers and managers what 
they thought of relations. Given that the factories visited nominated themselves, that 
93 
94 
Carew, 'The Anglo-American Council on Productivity% p. 64. 
Tomlinson, 'The Failure of the AACP' p. 85. 
85 Broadberry and Crafts, 'British Economic Policy and Industrial Performance', pp. 83-4. 
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the teams on average spent less than a day at each plant, that management were eager 
to present a good picture, and that no worker, when faced with a visiting party, was 
likely to complain, this evidence was somewhat unreliable. Academic studies at the 
time refuted the argument that there were better labour-management relations in the 
US than the UK, 86 as do some of the studies today. Wombwell has pointed out that 
'Contrary to popular perceptions, industrial disputes were much more prevalent in 
the United States than in the United Kingdom. ' He cites information collected by the 
ECA, which showed that comparative hours lost per man year were 0.82 in the UK 
compared to 4.59 in the US in 1948, and 0.75 in the UK as opposed to 7.67 in the 
US in 1949.87 
There was a massive amount of stress put on the difference in attitudes between UK 
and US workers, in terms of US labour being more productivity minded and 
competitive. Comments from a labour member of the Electrical Starting and Control 
Gear Team were indicative of this: 'your workers of all classes are all-out for 
efficiency and production. There is no holding back. There is no question of 
restrictive practices that I have seen. 88 But again, this information tended to be 
based on anecdotal evidence. Balfour's study of the productivity reports in 1953 came 
to the conclusion that 'In general, the teams tended to show an uncritical admiration of 
"' See, for example, Balfour, 'Productivity and the Worker'. 
97 Wombwell, 'Post-War Business-Labor Relations', n 6, p. 16, citing from National Archives, 
Washington D. C., ECA/London, RG469/1406/2/1, Facts About the British Economy', 15 February 
1959. 
88 National Archives, Washington D. C., RG469/178/4/Digest of Team Reports, 'Final Meeting of the 
Electrical Starting and Control Gear Team (UK Productivity Team No. 11), cited in Wombwell, 'Post- 
War Business-Labor Relations', p. 1 1. 
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the American worker and there is the danger that a social "mytlfl is being built on this 
subject. ' 89 As Balfour pointed out, no social scientist accompanied the teams, and the 
members of the teams were not really qualified to come up with far-reaching 
conclusions on the nature of the American worker and trade unions. 90 The TUC itself 
felt that whether the productivity teams should have considered themselves 
competent to put forward their opinions on the wider reasons (such as taxation) for 
higher productivity in the US than in Britain 'is itself somewhat debatable. '91 
William Gomberg of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union felt that it 
was 'strange to find oddly distorted views of what American trade unionists actually 
were doing'. 92 Gomberg also pointed out that British unionists were being told that 
the American counterparts only put forward ways of increasing productivity in the 
expectation of a future wage increase, when in reality unions would put forward a 
wage demand based on the wage that the most efficient producer could afford. 
inefficient producers would then be given suggestions by the union on how to 
increase productivity in order to meet this wage demand. " 
Despite this, British workers were not in a position to refute any of these claims, and 
resistance to new techniques or changes in working practices could simply be put 
down to obstructionism. Management, on the other hand, were in a better position to 
counteract any negative publicity by forwarding their own position and point of view 
'9 Balfour, 'Productivity and the Worker', p. 265. 
90 Ibid. 
91 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.372/2a Memo on Consultants' Report, 16 November 1950. 
92 William Gomberg Papers, British Library of Political and Economic Science, at the London School 
of Economics, Coll. Misc. 579. 
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in the press, and through their associations, or by placing the blame for productivity 
problems on government policy. It is easy to see why the ethos of productivity 
consciousness might appeal to the employers, 'for it is easily bent in the direction of 
injunctions to work harder and distracts attention from organization within the 
factory, let alone issues of ownership. 94 
The TUC itself had reservations, but did not make them public, even when it 
strongly disagreed with some of the publicity and conclusions that arose because of 
it. For instance, in 1950, two consultants, Plemming and Waddell, were 
commissioned by the AACP to write a report, The Foundations of High 
Productivity, summing up the first fifteen Productivity Team trips and reports. The 
TUC said of this report that: 
The first three sections of the report ... are necessarily based on rather superficial 
observations by the [AACP Productivity] teams. They naturally had no time to 
investigate any of these matters fully and were concerned only to refer to those 
things in America which appeared good, and not to deal with the unfavourable 
factors. To some extent they may also have been influenced by the natural desire 
of Americans to show off their country at its best, and a tendency to draw 
unfavourable comparisons with conditions in Great Britain as depicted in the 
American press. 
The TUC went on to say that 'The result is a somewhat distorted picture of the 
American scene which the American members of the Council admitted was hardly 
95 
recognisable. Since such criticisms were not made public by the TUC, this 
undoubtedly handed not only the employers but also the American side of the 
93 Ibid. 
94 Peter Stirk, 'Americanism and Anti-Americanism in British and German Responses to the Marshall 
Plan', in Peter Stirk & David Willis (eds. ), Shaping Postwar Europe: European Unity and Disunity, 
1945-195 7, London: Pinter, 199 1, pp. 30-3 1. 
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Council a propaganda advantage. 96 Problems with productivity in Britain continued 
to be put down to a large extent as due to a lack of 'productivity consciousness' of 
the British worker. 
In this way, the AACP was to shape the contours of the productivity debate, and for 
workers it meant that they 'had to contend with the "common sense'" of productivity, 
and from the late 1940s onwards that had been appropriated by management. ' This 
'rhetoric' of productivity politics continued after the end of the AACP. The American 
section ceased its activities with the end of Marshall Aid on 30 June 1952, and the 
British section was replaced by the British Productivity Council in November, 1952. 
The AACP productivity team reports also lived on in a summariscd form in Graham 
Hutton's commissioned work, We Too Can Prosper. His message was explicit. 'If 
British productivity were as high as American, many (indeed, most) of Britain's 
domestic economic problems would disappear. 97 According to Hutton, 'One of the 
most obvious facts' about productivity 'is the psychological factor: the climate of 
opinion, the social environment and the morale of a people. ' Thus, 'nations live as 
they deserve'. 
98 
95 TUC, MRC, MSS 292/552.372/2a Memo on Consultants, Report, 16 November 1950. 
96 Carew makes this point about a propaganda advantage being given to the employers, -The Anglo- 
American Council on Productivity', p. 64. 
97 Graham Hutton, We Too Can Prosper, published for the British Productivity Council, London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1953, p. 18. 
98 Ibid., p. 202. 
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7.3 The 'Success' of the AACP 
it has been persuasively argued that as a government policy mechanism for actually 
raising productivity, the Anglo-American Council on Productivity was a failure. 
According to Tomlinson: 
Overall it would seem the governmenfs attempt to use the AACP to engage the 
enthusiasm of employers and unions for the productivity drive failed. There is little 
evidence that the AACP had much impact except upon the already converted. 99 
Tomlinson argues that the Federation of British Industry, the main employers' 
organisation embraced the AACP 'largely in the belief that it would be a useful way to 
allay "ill-informed" criticism rather than in a more positive light. " 00 This was because 
the incentives for the FBI to play a dynamic role in the productivity campaign were 
limited. 101 The FBI acted more out of a desire to prevent government interference than 
a desire to find ways of increasing productivity, regarding any scheme sponsored by 
the government with a degree of suspicion. Both the unions and the employers were 
keen -to limit government involvement, fearing that this would 'impinge on the 
sphere of voluntary union-employer agreement'. 102 'Later on the FBI became 
somewhat disenchanted with the AACP when it focused so much attention on 
managerial shortcomings as the key problem of British industry. ' 103 
99 Jim Tomlinson, 'A Missed Opportunity? Labour and the Productivity Problem, 1945-511, in G. 
Jones and A Kirby, (eds. ), Competitiveness and the State, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
199 1, p. 46- 
10' Jim Tomlinson, 'Productivity Policy', in Helen Mercer, Nick Rollings & Jim Tomlinson (eds), 
Labour Governments and Private Industry, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992, p. 48. 
" Ibid., p. 50. 
102 Jim Tomlinson, in Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, Industrial Ericiency and State Intervention: 
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Broadberry and Crafts have also argued that the AACP was not a success in terms of 
raising productivity. While they have found in their econometric analysis that 
exposure of an industry to an AACP productivity report was positively related to an 
increase in labour productivity, this relationship is statistically insignificant. 104 
According to Crafts, the failure to make an impact on productivity levels was due to 
the postwar settlement between the government and the unions, in which full 
employment was guaranteed, implying an effective veto on trade union reform. 105 
However, this study argues that the AACP was a success in other ways. For the 
Labour government, as we have already seen the AACP fulfilled a number of 
purposes. Firstly, the AACP went some way to appease the ECA and US public 
opinion, and to reassure them that 'socialist' Britain was not too radical. It 
demonstrated that Britain was trying to help itself out of its economic difficulties, 
and, while it highlighted differences between the UK and the US, it also highlighted 
a similarity in terms of economic approach and priorities. Ellwood point out that in 
Britain, 
the [ECA] Mission men were convinced by 1952 that they had done a remarkable 
job in changing attitudes to work and its modernization, in a situation that 
appalled the Americans on their arrival. Whether directed at workers or 
employers the key words were always mass production, scientific management 
and above all productivity. 106 
104 Broadberry and Crafts, 'British Economic Policy and Industrial Performance in the Early Post-War 
Period', Business History, Vol. 38, No. 4,1996, p. 79. 
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The AACP could be used to actually prevent unwanted US interference, in terms of 
demonstrating that Britain was taking the productivity problem seriously. According 
to the US Ambassador in London, the government was beginning to accept that: 
To put the matter cryptically ... the only answer to Britain's difficulties is to 
work harder and, I fear, for less. The present government is subconsciously 
beginning to realise this, but because it has for 30 gars been promising the 
opposite, it finds it difficult to say Us to its supporters. C7 
Secondly, the AACP tied in with the government's own attempts to put the issue of 
productivity, rather than overall production, onto the British agenda. Tomlinson has 
argued that-'The Attlee government was the first in peacetime to put a high and 
continuing premium on raising the level of productivity in British industry'. 108 
Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer who initiated the AACP, was a keen 
proponent of raising awareness about productivity. He pointed out at the 1948 annual 
Trades Union Congress that, 'there is only one a certain sized cake to be divided up 
and if a lot of people want a larger slice they can only take it from others. ' 
There is only one way by which we can with a given volume of employment 
increase our real standard of living and that is by each of us producing more or in 
other words putting up our productivity. ' 09 
In October 1948 the government launched a propaganda and publicity campaign over 
the need for higher productivity. This was principally through the Economic 
information Unit, a government agency operating within the Treasury which had 
107 Foreign Relations UnitedStates, (hereafter FRUS), 1948, Vol. III, telegram from US Ambassador 
in the UK (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, II August 1948, p. 1116. 
"' Tomlinson, 'Productivity Policy', p. 37. 
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been set up to handle economic information and propaganda. 110 The campaign 
included ministerial speeches and BBC broadcasts, press publicity, posters, booklets, 
local 'productivitY weeks', touring exhibitions, and national conferences for 
industry. The campaign 'sought to remove the mystique that was attacked to the 
word "productivity"; to bring it down to earth and make it comprehensible to the 
individual worker and his family'. "' The AACP augmented this campaign, 
producing publicity and much-needed examples of what could be achieved under 
high-productivity system. By actively distancing itself from the activities and 
findings of the AACP, the government, while largely financing the Council's 
operations, could avoid responsibility for any success or failure of the AACP, and 
could avoid the accusation of interfering in either the activity of the unions or private 
industry. The AACP's exhortations could make an impact without raising tension 
between the trade unions and the government. Instead, any negative impressions 
could be blamed on the US section of the Council or on the British section's own 
members. 
Lastly, and for this study, most importantly, the AACP provided a further channel 
for the centre-right Labour government and trade union leadership to marginalise the 
far left, and assert their position and further the issues that they felt to be of 
importance. While there were complaints about American interference from those on 
the left and the right, since most trade union complaints were crouched in the 
I" TUCR, 1948, p. 362. 
William Crofts, Coercion or Persuasion? Propaganda in Britain qjIer 1945, London: Routledge, 
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language used by the Communist Party of Great Britain, it was easy for the union 
leadership to reject these as communist inspired. Overall, it was very difficult to 
criticise the AACP without appearing backward looking and obstructionist. Thus, the 
AACP provided useful vehicle for controlling the trade union agenda and for 
promoting the Marshall Plan. 
It is difficult to reach firm conclusions as to why the TUC did not make its 
reservations about the findings of the productivity teams known, apart from a desire 
not to undermine the productivity drive, but, it is possible to forward a number of 
ideas concerning its enthusiasm to embrace the issue of productivity. Firstly, that the 
TUC wanted to be seen to be in favour of industrial progress. Secondly, that it felt 
that the AACP was the best way to prevent unregulated US criticism of British 
workers. Thirdly, it also seems likely that the TUC saw labour involvement in the 
pursuit of increased productivity as a way of undennining, to a certain extent, 
managerial prerogative. Fourthly, according to Carew: 
In private, the TUC leaders were much closer to the American position [on 
restrictive practices] than they dared admit publicly. They were all really agreed 
on the need to eliminate restrictions on the more 'scientific' use of manpower, 
machines and raw materials. The problem was how to get the rank and file to see 
things that way. 112 
Lastly, this study argues that for the trade union leadership, which was on the whole 
on the right of the labour movement, the issue of increasing productivity tied in with 
their particular view of socialism. 
Ibid., p. 73. 
112 Carew, 'The AACP', p. 54. See also TUC, MRC, MSS 292/659 and 292/552.1, Report of the 
AACP Full Council, 26-29 October, 1948. 
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7.4 The AACP as a Socialist Modernisation Programme 
The Marshall Plan in general, and the AACP in particular, have often been portrayed 
as US programmes which influenced Britain by exporting the ideas and ideals of 
mass production, mass consumption, and liberal capitalism. Carew, for example, 
says it is arguable that the Marshall Plan's greatest achievement was its, 
role in developing among European workers a consciousness - indeed an 
acceptance- of the need for an ever increasing level of productivity, with all that that 
implies for the role of labour in the workplace and its relationship with capital. 1 13 
As such it is difficult to perceive why those in leadership roles in the British labour 
movement were so supportive of this initiative, and so open to US influence. 
However, in the remainder of this chapter, it is argued that far from being purely an 
American conception, the AACP and its productivity agenda can be seen as a type of 
modernisation programme that was compatible with the Attlee government's vision 
of British socialism. Consequently, the British government could utilise the AACP 
to pursue its own objectives of raising productivity. 
For many in the higher echelons of the labour movement, high productivity was seen 
as a necessary pre-requisite for the functioning of health economy, whether capitalist 
or socialist. For instance, the government's nationalisation programme was 
influenced not only by an ideological commitment to the common ownership of the 
"I Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester Manchester University Press, 1987, 
pp. 2-3.4- 
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means of production, but by the obvious need to streamline inefficient industries in 
need of modernisation. As Stirk points out, 
It had long been a standard thesis of Socialist literature that Capitalists restrained 
production for the sake of their profits. More specifically, members of the British 
Labour Party and trade-union movement liked to regard the employers as the 
source of attachment to outdated traditions. The future, which meant a more 
prosperous future, belonged to the Labour movement. 114 
This is highlighted by comments made well before the advent of the AACP. For 
instance, Attlee in his 1937 study, The Labour Party in Perspective, noted how, 
The unwillingness of private enterprise to utilise science is well known ... in 
general there is a great deal of conservatism in business. The Labour Government 
will make far greater use of science than is done to-day, because it alone has the 
policy which will prevent its frustration! 15 
On the eve of the 1945 general election, Herbert Morrison spoke of the need to free 
British industry from the burden of the 'privileged, uncreative ... amiable, useless, 
part-time, old school-tie, aristocratic or MP nominee director' who treated his post as 
a sinecure. 116 'Under Labour efficient, salaried management - in whose hands 
technical skill was concentrated -would be free to pursue a more productive working 
partnership with the rest of the labour force. ' 117 Under socialism, industry would be 
more efficient. Modernisation, scientific management and productivity went hand in 
hand, and it was said that 'Democratic Socialism required the creation of material 
conditions which could only come from increased productivity. "' 
114 Stirk, 'Americanism and Anti-Americanism', p. 3 1. 
"5 Clement Attlee, The Labour Party in Perspective, London: Victor Gollancz, 1937, p. 191. 
" Steven Fielding, "'To Make Men and Women Better Than They Are": Labour and the Building of 
Socialism', in Jim Fyrth (ed. ), Labour's Promised Land? Culture and Society in Labour Britain 1945- 
51, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1995, p. 19, referring to article in the Daily Herald, 30 April 1945. 
117 Ibid. 
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For the Labour government, increased efficiency and productivity not only required 
an (erosion of managerial prerogative', ' 19 but also for workers to have a greater stake 
and purpose in raising productivity. As Fielding points out, 
Enhanced morality and the achievement of higher levels of material wealth were 
seen as connected in a dialectical way. It was thought that a fairer distribution of 
the "national cake" would encourage workers to increase productivity, thereby 
further expanding the size of the cake. 120 
Raising productivity was to become a priority for workers, it was said, since trade 
unions had an interest in improving the efficiency of industry and, as pointed out at 
the 1946 annual Trades Union Congress, 
in improving their techniques, and insisting upon the highest attainable standards 
of mechanisation and modem scientific methods. 
Implicit in this view is the realisation that industrial efficiency is not the exclusive 
concern of management, and not solely the responsibility of the employers' side 
of industry. 121 
Such sentiments were re-iterated throughout the Attlee gover=cnt's years in power. 
However, as time went on and the realisation of the extent of the economic problems 
and the reality of governing sunk in, there was a significantly diminished focus on 
redistribution and a greater focus on the need for workers to co-operate. When 
Herbert Morrison presented the Labour Party's Executive Committee's statement 
entitled, 'Production the Bridge to Socialism', to the 1948 Labour Party Annual 
Conference he pointed out that, 
118 lbid, p. 22, referring to the Daily Herald, 23 October 1944. 
119 Stirk, 'Americanism and Anti-Americanism', p. 3 1. 
110 Fielding, 'Labour and the Building of Socialism, p. 22, citing H. A. Marquand, 'Our Production 
Plan' in Fabian Society, Forward From Victory, London: Gollancz, 1946, pp. 53-4. 
121 1946 Annual Trades Union Congress Report, address by Charles Duke, p. 11. 
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Socialism has always aimed at an abundance of goods and services, but past 
Socialist have sometimes been so preoccupied with the immense problems of 
securing a fair distribution that they have not tackled in depth the equally 
immense problem of securing full production. 122 
Morrison went to say that there has been "a damaging succession of revelations of 
incapacity and inefficiency' in industry, and that, 
Capacity to produce efficiently an abundance of goods and services is the very 
foundation of all our plans and that capacity, owing to past neglect, is still lagging 
and cannot be made good by Acts of Parliament or by votes. It can only be made 
good by an all-out drive to make our country a modem, scientifically-minded, 
vigorous, industrial nation. 123 
Thus, while the ideal was for the worker to have a stake in raising productivity, the 
reality became a belief in the need for increased productivity for its own sake, and 
regardless of any benefit that might accrue in the short run to the worker. Of course, 
in the long run, it was felt that increased productivity would benefit all, resulting in a 
rising standard of living. 
The AACP worked because it combined exhortations to both sides of industry, to 
management and labour, though the practicalities of the way the trips and 
productivity reports were organised meant that it was labour that came in for most of 
the criticism. But, it also worked because it tied in with the government's own 
realisation of the need for increased productivity, a realisation that had been present 
since before the War. As Stirk argues, 
There was ... little new 
in the basic concerns of the Anglo-American Council. 
Increased production had been a priority during the War; in times of manpower 
122 Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1948, p. 130. 
123 Ibid., p. 13 1. 
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shortages that meant, in part, increased productivity. The same imperative was 
carried over into peacetime in the interests of economic recovery. 124 
Thus, the govenunent's support for the AACP, and even the TUC's positive 
involvement, are not so difficult to explain. The AACP reflected many of their own 
perceptions, in its general aim and in some of the specifics of its organisation and 
activities. For the TUC, the AACP was a joint management-labour initiative 
designed to improve the efficiency of the capitalist system in order to help 'socialist' 
reconstruction, without necessitating an overhaul of industrial relations. The AACP 
also focused on some particular issues that the TUC was keen on, for example the 
issues of simplification, standardization and specialization. These virtuous practices 
were achieved, the TUC publication Labour, noted, by collaboration between 
American firms. 125 Thus, 'For Socialists accustomed to looking for the incipient 
traits of the new social order in the old, the step from interfirm collaboration to 
Socialist planning was not necessarily a great one. ' 126 This was especially so given 
that the Labour government had come to power with no clear idea of what socialist 
planning really meant in practice. 
All those involved in the work of the AACP took on board the approach towards 
productivity held by their American counterparts, what Maier has called the 'politics 
of productivity'. This was the idea that it was possible to ameliorate social conflict, 
and by implication, class conflict, through the transition to a 'society of abundance' 
through increased production and productivity, which was presented as a 'problem of 
124 Stirk, 'Americanism and Anti-Americanism', p. 3 1. 
125 Labour, November 1949, pp. 500-2, London: TUC. 
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engineering, not politics'. 127 This was not just due to US influence, but to the 
conception of socialism held by the leadership of the Labour government, namely 
'that economic growth wouldprovide an automatic solution to the moral dilemma of 
a socialist party in an affluent society, that growth would give us equality without a 
fight, justice without tears. ' 128 There was, of course, a political agenda to this: by 
getting workers and employers to co-operate and moving beyond class conflict, it 
was felt that there would be less of a breeding ground for communist agitators. The 
way forward was based on the premise of worker co-operation in the productivity 
drive. On the British side of the AACP, the largest membership representation was 
for the TUC, and its General Secretary, Vincent Tewson, was made a Joint Secretary. 
On the US side there was less trade union representation, but Victor Reuther of the 
United Automobile Workers was made a Joint Secretary part way through the 
AACTs operations. This of course had an impact on how the working class in 
Britain and the US perceived the issue of production and productivity. Reuther 
described the AACP as a 'partnership' between management and labour in order 'to 
encourage a more rapid and uniforrn application ... of [American style) methods to 
increase productivity and speed up postwar recovery. ' 129 
126 Stirk, 'Americanism and Anti-Americanism', p. 3 1. 
127 Charles Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity- Foundations of American International Economic 
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128 David Owen, John Macintosh and David Marquand, quoted in Radhika Desai, Intellectuals and 
Socialism, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1994, p. 127, my italics. 
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Thus, many in leadership positions in the Labour Party, such as Attlee, Morrison, 
and Cripps, had already taken on board the need for scientific management and 
increased productivity, and this was not a policy objective imposed by the US. As 
Maier points out in a European context, 'Far from turning out to be an infinitely 
malleable society, Europe and its divisions forced the American politics of 
productivity in a clear centrist direction. ' 130 That the reality of the British 
productivity campaign from 1948 onwards did not involve addressing questions of 
the distribution of the gains from productivity, or workers' involvement in 
management decisions, was due to the government's priorities of limiting the scope 
of the demands of the labour movement, rather than the influence of the United 
States. That the AACP ended up focusing on the somewhat nebulous findings from 
the productivity trips, rather than on the specifics of issues such as standardization or 
productivity measurements, was largely due to the difficulties inherent in these 
projects. The AACP and the Marshall Plan tied in with the British Labour 
government's needs, and could, largely, be used to reinforce and complement their 
policies. Thus, while the AACP is evidence of the success of the US in exporting 
Fordism, scientific management and anti-communism to Britain, this success was 
due largely to the fact that the leadership of the labour movement was already in 
favour of it. As Stirk points out, 'In so far as Marshall Plan ideologues were 
promoting increased production and productivity they were knocking at an open door 
in the case of the British Labour movernent. ' 131 
130 Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity', p. 627. 
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The AACP became a model for similar organizations across Europe as part of the 
ECA's technical assistance programme. While there is debate over whether the 
AACP was a success in terms of helping to achieve increased physical productivity, 
it can be seen as an institutional success in terms of affecting attitudes and increasing 
the marginalisation of those on the left who railed against the productivity drive, and 
entrenching the hegemony of the centre-right of the labour movement. 
Conclusion 
One of the main achievements of the Marshall Plan was that it did help to transfer the 
6politics of productivity' to Britain. The AACP, with the TUC's involvement, was an 
important component of this. The AACP productivity team trips and subsequent 
published reports acted as a conduit for transferring American ideas of economic 
growth to Britain, and were one of the factors in a process of 'Americanisation'. 
132 
However, while the AACP was instnimental in shaping attitudes towards productivity 
in Britain, this was because it was to a large extent in line with a particular section of 
labour thinking, which saw socialism in terms of the more efficient organisation of the 
capitalist system. Thus, the AACP was successful in terms of helping to restructure the 
unions in Britain, and in furthering the marginalisation of those on the hard left who 
argued against the Council and the productivity drive, to establish the hegemony of the 
centre-right of the government and trade union leadership over the labour movement. 
"I Stirk, 'Americanism and Anti-Americanism', p. 32. 
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Conclusion 
This study has examined the impact of the Marshall Plan on the British Labour 
government and the trade union movement, and, more importantly, how they 
used the Marshall Plan to pursue their own aims. It has argued that the British 
government was able to 4 manage' relations with the US, in terms of limiting 
unwanted US influence, while restructuring relations with its domestic support 
base. In particular, the goverment and the leadership of the TUC used the 
Marshall Plan to realign the unions and establish their hegemony over the labour 
movement. In this way, the British government was able to play what Putnam has 
refeffed to as a two-level game, satisfying demands at both the national and 
international levels. The Marshall Plan provides evidence of how, as Putnam 
explains, 'central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international 
imperatives simultaneous y. 
Hegemony is a useful concept for understanding this process, for it can be 
applied to both relations between states and relations within states. It denotes 
leadership based on some form of consensus, based around a 'structure of values 
and understandings about the nature of order'. 2 One of the main conclusions from 
this study is that there were limits to the influence of US hegemony over Britain 
Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', Appendix 
in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds. ), Double-Edged Diplomacy. 
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due to the strength of British political actors. While the values of the Marshall 
Plan, such as anti-communism and the 'politics of productivity', were exported to 
Britain, this was advanced because the British Labour government and the trade 
union leadership were already espousing these values. 
The study has sought in particular to assess two types of accounts of the Marshall 
Plan. Firstly, the macro accounts written within the context of an international 
relations and international political economy framework, such as the work by 
Ikenberry, Cox and Van der piji. 3 Secondly the accounts of labour and economic 
historians such as Carew and Tomlinson. 4 While the former draw on theoretical 
assumptions to make substantive arguments, they tend to over-state the power of 
the US to rework the postwar order, and do not contain adequate empirical 
research with which to test their arguments. The latter, while containing detailed, 
micro-level research, do not make explicit their theoretical concerns or draw out 
substantive arguments. This study has built on the two approaches by locating its 
empirical research with reference to theories of International Relations. By 
drawing on arguments surrounding the establishment and the exercise of US 
hegemony through the Marshall Plan, the study has looked at the impact of the 
Marshall Plan on relations between and within states. It has treated the 
relationship between donor and recipient state as complex and uneven, and has 
t y, John Ikenberry 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony', Political Science Quar erl 
Vol. 104, No. 4,1989, pp. 375400; Robert Cox, Production, Power, and World Order. Social 
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sought to establish a view of the recipient state as an active and not a passive 
political agent, which was able to draw on the external conditions of US 
patronage and aid to pursue its own interests. It has shown that the Labour 
goverment was able to utilise a policy of what Bayart refers to as extraversion, 5 
whereby leading actors in a state mobilise resources from the external 
enviromnent to consolidate their own power in a process of political 
centralisation. In this way, they are pursuing their own agenda, rather than one set 
by the donor nation, an agenda that is defined by their location within the 
domestic arena. 
The study has also rejected arguments that state that the British Labour 
government was forced to change its policies because of the Marshall Plan and 
US hegemony. Instead it has shown that the Labour government used American 
pressure to persuade its own constituents of the value of its policies. This was at 
a time when there were expectations of wide-ranging change amongst the Labour 
Party's supporters in the trade unions, from workers control in the nationalised 
industries to a socialist foreign policy, and when the far left was well particularly 
well organised. The govenunent and trade union leaderships were able to 
restructure the unions and control those on the left in the short-term by launching 
an anti-communist campaign while removing communists from positions of 
authority in the unions. Furthermore, through its careful timing over the schism 
in the World Federation of Trades Unions and the establishment of an anti. 
communist, pro-Marshall Plan international trade union body, the British Trades 
Press, 199 1, pp. 40-59, and 'The Failure of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity% 
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Union Congress weakened the hard left's source of legitimate external support. 
Through the establishment of networks of pro-Marshall Plan organisations such 
as the European Recovery Programme Trade Union Advisory Committee (which 
became the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) and the Anglo- 
American Council on Productivity, the British trade union leadership was then 
able to delineate the parameters of debate and to assure the longer-term 
marginalisation of the far left through its control of trade union issues and 
organisations. Criticism of the Marshall Plan became equated with communism 
and treachery, while the communists lost the opportunity to publicise the 
conditions that were attached to the Marshall Plan by focusing on anti-American 
propaganda. 
That this policy was effective was due to the close relationship between the 
unions and the govenunent. This study has illustrated that as Middlemas, Hinton 
and Hyman have argued, 6 unions are central to the governing of the working 
class and the regulation of labour. It was not the case that the union leadership 
6caved in' to government demands, rather they shared the same vision of postwar 
Britain, based on full employment, high productivity, and acquiescent industrial 
relations, and because both 'feared the power of opposition from within its own 
organisation. 7 The Marshall Plan provided the opportunity of splitting 
communists from non-communists at a time when the opposition within the 
unions was strong. With its intrinsic stress on productivity, responsibility and 
5 J. F. Bayart, The State in Africa, London: Longmans, 1993, pp. 21-23. 
6 Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society, London: Andre Deutsch, 1979; James Hinton, 
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working in the national interest, the Marshall Plan could be used by the centre- 
right labour leadership to firmly establish its hegemony over the left at a time of 
radical change and expectations. In this way the trade union leadership acted, in a 
somewhat contradictory sense, as part of the governing structure, while 
maintaining that it represented the sectional interests of its members. The dangers 
of such a policy were not fully revealed for another two decades with the 
breakdown of the postwar social contract. 
Finally, this work has combined an examination of domestic and international 
relations. One of its main theoretical conclusions is that the study of each can be 
enhanced when put into the context of the other. Internationally, the Marshall 
Plan was to prove the litmus test of loyalty to the West, while domestically it 
gave the British government the opportunity to present communists and those 
who sympathised with them as taking orders from another country and trying to 
block recovery. In this way, the domestic fight against communists tallied with 
the growing suspicion of the Soviet Union, especially since the main grievance 
articulated by the left was over the Labour government's abandonment of a 
fisocialist' foreign policy. Once the far left had been marginalised, such criticism 
could be effectively ignored, which strengthened the position of the Labour 
government and trade union leaderships. 
I Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society, p. 2 1. 
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Methodological Appendix 
Introduction 
In this Appendix, I explore the choice of my thesis topic, and the implications 
that this had for my research. Secondly, I examine my choice of reading for the 
thesis. Thirdly, I shall turn to the research process itself, looking at some of the 
archive centres that I visite , an wI set about using archives. Fourthly, I 
address some of the methodological questions arising from my thesis topic and 
my research approach and methods. Lastly, I shall examine the final evolution of 
my research topic and hypotheses, which happened after I had done much of the 
actual research. 
1. Choice of Thesis Topic 
Initially, I had intended to write my thesis on the impact of the end of the Cold 
War on the international trade union movement. This topic had arisen in the 
course of discussions with other acadernics. Although I had little background 
knowledge of trade unions or the international union movement, I had always 
been interested in the Cold War, and felt this would be an exciting topic to 
research. However, when it CaMe to considering how I could sensibly write a 
PhD on such a large topic I found that I would face serious problems of gaining 
access to up-to-date information, given the limited time and resources available 
to doctorate students. This was rather disheartening. My supervisor suggested 
that I look at the beginning of the Cold War and the international trade union 
movement as the archives of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), which would be 
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one of my major sources of information, were held at the Modem Records Centre 
at Warwick. 
At first I was rather reluctant to pursue this course, but I started to read round the 
subject and again developed an interest. The topic seemed more manageable as I 
could get access to relevant archives. While going back in time meant that my 
research would not have the immediacy that I would have liked, it also meant that 
events would not be changing as I studied them, which I felt would be of benefit 
for a PhD topic. 
Thus I began investigating the origins of the Cold War and the international trade 
union movement, primarily the role of Britain in the setting up of the new trade 
union international, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), after the 
Second World War. The split of the World Federation of Trade Unions into 
communist and anti-communist camps in 1947 seemed to be of particular 
interest. However, the more I researched the topic, the more it seemed that the 
focus of my topic should in fact be the Marshall Plan. It became impossible for 
me to understand the reasons for the split of the VvTTU and the failure to create 
world trade union solidarity between East and West without understanding the 
impact that the Marshall Plan had on the politics of trade unions at this time. 
What seemed to me to be of special interest was the way the trade union 
leadership in Britain co-operated with the Labour goverment in a policy which 
they acknowledged could deepen divisions within trade unions in Britain and 
internationally between communists and non-communists. In this way my focus 
shifted from the creation and divisions of the trade union intemationals at this 
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time, to the effect that the Marshall Plan had on the politics of British trade 
unions, and the role that the unions played in the Marshall Plan apparatus. The 
title for my thesis became 'The Impact of the Marshall Plan on British Trade 
Unionism'. 
While much has been written on the Marshall Plan, very little places the trade 
unions at the centre of the focus. Existing work, with some notable exceptions, ' 
tends to take a diplomatic relations or macro-economic approach. Both these 
approaches focus on the activities of policy-making elite. The 'original' angle I 
wished to develop was to place trade unions at the centre, rather than on the 
periphery. Existing work that did contain information on trade unions also tended 
to look at elite groups, narnely the Trades Union Congress leadership. This 
resulted in the assumption that the bulk of trade unionists in Britain were passive 
and had no opinion other than that of the 'official' line set out by the TUC. I 
wanted to investigate what trade unionists at all levels thought about the Marshall 
Plan, and what has been called the 'politics of productivity, 2 to see to what extent 
criticism over the government's economic, industrial and foreign policy had been 
marginalised. I expected to find evidence which would support two hypotheses: 
firstly, that the Marshall Plan had had a large impact on British trade unions in 
that it had been the issue which caused the rift between communists and non- 
communists; and, secondly, that there had been considerable discontent over the 
Marshall Plan, but that the TUC had effectively used its power to marginalise this 
For example, see Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1987 
' Charles Maier, In Search ofStability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, Chapters 
3 and 5 
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discontent. Thus, I was using a deductive method, developing hypotheses and 
then setting out to test them against the archival evidence. 
These research hypotheses did prove to be problematic, and evolved into a 
different perspective after I had done the bulk of my research. However, as they 
were the ones which were utilized early on, I shall examine the implications of 
this choice of research topic, the secondary reading that I undertook and the 
research process itself before turning to an evaluation of my eventual focus, that 
of 'Manipulating Hegemony: British Trade Unions and the Marshall Plan. ' 
Implications of my choice of thesis topic 
My choice of topic had two main implications. Firstly, it determined what sort of 
primary research I could do. As the topic was historical in nature, it meant that 
the main source of information that I would be using was documentary evidence, 
based around the archives of the trade union movement, and, to a lesser Went, 
the Labour goverment and business groups. Using archives and studying 
historical documents was not something I had done before, my previous research 
experience having been based on studying aggregate and survey data. This was a 
little daunting, and I was not sure how I would respond to researching an area 
which to me at the time seemed vague and non-scientific'. As I gained in 
experience, I found that this was not as much of a problem as I had anticipated. 
The second implication of my choice of topic was that I found I no longer seemed 
to quite 'fit' into a Politics department. A number of people felt my topic was not 
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suitable for a politics student, being 'historical' and hence 'impressionistic' and 
of no practical value, and moreover it was about trade unions. 
On this first point, my research has convinced me that the study of politics should 
not be confined to the current decade. One of the interesting aspects of my 
research is the way that it has changed my understanding of current issues, and 
the way that parallels can be drawn with recent events. For instance, the extent to 
which the trade union movement in Britain should co-operate with a Labour 
government is a pertinent question today. Also, following the end of the Cold 
War, a Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe was widely discussed, which in turn 
opened up questions about the postwar period. Moreover, the 50th anniversary of 
the Marshall Plan in 1997 was quite timely in terms of generating interest in the 
topic more generally. 
Turning to the second point, that of studying trade unions, it is now clear to me 
that they are a legitimate topic of research for a student of Politics. Although they 
appear to have lost much of their influence in contemporary British politics, and 
might not be an academically 'profitable' topic, this does not mean that the 
labour movement can be written off or thought of as something not worthy of 
consideration. Certainly I have found that researchers who study similar topics to 
myself tend to be in economic history, contemporary history or industrial 
relations departments. Nevertheless, I feel I have benefited from having contacts 
with people outside my own department, and in many ways this is a strength 
rather than a weakness. It does mean that it can be difficult to know where to be 
placed within the discipline of Politics, but I have become comfortable with a 
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trans-disciplinary approach to my work so that this is no longer a major cause for 
concem. 
2. Secondary Reading 
Another implication of my choice of topic was that as it covered so many areas, 
found that I needed to read widely. Initially, my reading was on the Marshall Plan 
and on trade unions in the postwar period, in particular the international trade 
union movement. Work I found of particular benefit was that of Burnham and 
Milward, and Carew and Weiler. 3 However, as time progressed so did my interest 
in background literature and academic debate. While the main source of literature 
drew remained that on the Marshall Plan itself, I became interested in how my 
work fitted in with that of economic historians such Broadberry and Crafts, in 
particular over the debate on postwar productivity! Another direction my interest 
took me in was on international political economy reading on postwar hegemony, 
with the work of people such as Robert Cox, John Ikenberry, and Charles Maicr. 5 
This influenced the choice of topics covered in the introductory chapter. While 
the breadth of reading necessary to cover all these fields proved frustrating, as 
3 Peter Burnham, The Political Economy ofPostwar Reconstruction, London: Macmillan, 1990; 
Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, London: Methuen, 1984, 
Anthony Carew, Labour Under the Marshall Plan; Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold 
War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. 
4 For example, S. N. Broadberry and N. F. R. Crafts, Explaining Anglo-American Productivity 
Differences in the Mid-Twentieth Century'. Bulletin ofthe Oxford Institute OfEconomics and 
statistics, 1990, Vol. 52, No. 4; 'British Economic Policy and Industrial Performance in the Early 
Post-War Period', Business History, Vol. 38, No. 4,1996, pp. 65-9 1; Crafts, '"You've Never Had it 
so Good? ": British Economic Policy and Performance, 1945-60', in B. Eichengreen (ed. ), 
Europe's Postwar Recovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 246-270. 
5 Robert Cox, 'Labor and Hegemony, International Organization, Vol. 3 1, No. 3,1977, pp. 385. 
424; Production, Power and World Order, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987; John 
Ikenberry 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 104, 
No. 4,1989, pp. 375400; Charles Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American 
International Economic Policy after World War Il', International Organization, Vol. Vol-3 1, 
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there was always so much that I did not yet know, it also meant that it was easier 
to maintain impetus and interest in the thesis as it was constantly evolving. As 
time went on it also became clearer to me where this work fitted into various 
debates and fields. Thus, my work became a synthesis of literature from the fields 
of international political economy, international relations, contemporary and 
labour history. 
3. Doing the Research 
I spent the first twolernis of my PhD research reading secondary sources. Ilis 
was necessary to give me a 'feel' for my topic, as I had hardly any background 
knowledge about trade unions, the international trade union movement, the early 
postwar period or the Marshall Plan. 
In the course of the first year I wrote three descriptive pieces for my supervisor 
before I produced a serious attempt to delineate my precise focus. This was 
largely because of teaching commitments and because my topic had shifted so 
much in focus, but also partly because I lacked the confidence to commit myself 
to explaining what my thesis was about, and it took a while for me to have 
substantive ideas about how to interpret my research. By the summer of the first 
year I had produced a literature review that I was fairly happy with in which I set 
out my main theme and how this differed from other people's work. This 
literature review actually proved invaluable for reminding myself of what I was 
No. 4,1977, pp. 607-633, and 'Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth. 
Century Western Europe', American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 1,198 1, pp. 327-367. 
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supposed to be doing every time I had been away from the research for a while in 
my second year and felt that my topic was drifting. 
Archival work 
My primary research began about ten months into the PhD. This was because my 
focus had shifted so much that I did not feel prepared to work through archival 
holdings until I had a clear idea of what I was doing. Most of the archival work I 
carried out was on the Trades Union Congress (TUC) archive at the Modem 
Records Centre at the University of Warwick. As I was based at Warwick for the 
first two years of my PhD, it was fairly easy for me to work there whenever I had 
time. Initially, I was reluctant to use the Modem Records Centre, finding the 
whole idea of doing archival research a little off-putting. However, once I had 
grown used to the place and could find my way round their cataloguing system I 
found that I actually enjoyed it. During the summer of my first year of study I 
visited the Modem Records Centre intermittently to ferret around in the files. By 
the following spring I was spending as much time as possible there, and feeling 
that I was making solid progress finding relevant information. A work pattern 
emerged such that I would spend all my time in the archives for about a fortnight, 
reach saturation point, and then have a week away from them. The amount of 
information I gathered from the archives varied. Sometimes I would use files that 
were a goldmine of information, and sometimes I would spend what seemed an 
eternity working through files that turned out to have nothing much of interest. 
This, I have since realised, is typical of archival analysis. 
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How I used the archives 
Before ordering files I would spend a considerable amount of time looking 
though indexes and guides to see which files might be of interest. Some of my 
references came from secondary accounts I had read, some from conversations 
with archivists, and some from my investigations into the archive guides. Once I 
had ordered a file I developed a process of having a quick look at the file as a 
whole, and then writing down all the required references for it along with a two 
sentence description of what it contained. After that I would work through the 
file, sometimes fairly quickly, but often very meticulously, depending on how 
relevant I felt the file to be. This was a very time-consuming process, and is also 
quite tiring. Sometimes I would order a file which would turn out to be huge, in 
which case I could feel a little overwhelmed, and sometimes a file would consist 
of no more than three pages. One problem I found was that often the files that I 
had assumed would be particularly relevant were not so, whereas others I just 
happened to look at on the off-chance were very valuable. This would suggest 
that there were other files I did not look at which may have contained useful 
infonnation. It was not always possible to tell whether the infonnation I sought 
had ever existed, had been shredded, or whether it was kept elsewhere. Also, it 
was not always obvious that a document was important until I had looked at other 
files, which meant that to start with I would often have to return to files I had 
already looked at to reconsider their significance. In the case of TUC files in 
particular, it was often necessary to work on several files at once as they 
contained different types of documents relating to the same issue or event, and 
did not make sense in isolation from one another. I found that the more archival 
work I did the easier the process became. Whilst at first I found it difficult to 
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know what to look for, or how to assess the importance of documents, this 
improved with experience. 
The archive sources I used 
The main archive repository I consulted was the Trades Union Congress archive 
at the Modem Records Centre. This contained information on TUC activities 
relating to the Marshall Plan, on its relationship with unions in Britain, and its 
relationship with other national union centres and the organs of the international 
trade union movement. Two of the main topics of interest were the involvement 
of the TUC in the Anglo-American Council on Productivity, and the European 
Recovery Trade Union Advisory Committee. Other sources that I used at the 
Modem Records Centre included the files of the Federation of British Industries 
(the predecessor to the Confederation of British Industries), the files of individual 
trade unions, especially engineering, of local Trades Councils, and of individuals 
who had been prominent in the union movement. I also looked at items such at 
the Trades Union Annual Congress Reports to see what resolution had been put 
forward at Congress, and also at journals and papers relating to the union 
movement. The types of documents that I consulted included minutes of 
meetings, internal memos, letters, published and unpublished reports, conference 
resolutions, pamphlets, and newspaper and j ournal articles. 
Other archival sources included the TUC library at the TUC headquarters in 
London. This did not contain much in the way of official records, but did have 
copies of relevant published pamphlets, and importantly, the Productivity Reports 
of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity. I consulted the records of the 
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Labour Party and the Communist Party held at the National Museum of Labour 
History in Manchester, official documents at the Public Record Office in Kew, 
and holdings of various individuals hcld at the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science (at the LSE). I received funding from the Leeds Politics 
department for a trip to consult archives at the International Institute of Social 
History in Amsterdam. This turned out to be a wonderful place to work, but I 
found that the documents I consulted there on the international trade union 
movement were duplicates of items already covered at the TUC archive at the 
Modem Records Centre. While this was disappointing, it was also reassuring, 
implying I had covered my sources thoroughly. 
I found a number of differences between the various archive centres that I used. 
Most were very pleasant places to work, in particular the Modem Records Centre 
and the International Institute of Social History, but my experiences did vary. 
Some, especially the Public Record Office, have very strict rules and regulations 
about using documents, whereas others have a more relaxed approach. One of the 
main problems I found was that of photocopying documents which were of 
particular interest to me: strict copyright rules have to be complied with and it 
tends to be an expensive and time-consuming process at archive centres. Further 
problems arise the way in which the files are indexed. Some archival centres have 
very easy to use guides, others are often rather vague, cataloguing large groups of 
files under one heading. The main set of archives that I needed to consult in 
Amsterdam were in the process of being catalogued, and at one archive centre I 
used some groups of documents had no referencing system. This means that the 
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process of working out which files are likely to be of interest and recording 
correct reference numbers for them can be extremely convoluted and frustrating. 
4. Methodological Questions 
At the beginning of my research I felt rather isolated in a Politics department 
studying a historical topic. I could not consult new data sets that I could have 
gained through survey analysis (of which I had a little experience), with the 
consequent statistical analysis that I could have used to impress myself and other 
people. Instead I was re-evaluating and re-interpreting existing information from 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. I was anxious to avoid using an ad hoc historical 
descriptive narrative, and to take a more rigorous approach in which I would 
explain the significance of events. The best way of describing my approach is as 
a 'narrative-analysis-interpretation structure', that is, I was 'telling a story, trying 
to develop a reasonable explanation for the observed phenomena in the story, and 
then discussing whether that explanation supports or diverges from previous 
explanations, and whether it is generalizable to other cases. 61 found that I was 
coming up with hypotheses that I was trying to test: I was looking at past events, 
but trying to do so with the analytical skills I had learnt from my study of 
Politics. This was actually very difficult, as I found it much easier and less 
intellectually demanding just to tell a story or describe events rather than to 
analyse and to lay out hypotheses that could be tested. Rather to my surprise I 
found that this approach was being recommended when doing historical research 
in education: 
6 Email from Tom Nichols, to the H-Diplo email list, re 'What Makes Good History? ', 9 
November 199 1. 
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A fact that many students fail to realize is that historical research usually 
requires the setting up of specific, testable hypotheses. Without such 
hypotheses, historical research often becomes little more than an aimless 
gathering of facts. In searching the materials that make up the source of 
historical research data, unless the student's attention is aimed at information 
relating to specific questions or concerned with specific hypotheses, [s]he has 
little chance of extracting a body of data from the available documents that 
can be synthesized to provide new knowledge or new understanding of the 
topic studied. 7 
Having completed a considerable amount of secondary reading and thinking 
before I launched myself into the archival work, I found that I was working with 
a set of hypotheses and ideas, whether I was always fully aware of them or not. I 
found it helpful to try to keep these in mind when looking through files, as it was 
very easy to just note down a lot of information without really thinking where it 
fitted into the wider picture of my research. When I approached files because I 
thought they might possibly be interesting but was not sure why, and did not stop 
to think about why the information might be relevant or useful, I often felt that I 
had been wasting time. I found the work most rewarding when I had a focus, 
made a conscious effort to analyse the information as I went along, and tried to 
relate it to the broader picture of my research as a whole. 
one aspect of using documents that did concern me, especially at the beginning, 
was whether of not I was being 'objective' in my research. The only primary 
research I had carried out before I started the PhD was of a quantitative, not a 
qualitative nature, and I was concerned that my findings would be too much 
based upon interpretation. Mapping out my ideas before consulting the files 
7 Walter R. Borg, Educational Research: An Introduction, London: Longmans, 1963, pp. 189. 
190 
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helped in this respect. I do not feel that this biased my work, as I constantly 
reviewed my ideas and hypotheses is the light of information that I gained as I 
proceeded with my research. Furthermore, without delineating my own ideas and 
concerns before approaching the archives it would have been very easy to simply 
assimilate the theories of the academic accounts I had been reading in my study 
of secondary work. 
Another problem arose over my intention to gain as much material as possible 
about what the rank and file of the trade union movement had felt about the 
Marshall Plan, and to trace the dissent voiced over the Marshall Plan. I was 
attempting to combine the study of 'high politics', of the Labour Party and trade 
union elite, with that of the social history of the working class. However, as 
Middlemas puts it, 'Between the two lies a gulf both in method and 
understanding. '8 Firstly, the vary nature of archives means that they tend to be 
kept be elite groups in society, so discontent was not so likely to bc found evcn 
when it had occurred. Secondly, the types of records kept by the two groups vary 
enormously. While there was a massive amount of information on the Marshall 
Plan, and the government's economic and foreign policy in the TUC archive. the 
records of actual trade unions tended to focus on local issues, such as conditions 
at work, rather than on goverment policy or the TUC's activities in the 
international arena. Another problem was that as I was trying to analyse the 
documents from a political science viewpoint, I was constantly on the look-out 
for examples of the exercise of power, which involved tracking down instances 
of discontent. This was particularly difficult, for of course power can be 
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exercised without the recipients being aware of it. For this reason, I found that 
my desire to focus on what the rank and file felt could not be realistically met. 
Hence, I found that my work reflected the views and interests of those in 
positions of leadership in the trade union movement. This led me to change my 
focus slightly: instead of basing my hypotheses over the extent of the discontent 
over the Marshall Plan, I looked at the ways that the TUC and the Labour 
government had operated to keep potential discontent out of the political arena. 
5. The Final Evolution of my Research Topic and Hypotheses 
As mentioned above, I found that my desire to track the degree of discontent over 
the Marshall Plan was unrealistic given the nature of the resources I was using. I 
also found that my whole standpoint on the impact of the Marshall Plan on 
British trade unionism meant that I was placing trade unions in a passive role, 
being 'impacted upon' rather than being pro-active themselves. I became 
increasingly unhappy about this aspect of my research. The infortnation that arose 
from my archival research did not present such a picture. I also found that this 
approach implied that the United States had used their position to influence not 
just British trade unions but the Labour government as well. This also did not tic 
in with the viewpoint I was formulating from my archival research or from my 
secondary reading. While I had not necessarily found that my original hypotheses 
were wrong, they did not seem to be the most interesting or most pertinent in the 
light of my research. 
8 Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society, London: Andre Deutsch, 1979, p. 12. 
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As the third year of my thesis work progressed, I came increasingly to the 
conclusion that I wanted to relate my work to the literature about American 
hegemony in the postwar era, rather than focusing purely on internal events in 
Britain. This interest in international relations, and a rethinking of my research 
hypotheses, led me to the conclusion that my research findings had changed 
shape again. Thus, I developed my research hypotheses in a different formulation, 
which involved relating them back to the concept of not only power, but 
hegemony. Firstly, I was interested in the debate over whether the Untied States 
had been able to use their hegemony, specifically through the Marshall Plan, to 
force the Labour government to act in ways it would not otherwise have done. 
Secondly, I was interested in the way that the Marshall Plan had been used by the 
TUC and the Labour government to establish their hegemony over organiscd 
labour, which involved shaping the political agenda to prevent discontent arising 
in the first place. This led to the evolution of my final research hypotheses. The 
first, which arose largely from the secondary reading that I had done, and is to a 
certain extent a pre-requisite for my other main research hypothesis, was that the 
British government, while welcoming the stability that US hegemony providcd, 
was largely able to resist unwanted American influence exerted through the 
Marshall Plan. The second, which arose from my primary research, and is more 
central to the thesis than the first, is that the centre-right of the I. -abour 
government and the leadership of the Trades Union Congress, through the nature 
of their close relationship, were successftil in manipulating the whole issue of the 
Marshall Plan to restructure internal relations within Britain and establish their 
hegemony over the labour movement. 
274 
Conclusions 
Overall, I found the research for my PhD far more enjoyable than I had at first 
anticipated. Largely this was due to my growing confidence over my written 
work and my ability to evaluate information from primary and secondary sources. 
While the changing nature of my research topic and hypotheses did prove 
problematic in that I had to get to grips with a greater breadth of arguments and 
literature, this too provided added stimulus to the research project in that I felt 
that my findings were evolving and improving over time. 
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